World Politiks

Valid Reasons for the U.S. to Be, or Not to Be, Part of a Multi-National Conflict Management Force

2006-08-01T14:04:00.000Z

The United States has been in an interesting position within the international community for the last two decades. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became the sole global superpower and ushered in a new, unipolar era. This unprecedented environment continues to present the US with an interesting problem; how does it deal with the notion of multilateralism, especially when dealing with conflict management?
Leading the Way?

An interesting dilemma within the conundrum of multilateral participation on the part of the US is whether the US is behind or ahead of the curve with regards to multilateralism. Depending on perspective, an argument could potentially be made for each.

Take the case of Kosovo. The US predominantly made up the NATO force that conducted ten weeks and over 38,000 sorties [1] and provided 650 of the 927 NATO aircraft.[2] This operation did not have United Nation’s support, primarily due to the belief that Russia would veto any such action within the UN Security Council. Therefore, through NATO, the US pushed for the use of military strikes to coerce Bosnian actions with regards to the Albanian population in the Kosovo province. Following the controversial conflict, the UNSC passed resolution 1244, authorizing “relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo,”[3] thus providing a UN mandate for the NATO Kosovo Forces (KFOR).

70% of the air forces used to conduct Operation Allied Force were American, and while all NATO members participated in the operation to some degree, this was a US campaign attempting to manage the Kosovo conflict. One could easily argue that it was US action that fostered NATO and UN participation since these regional and international institutions followed the US’s lead in the conflict. However, the argument could also be made that the US did not fully engage the UN completely and used NATO as a cover of multilateralism while really acting independently. So was the Kosovo conflict a case of the US elevating itself to international interaction or degrading itself so as to conform to international pressure?
Who Says?

Consider further that this highlights another relevant question; how does international law fit into the equation? Russia and China both played prominent roles in preventing the Kosovo question from being fully addressed within the UN Security Council.[4] Because of the structure of the UNSC, this opposition effectively ceased further action on the issue on the part of the council. As a result, the US bypassed the Security Council and chose to form a coalition of its own making, in this case through the regional security organization NATO. But this is technically in violation to international law and is one of the predominant contentious issues that question’s the legitimacy of the operation.

Fast forward to the development of the Iraq War in 2003 and it is a case of déjà vu. The US and the United Kingdom pursued within the UNSC a resolution geared towards forcing the Saddam Hussein regime to abandon its Weapons of Mass Destruction programs. Opposition to resolution enforcement was led by the French, and again due to the structure of the UNSC, the issue was at an impasse and the US therefore bypassed the Security Council and developed a coalition of its own making.

The structure of the UN and the composition of the UNSC have coalesced into what could arguably be called a fatal flaw in the system. Because the UN is the only recognized comprehensive international security organization that is authorized to address any interstate crisis, it is in the unique and solitary position of managing conflicts. Yet because of the veto powers of the permanent members of the UNSC, geo-politics and state interests greatly impact the ability of the council to address global crisis.

In addition to the examples of Kosovo and Iraq, the UNSC was relatively ineffective during the Cold War as the US, UK and France stood on the opposite side of the Soviet Union and China. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, and with the rise of Chinese influence, coupled with the geo-political ambitions of France, the UNSC has become an extremely volatile and unpredictable environment. So as the US addresses conflict management and its decision to incorporate other international actors, it must understand the dynamics and politics of the UNSC.

All of this impacts US policy as the state contemplates unilateral or multilateral action. A current example of this is the situation in Darfur, Sudan. The US is calling for international action, going so far as to call the violence in Darfur genocide. However, the West has been tenuous at best as it examines the situation. Currently about 7,000 African Union troops are operating in Darfur under a very limited mandate,[5] with most observers calling this force woefully inadequate to deal with the crisis. Moves to incorporate UN troops have received intense pushback from the Sudanese government, which according to some is complicit with the violence. To further complicate the issue is the fact that Sudan is the largest foreign oil project for China, who also happens to be the largest weapons supplier to the Sudanese government.[6] So the dilemma for the US, as well as the rest of the international community, is how to address the issue through the UNSC and in the face of China’s veto. This dilemma is replicated with the Iranian nuclear crisis as Iran recently signed a $70 Billion dollar oil deal with China.[7] Because of China’s growing thirst for oil and its heavy investment in these troubled locations, China simply will not allow Sudan or Iran to be impacted by UN sanctions, which would effectively eliminate China’s investments and restrict its access to these energy sources. This presents the international community and the US in particular, with two more crises that may not be able to be addressed by the one institution that was designed to deal with them.
Hard or Soft?

The bottom line with regards to the UN is that it is plagued with conflicts of interest. These conflicts of interests extend to every nation within the organization, but are most apparent and felt in the permanent five members of the UNSC. Therefore the interaction of the UN and the UNSC specifically, will always be limited, as it will be forced to address conflicts that do not garner direct and opposing views on the part of the permanent five members of the UNSC.

So when the US examines policy options with regards to conflict management, how should it decide on who, if any, to incorporate into the process? This decision should be largely based and driven by effects. Once the effects desired have been established, the state can then decide on what conditions then lead to these effect-objectives. After recognizing the desired conditions necessary, the US must then decide on the actions needed to create those conditions. Those actions will either be based on America’s hard or soft power. It will be that determination that will largely dictate whether the US should pursue unilateral or multilateral avenues.

The US boasts the worlds most powerful military, advanced and capable beyond the dreams of most worlds leaders. It is also home to the most power economy in the world. This constitutes considerable hard power and provides the US with many options for achieving its policies. The US is also known as the leader of the free world and as an icon of liberties, freedoms and opportunity. It is these qualities that allows the US to convince or persuades a foreign state that our goals should be their goals. This is soft power and it is not dependent on the capabilities of the state but on the foreign perception of the state.[8]

It is this reality, perception versus capability, that drives the paradigm needed to develop effective policy towards a conflict. Hard power versus Soft power, which can be focused as unilateral versus multilateral. Hard power depends on military and economic capabilities and is intended to coerce another state towards a certain action through either force or treasure. Soft power on the other hand is dependent on the intangible of perception, particularly that of the people. So the US could use the military to coerce a state to hold elections or its own government could serve as an example to the people of that state who then force their own government to hold elections. Both achieve the desired action of elections, but it is soft power that properly addressed the required conditions needed for the elections to occur.
Conclusions…

Within the preamble of the 2006 National Security Strategy, President Bush states that US national security strategy is founded on two pillars. “The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity,”[9] all primary elements of Soft power. The second pillar is, “confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.”[10] This second pillar of confrontation revolves around tangibles or elements of Hard power. The significance of Soft power as the first pillar shows a conscious effort by the US administration to at least theoretically constrain its enormous economic and military advantages while soliciting global buy-in towards the US position with regards to a conflict.

So when does multilateral conflict management work for the US? For one, when the conflict is controversial. If the legitimacy of the US position is in question, then US Soft power is under threat. Therefore an effort needs to be made to manage the conflict with as much of a concerted effort and with as many allies as possible so as to reinforce legitimacy. This was seen with regards to the Kosovo conflict and the incorporation of NATO. Secondly, conflicts that are dependent on reconstruction and reconciliation typically require multilateralism. This has been a shortfall for the US with regards to the current Iraq conflict. While the US was more than capable of dealing with the invasion, and it did so quite effectively, it has not been as successful with the reconstruction portion of the mission. This lack of success is due partially to the lack of legitimacy the US has in Iraq as well as the nature of the reconstruction mission itself. Finally, the US should search for a multilateral approach when the nature of the mission is specialized to a point that the US is not fully up to the task itself. While the US is improving, an example of this is peacekeeping operations; an operation the US has been slow in accepting and performing. All of this is of course under the umbrella of international legality, which if is lacking will inherently complicate the ability to garner multilateral support anyway.

As the second pillar of the 2006 NSS states, the US will continue to lead the way in addressing global conflicts but it highlights that, “history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs.”[11] The obvious implication in this is that unilateral US action is not a snub towards multilateralism but rather a drive to force multilateral participation. Kosovo again serves as a good example of this.

Of course many tangible reasons exist to incorporate multilateral action, to include the conflict cost-sharing factor and increased troop deployment numbers; and they can be serious contributions to a conflict. For instance in the 1991 Gulf War, the US had committed over 500,000 troops along with about 160,000 coalition allies who made up around 24% of the UN force. But the conflict only cost the US about $7 Billion rather than the roughly $62 Billions dollar cost of the conflict.[12] So the contributions of states in treasure to a conflict can be very important.

The US, as the most powerful state in the world is in the unique position of having its foreign policy, especially its management of conflicts, examined and criticized by the global community. Under this scrutiny, the US must ensure that its Hard power is used precisely and rarely while strengthening and projecting its Soft power as broadly and often as possible. By using this approach to conflict management, the US maximizes its ability to leverage force or goodwill as appropriate. There are many valid reasons for the U.S. to be, or not to be, a part of a multilateral conflict management force, but the determining factor for that participation must be determined by what the US hopes to effect and how they intend to do it.

[1] Kosovo War. The NATO Bombing Campaign. Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War#Criticism_of_the_Case_for_War.
[2] Operation Allied Force. http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/.
[3] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Article 7. 10Jun1999. 4May2006. http://www.un.int/usa/sres1244.htm.
[4] Nye, Joseph S., Jr., “Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism: America Can’t Go It Alone”. International Herald Tribune. 13Jun2002. 2May2006. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/us/2002/0613uni.htm.
[5] Q&A: Sudan's Darfur Conflict. BBC News. 5May2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3496731.stm.
[6] Goodman, Peter S. “China Invests Heavily In Sudan's Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on Villagers”. The Washington Post. 23Dec2004. 5May2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power”. International Herald Tribune. 10Jan2003. 4May2006. http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/nye_soft_power_iht_011003.htm.
[9] Bush, George W., Preamble. The National Security Strategy of the United States. Mar2006. 5May2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Horan, Fred. “How much did the Gulf War cost the US”. Information taken from Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, The Final Report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense; April 1992; Appendix P. Cornell University. 20May1997. 6May2006. http://people.psych.cornell.edu/~fhoran/gulf/GW_cost/GW_payments.html.

Multinational Conflict Management: Does the Concept Conflict with Sovereignty?

2006-08-01T14:00:00.000Z

Sovereignty is classically and generally defined as, “supreme authority within a territory,”[1] and basically revolves around the notion that no entity supercedes the legal authority of the state. This definition has described the role of the state as the sovereign since the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the 30 Years War in 1648.[2] But with the development of supranational institutions, this definition of sovereignty has changed slightly to reflect, “the legal principle that no authority is above the state to establish or enforce rules about foreign or domestic conduct.”[3] However, with the expansion of supranational institutions and/or multinational coalitions, the conduct of state domestic policy is becoming ever more international. This development begs the question: does multinational conflict management conflict with the concept of sovereignty?

An obvious element of the question resides within the newer developments of sovereignty itself. As states concede certain provisions or accept a limited amount of oversight into their domestic policies, the idea of conflict or violation diminishes. So the acceptance of supranational supervision does not conflict with state sovereignty, provided the parameters of supervision include domestic policy. The United Nations is the world’s premier supranational institution, if for no other reason because of its size. The UN is the only institution with the mandate of maintaining global peace that can boast total global membership. But does the UN have the mandate to manage domestic peace?

The purpose of the UN per it’s Charter is, “to maintain international peace and security… take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace…[suppress] acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace…”[4] However, the charter states that, “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”[5] So clearly there is a limitation in the authority bestowed on the UN by member states. Per the charter, the UN does not posses a mandate for the enforcement of peace within state domestic policy. But what about regional organizations?

Second only to the UN in global stature is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. The organization, established to counter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, has been the preeminent regional security institution since the Second World War. But institutions, even ones such as NATO, are constrained in what they can and cannot do with regards to peace and security. The UN Charter states that, “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”[6] Moreover, the UN Charter goes on to explain that these regional institutions can be used, “where appropriate… such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.”[7] However, the charter specifically comments that, “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”[8] Since regional institutions require UN Security Council approval, and since the UN does not posses a mandate for interfering in state domestic policies, it is not justified for regional organizations or actors to interfere with state domestic policy.

But does this answer the question of conflict between the concept of sovereignty and multinational conflict management? The nature of the conflict is very important, especially with regards to the parties of the conflict. Is the nature of the conflict intra-state or inter-state? If the crisis meets the criteria of international conflict, then supranational institutions and regional collective security organizations are justified in their actions. But what happens with regards to intra-state conflict?

It is important to recognize that the norms of sovereignty- such as nonintervention, self-determination or sovereign equality- are “morally ambiguous” and can be judged moral or immoral based on perspective, period or place.[9] The relative norms of sovereignty contradict any moral justifications of its violation. Couple that with the lack of any legal provisions authorizing sovereignty’s breach and a conflict between the concepts of sovereignty and multilateral conflict management becomes more apparent.

So the precepts surrounding multilateral conflict management permit international conflicts to be addressed, but greatly constrain intervention with regards to intrastate crisis. Therefore within the classical and technical perceptions of multilateral conflict management, it is difficult to justify intrastate intervention. However, with the expansion of global interconnectedness, it is virtually impossible to have intrastate conflicts not impact their neighbors and thus transform into interstate conflicts.

This was the line of thought used by NATO to intervene in Kosovo. They asserted that, “NATO and the international community have a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo, inter alia because of their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern to the Alliance.”[10] Supporters of their intervention contend that the refugee issues, specifically that involving the Albanians, were solved and that political stability was reinstalled in the region. Opponents disagree and claim that the Albanian refugees were simply replaced by different ethnic groups and that the region is still unstable with violence and crime still prevalent.

What is clear is that the intervention of NATO lead to the removal of Slobodan Milošević’s regime and expedited his standing trial for war crimes. What is not clear is whether or not NATO had the legal justification for such action. A Canadian law professor by the name of Michael Mandel filed a formal complaint to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in which he charged the NATO leadership with war crimes.[11] However, the tribunal rejected this complaint because they felt they had no jurisdiction over NATO, so the issue of NATO’s legitimacy in acting against Kosovo is likely to never be formally decided.[12]
What is clear is that multinational conflict management is directly applicable to international crisis, what is not so clear is the applicability of multinational conflict management to intrastate conflict. In a technical or classical sense, the concept of sovereignty does conflict with multinational conflict management directed towards intrastate conflict, but if the attitude associated with the NATO intervention is indicative of future international perspectives, then the use of multinational conflict management and intervention will continue to exist.

[1] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/#1.
[2] The Avalon Project. The Treaty of Westphalia. Yale Law School. April 15, 2006. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm.
[3] Kegley, Charles W., Jr., Gregory A. Raymond. From War to Peace: Fateful Decisions in International Politics. Bedford/St. Martin’s. Boston. 2002. Pg. 280.
[4] United Nations Charter. Article 1:1. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[5] Ibid. Article 2:7. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[6] Ibid. Article 52:1. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[7] Ibid. Article 53:1. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[8] Ibid. Article 53:1. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[9] Acharya, Amitav. “Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics”. Institute of Defense and Security Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Singapore. May 2005. Apr 2006. Pg. 3. http://www.ntu.edu.sg/IDSS/publications/WorkingPapers/wp78.pdf.
[10] Council statement on the situation in Kosovo. NATO Press Release (98) 29. 5 Mar. 1998. Apr 2006. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-029e.htm.
[11] Formal complaint to the ICTFY stating NATO War Crimes. Apr 2006. http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/icty.htm.
[12] A summary of the legitimacy of the NATO intervention in Kosovo is laid out in Wikipedia, however, as with anything in Wikipedia the information must be vetted.

2006-03-10T22:35:00.001Z

Combating Terrorism Through Conflict Resolution

By B.E.N.
10 March 2006

Introduction…
Following the events of September 11, 2001, a major geo-political shift occurred, thrusting the threats of terrorism to the forefront of the international agenda. While terrorism is not a new tactic, it took the magnitude of the New York and Washington, D.C. attacks to bring to bear the full power and attention of the United States, and like the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, awake a sleeping giant.

Since 9/11 the US has focused on the notion of counter-terrorism, defined by Paul de Armond as, “essentially a defensive military strategy,” which, “consists of gathering intelligence, maintaining operational security, and applying force to capture or kill opponents.”[1] He continues, “Counter-terrorism is a strategy of repression or suppression [whose] aim is not to eliminate root causes or eliminate terrorism, but only to ‘bring the situation under control.’”[2]

So the strategy of counter-terrorism is short-term in nature and intended to mitigate the effectiveness and frequency of terrorist acts themselves. This has been the primary focus of the international community in general and specifically that of the United States for the last four and a half years. The notion of a long term strategy to deal with terrorism exists in a familiar international process known as conflict resolution. Conflict resolution provides a plethora of tools that not only deal with the symptoms of terrorism, but the root causes as well. It is these tools, within the process of conflict resolution, that allow a long-term, non-kinetic strategy of anti-terror to be developed, effectively combating terrorism.

The Framework…
In order to effectively devise a means for developing a long-term, strategic focus for combating terrorism through conflict resolution, it is necessary to form a policy framework. This can be applied through a four dimensional perspective that focuses on prevention, persuasion, denial and coordination.[3]

The first dimension of prevention centers itself around the general notion of properly addressing legitimate grievances, essentially reducing the disposition of disgruntled parties to use terrorism as a viable political tactic. This notion of prevention revolves around removing the political oxygen used by terrorist organizations to mobilize popular support and provide justification for terrorist events. It can be effective in addressing both root causes as well as the enablers to terrorism.

The importance of the preventive dimension is that it can be addressed through non-kinetic means and prevent a violent facet to the conflict. This dimension is the most effective and opportune moment for instituting structural change geared towards democratic transformation in the troubled state. This democratic transition requires an institutional and cultural attitude that is nurtured and embraced by both the state as well as the opposition groups. This transformation must address the economic conditions within the state so as to provide enfranchisement by all of the parties involved, effectively removing or mitigating the symptoms of under-development, such as poverty, which can be an enabling condition for terrorism.

The economic condition of the state is also important in that it impacts the ability of the state to develop and maintain the infrastructure necessary to effectively implement the democratic process. Moreover, it allows for a broader development program to include and incorporate minority and opposition parties, ensuring a more expansive and equal distribution of funds within the state.

In conjunction with the economic condition, the culture and mindset within the state and opposition, especially within the support constituency used by both, must be open to the notion and idea of democracy and resolution. This serves to support the first dimension of prevention as well as lay the ground work for the second dimension of persuasion.

Persuasion is intended to delegitimize and discredit terrorism and impact the policies and decisions of terrorist leaders. It also serves to reduce the support base for terrorist groups by again removing the political oxygen they use to muster logistical and financial support. This constitutes the effective implementation of the carrot and stick approach. When dealing with terrorism, this entails balancing counter-terrorism operations against political concessions and enfranchisement. For the diasporas and domestic support communities, the goal is to convincingly show non-violent options as the best course towards political accommodation. Jointly and when effectively employed, they provide a political environment non-conducive to violence and accommodating to political incorporation.

This political environment further denies the capability of terrorist groups to operate and is expanded further within a separate and unique third dimension of denial. The core consideration for properly employing denial is through a complementary process utilizing effective counter-terrorism tactics while maintaining certain inalienable freedoms. Denial is the quintessential dimension for counter-terrorism to operate. It serves to harden as many potential targets as possible, interrupt terrorist financial and logistical support, and disrupt or dismantle terrorist operational networks through effective coordination and cooperation both domestically and internationally.

The fourth and final dimension of coordination is essential for local and state services to be successful in combating terrorism. It involves the coordination of the various state intelligence and security services as they target the terrorists, as well as the synchronization of the reconstruction effort within the state. This dimension is the culmination of tying together the tactics of counter-terrorism with the tools of conflict resolution. This coordination and cooperation must occur on every level of both programs as they progress in parallel.

It is through this framework, as applied through these four dimensions, which allow a strategy to develop that can effectively utilize conflict resolution for combating terrorism. But it is important to know more than just the general premise behind the framework. How can these concepts be properly applied?

The Tools…
The US National Security Strategy defines terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”[4] Simply put, it is a political event geared towards achieving political results through violence, fear and intimidation. Conflict resolution is focused on achieving political appeasement between conflicting parties, utilizing political tools that range from official dialogue through economic actions to military operations. So it is natural, if not obvious, that conflict resolution as a political solution is applicable to terrorism which revolves around a political problem.

A key mechanism within official dialogue, geared towards conflict resolution, is the notion and process of reconciliation. A major challenge to this process is the ability to identify and understand the root causes of the conflict as well as the enabling factors that perpetuate the fight. This requires communication on all levels and fronts as the relationship between the state and the opposition transforms and grows. As with any conflict, the grievances of the past must be understood and amends, as appropriate, be made. There must be the capacity for all involved to coexist, requiring the ability for justice to prevail for injured parties. But justice per se does not imply only a punitive solution. Reconciliation contains four key elements: restorative justice and reparations, which are more punitive in nature and through reconciliatory measures like healing and truth-telling.[5]

Restorative justice is an effort to right past wrongs through legal methods via four primary modes: retribution through prosecution, restoration via mediation, historically with truth commissions and economically by reparations.[6] While these measures are punitive in nature and seek to assign some accountability to the offending party, they are not the only means for effectively reconciling the conflict. In fact, they’re only half of the solution for while it is important for justice to be handed out, it is also necessary for the victim to forgive the offending party. This is accomplished through healing and truth-telling and allows all involved to reach a point of closure on the conflict. These more forgiving elements of reconciliation touch on the intangible aspects of human nature and can sometimes utilize punitive tools in non-punitive ways. For example, truth-telling within a truth-commission allows victims and society in general to know the truth of what occurred so as to prevent false reconciliation and foster a new social beginning.

The key to reconciliation being successful is the proper management of the environment, which is the primary responsibility of the state. The goal of reconciliation is to mitigate and change the emotional attitude of the conflict and when used to combat terrorism, it prevents and persuades the support structure for terrorist organizations to pursue non-violent means. So to be an effective tool, the state must balance its approach and use of these differing forums, preventing the overuse or under-use of any particular one.

Economics can be a bulwark against, or a fuel for, terrorism. Groups like al Qaeda have received tens of millions of dollars over the years through legitimate charities or organized criminal activities. This money is then spent on training facilities in the lawless reaches of the globe, on maintaining its global support network or on clandestine terrorist plots. At the same time, in countries were terrorism, or terrorist groups, are most prevalent, like Yemen, Afghanistan, the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, we see a per capita GDP average of only $825.[7] So what is the role of economics, specifically through the process of conflict resolution, in combating terrorism?

The advantage of economic measures with regards to conflict resolution is that it provides a non-kinetic means for addressing the situation. Whether through sanctions or aid, these tools either hinder or support the parties involved. In combating terrorism, these tools can impact the ability for terrorist groups to garner direct state support and can mobilize international pressure and procedures that further complicate or prevent their financial capabilities. These tools can also benefit local communities and prevent them from becoming breeding grounds for terrorist recruitment by providing hope and progress. Investment in education facilities, administrative and judicial centers and the expansion of economic opportunities can all remove the political oxygen needed by terrorist organizations.

But it is important that the international community, in its bid to develop an aid program for the conflicted state, not replace one problem with another by creating a dependence on foreign aid. Ethiopia is a prime example of this phenomenon.

With a per capita GDP of just $800, it is one of the poorest nations on earth.[8] What’s more, between 1984 and 2002, the annual food production on a per capita basis fell from 450 kilos to only 140 kilos- a 69% drop. But there is no incentive to restructure this situation on the part of the Ethiopians. In 2003, it cost an Ethiopian farmer $50 to produce a ton of grain that would only receive $25 on the market, primarily because of the massive aid program’s influx of free grain.[9] This leads to an increase in unemployment and dependence on the international community. What’s worse is that it allows ill feelings to fester and mature, fertilizing a potential resource pool for terrorist organizations to utilize, which is occurring as terrorism is on the rise in the state. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the aid that is used is in such a manner as to foster development for long term growth and not simply address the symptoms of under-development.

But as stated previously, aid is only one tool available in conflict resolution. Sanctions can provide an effective means for combating terrorism as they can greatly impact a terrorist group’s ability to locate a safe zone to operate or garner state level support. Depending on the geo-political ‘neighborhood’, the implementation and relevance of sanctions can vary in their scope and objective. The key to effective sanctions is their ability to be dynamic in nature. Static sanction regimes are immobile and do not have the ability to reward positive actions on the part of the targeted state.

Therefore, the nature of the sanction regime depends greatly on the parties involved. Individual states may choose to install their own set of economic sanctions against a state with some limited success. The United States has taken this approach with Cuba, deciding to sanction the state for its poor record on human rights. However, some situations cannot be addressed by single actors and require the cooperation of the international community. This style of sanction regime is normally monitored and managed by a supranational institution, like the United Nations. It may still be a single-issue set of sanctions, such as an oil embargo, which will punish a state without crippling it or the sanctions may consist of a comprehensive and complex program designed to paralyze the national regime.

Sometimes, however, dialogue breaks down or the economic tools are not capable of dealing with the situation, thus forcing the use of force to placate the conflict. The use of force should not be confused with war and in regards to conflict resolution; it generally takes the form of peace keeping or peacemaking.

Peacekeeping, as defined by the Conflict Research Consortium at the University of Colorado, is the prevention of hostilities by using a barrier, which is typically embodied by neutral foreign troops, and does not focus on the resolution of the conflict per se or its negotiations for peace.[10] Peacemaking is a much broader term defined by the United Nations as “the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.”[11] Within the context of peacemaking, is the notion of peace-enforcement, which is the application of force to further the program of the peacemaking regime. Therefore, the key difference between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is the goal of the forces on the ground. Peacekeepers are focused simply on preventing the conflicting factions from violently engaging one another. Peace-enforcement, under the over arching premise of peacemaking, is the active engagement of the forces to implement and enforce the provisions of the process. Within the context of combating terrorism, peace-enforcement is synonymous with the application of counter-terrorism operations.

The Roadmap…
When examining the dimensions of the political framework and some of the tools available to conflict resolution, a roadmap for combating terrorism does begin to present itself. However, this roadmap must present more than a short term solution, abandoning the finger-in-the-dyke policies that have been utilized thus far through the application of counter-terrorism. It is imperative that both an international and national level strategy be nurtured and developed. But before the strategy can be effectively and completely drawn, it is imperative that a definition of terrorism be decided upon and applied on an international basis.

Countless definitions within a myriad of organizations from every nation attempt to define the tactic, which needs to be refined down to a single identifiable definition that can be applied through supranational institutions as well as within national regimes and their associated organizations. This definition must contain the general premise of an extra-legal, violent action, or the threat thereof, directed towards achieving a political concession through intimidation and/or fear.

Once the definition of terrorism has been set, a strategy for combating it can be accurately developed. This comprehensive strategic regime should enlist elements of democratic transition, like economic development, culture, regional attitudes and domestic ideas, as well as the some of the core tools of conflict resolution, such as reconciliation, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. The building blocks of conflict resolution can effectively provide the short to mid-term process of the strategy with the factors of democratic transition presenting the mid to long-term benchmarks. But for the short term plan to be effective, it must be geared towards the long term agenda of the strategy.

Therefore, within the strategy of democratic transition, it is necessary that economic support be focused metaphorically on teaching a state to fish. That said and in regards to the concept of foreign aid, the Millennium Challenge Account needs to be the primary factor used by the international community, shifting the focus from the notion of aid towards the concept of international developmental support. Target states looking to receive grants and/or loans should be progressing towards economic freedom and openness. A benchmark for determining this developmental support can be based on the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s Index for Economic Freedom, which centers it rankings on 10 key economic factors: trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market activity.[12] This focus on economic freedom has a proven track record of improving the per capita GDP of the developing state, thus supporting a core element in combating terrorism within the dimension of prevention. An important and vital element that should be incorporated in the economic developmental program is the reinvestment in the local and state infrastructure so as to support other components of the strategy, like reconciliation. This is to include administrative, judicial and educational centers throughout the state.

Balancing as well as supporting economic development, sanction programs can be employed to effectively address states that provide support to terrorist organizations. However, it is necessary that the sanction regime contain several key elements to ensure their effectiveness. First, the sanction program needs to be as multilateral as possible. Single state sanction regimes are not nearly as effective as supranational programs and require much longer in achieving the changes they desire.[13] Secondly, slow and incrementally introduced sanction regimes allow the target state to find “alternative suppliers, to build new alliances, and to mobilize domestic opinion in support of its policies.”[14] Finally, it is necessary for the sanction regime to be dynamic and flexible, adjusting as needed and rewarding positive state action when warranted. Together, sanctions and developmental aid can be effective in combating terrorism as well as accomplishing the goals of developing the target states economy.

In addition to economic development, the process of reconciliation must be applied. As a part of reconciliation, reparations can and should be tied in, as appropriate, with economic developmental programs. As the local and state infrastructure is advanced and improved, restorative justice can be implemented and applied. Those guilty of serious human rights violations should face justice within the domestic judicial system if at all possible. While the supranational institutions, such as The Hague, provide a similar service, they take too much time to prosecute and can desensitize the victim from the justice to be achieved. Truth Commissions are a vital element of the process as well. The most popular examples of the use of truth commissions are those of South Africa and Rwanda, which followed devastating human tragedies. But it should not take events like apartheid or genocide to mobilize this tool. Consider the impact that a truth commission might have on the Israel-Palestine conflict. On both sides of the struggle, disinformation and propaganda are present and serve only to exacerbate and perpetuate the conflict. However, if these two parties could use the truth commission process to remove the extraneous and enabling elements of the conflict, it would allow for a focused and direct negotiation on the root cause of the conflict, potentially expediting a settlement to the dispute.

As the Israel-Palestine conflict also shows, the geo-political ‘neighborhood’ of the conflict greatly impacts said dispute. States like Syria and Iran have been key supporting cogs in perpetuating the conflict and in ensuring that peace cannot be achieved for decades. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and the rest of the Arab League members have also, albeit to a lesser degree, complicated and prevented peace. Therefore it is necessary that the tools of conflict resolution be applied to all involved- the primary and secondary players to the conflict. The goal in addressing the neighborhood approach is that peace cannot be achieved within a specific conflict if the supporting geo-political cast subverts the process, therefore, it is necessary for the international community- and this is an international issue- to mitigate and prevent this as much as possible.

In developing the strategy for democratic transition, the face of democracy must have a local flavor and not have the appearance of a foreign entity. This requires the incorporation of domestic cultural norms and it must be sold to the people. This requires incorporating it into the general social context, educating and preparing the population for the transition. Another important element, not geared towards the target state’s population, but at the greater international community, is that democratic transition is the development of a system and the results of the system are the responsibility of the local population. So when the Palestinian people, for example, elect a group like Hamas to represent them in their governmental system, the international community must respect that choice. Attacking the system is certainly not the answer as other tools of statecraft exist for interacting, or not, with the elected body. The point is that in states transitioning towards democracy, it is vital that the international community support the transition and educate the state and its population on the responsibilities of the system.

The bulk of the strategy to combat terrorism is non-violent. The use of force is a very small element in the approach; however, it provides a critical atmospheric condition- peace. The role of force in the strategy is the implementation of peace-enforcement. Peacekeeping is necessary in the initial stages and allows for a cooling off period to occur to start the rest of the strategic processes, but it is the support peace-enforcement, as it implements the provisions of the process, contributes to the overall strategy. Furthermore, the perception of peacekeeping versus that of peace-enforcement is very different. Peace-enforcement requires more than just the perception of security, but also that of compassion and understanding. Peacekeeping operates under a simple premise, prevent violence. Peace-enforcement must maneuver itself and support restorative justice operations, contribute to the reconciliation process, support and protect the truth-commissions, etcetera.

This is not to say that peace-enforcement is a passive use of force, quite the contrary. The operative word here is enforcement, which is why peace-enforcement operations are synonymous with that of counter-terror operations. Both focus on the need to gather intelligence, to provide security to the process, and to attack those that threaten peace. Neither one is intended to be an independent solution to the conflict; rather their key contribution is providing an atmosphere for the process to take place.

Conclusion…
The war on terror is more than just the prevention of terrorist operations. It is the process of attacking the premise of terrorism itself. Its focus needs to be comprehensive in nature, addressing the root causes, the enablers, and the operations; in general it is the culmination of goals and justifications of terrorism itself reversed engineered. Combating terrorism is as much about promoting cooperation as it is countering extra-legal violent action. The strategy has an obligation to provide not just security, but hope and progress.

Therefore, any strategic development towards combating terrorism must examine and utilize the tools of conflict resolution, for it is within this process that the war on terror, and terrorism itself, can be won.

[1] De Armond, Paul. “Rock, Paper, Scissors: Counter-terrorism, Anti-terrorism and Terrorism.” Public Good occasional Paper #6. 1997. 1 Mar 2006. http://nwcitizen.com/publicgood/reports/rockpaperscissors/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ramsbotham, Oliver; Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Second Edition. Cambridge. Polity Press. 2005. Pg. 257.
[4] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002. 7 Mar 2006. Pg. 5. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
[5] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 24. Box 1.1. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.

[6] Ibid.
[7] CIA World Fact Book. 7 Mar 2006. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/rankorderguide.html.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Wiedemann, Erich. “Addicted to Aid in Ethiopia”. Der Speigal via Global Policy Forum. 28 Nov 2005. 7 Mar 2006. http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/africa/2005/1128ethiopia.htm.
[10] “Peacemaking”. International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict. Conflict Research Consortium. University of Colorado. 1998. 8 Mar 2006. http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/peacemkg.htm.
[11] Peacemaking. Introduction. DPA Home. Pg. 2. 8 Mar 2006. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm.
[12] Fitzgerald, Sara J.; Anthony B. Kim. “MCA: Rewarding Open Markets”. Executive Memorandum #915. The Heritage Foundation. 25 Feb 2004. 9 Mar 2006. http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/em915.cfm.
[13] Hufbauer, Gary Clyde; Jeffrey J. Schott; and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, second edition, revised, 2 vols. Washington. Institute for International Economics. Dec 1990. 9 Mar 2006. http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-summary.cfm.
[14] Ibid.

2006-03-10T22:32:00.001Z

America as a Democratic Model:
Promoting or Preventing Democratic Transition?
By B.E.N.

What’s the best democracy? A relevant question focused on what model should be followed when promoting this form of governance to states foreign to the practice. It begs to question who the best democracy really is. Who has the most to offer as an example to the fledgling state? For those engaged in the process of building states, it seeks a model for success. But what it does not do, this simple question, is ask what is feasible for democratic development.

As the sole superpower, unrivaled militarily and envied economically, the United States is a unique paradigm of democracy. As the oldest example of this form of government today, many assume that this model is the best one, again begging the question of feasibility. Is it feasible to apply the principles of democracy and capitalism as practiced by the US to nation-building projects in the developing world? The answer to this is an obvious and definitive no. Why?

Before we can properly answer this question, we must first examine what democracy is, more specifically that of democratic change. Dr. Mohammed Nimer, the research director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), states that, “democratic change implies that members of any collectivity agree on the management of existing conflicts.” He continues, “the absence of such condition means society will eventually break-up or be held together artificially by some coercive power.”[1] So there must exist, first and foremost, a general desire for collective management within a society for democracy to take root.

Dr. Francis Fukuyama, who speaks to it as democratic transition, continues this line of thought. For this process of democratic transition to occur, Fukuyama points to four conditions: one is the level of development, the second is culture, thirdly is the geo-political “neighborhood”, and finally domestic ideas.[2]

While it is the fourth condition put forward, it echoes that of Nimer in the importance of societal acceptance of collective rule. He simply, and quite aptly puts it, “you cannot have democracy unless you have people who believe in democracy.”[3]

But do Americans believe in democracy? Just 64% of eligible US voters cast ballots in 2004, and this was up from 60% in 2000.[4] Voter turnout in US elections is relatively low compared to elections held in other Western states. Even developing democracies typically show a much higher turn out than the US musters. Iraq’s parliamentary elections, under fear of death from the various insurgent groups, managed a voter turnout of 79.6%[5], over 20% higher than the US. If a developing state, in the process of transitioning to democracy, only turned out 60% or 64% in its elections, the legitimacy and success of said elections would be mixed at best. So the practice of democracy, at least by US standards, requires a much higher benchmark than even the US can meet.

While the idea of democracy could arguably be the single most important element to democratic development, Fukuyama also examines the importance of enablers to democratic transition. For instance, he points to a correlation between per capita GDP and its proportionality to democracy, highlighting that, “virtually all of the industrialized countries are functioning democracies, and relatively few poor countries are democratic.”[6] While valid exceptions do exist, most notably India and Saudi Arabia as representatives of the ends of the spectrum, this is a pretty valid point, which examines the ability of an emerging democratic state to sustain its democratic development. “If you live in a subsistence economy you worry about feeding your family and not whether you can vote,” Fukuyama points out, continuing, “and all of those things begin changing as you become richer.”[7] He even goes so far as to assign a value of $6,000 per capita GDP to this condition as the typical benchmark required for democratic transition to occur.

Per the CIA World Factbook, the US per capita GDP is $41,800. Per the same source, the per capita GDP of the world is only $9,300 and the European Union amounts to $28,100. So the individual purchasing power of one average American is equal to two average Europeans or 52.25 typical Congolese.[8] Comparatively speaking, it is difficult for Americans, use to so much, to identify with the struggles of people in the developing world who are use to so little. It is this economic disparity that also translates into the intolerance Americans hold for corruption; something rather common and somewhat tolerated through most of the developing world. So the American practice of throwing money, and occasionally a solution, at a problem is simply not feasible for states transitioning towards democracy.

Fukuyama mentions, as his third condition, the importance of the neighborhood. All states are influenced, and sometimes coerced towards certain predetermined outcomes beneficial to their more powerful neighbors. But sometimes it is not strength or arms as it is simple peer pressure that influences state actions. Democracy, as it is typically understood as a form of government, is a Western concept. In certain locals, especially the Middle East, Western concepts are foreign concepts and anything foreign is not accepted as a good concept. It is necessary to translate democracy into something acceptable to the Transitioning State as it furthers its democratic development.

If the US is considered anything, it is certainly Western. It is the quintessential icon of the Western world. Therefore it is impossible to package US democracy as anything other than just that- US democracy. Without an ability to literally translate US democracy into something less, Western, it will hold more the image of Western encroachment rather than that of democratic enlightenment.

This fits into the larger concept of culture and Fukuyama’s final condition. Culture has become more and more a hot topic in the developing world, especially with their impression that they are losing their culture to Western influence. This includes the notion of religion and couldn’t be more apparent than the struggle some are having with the compatibility of Islam with democracy. This struggle has been manipulated by some as avenues for exploiting the cultural dilemma transitioning states are facing.

For example, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi used the fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran put forth by his religious mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Per both Maqdisi and Zarqawi, democracy is heresy as it promotes the decision of the people over that of God as laid out in the Quran. The logical progression used by both is simple in its self-fulfilling nature and extremely dangerous when presented to illiterate and ignorant Muslims who depend on the wisdom and intentions of their religious leaders to show them the pitfalls in fundamentalist teachings.

But more than religion alone, it is the all-encompassing notion of culture as a whole that constitutes the concern of developing states transitioning to democracy. US culture revolves around the notion of capitalism with market drivers and competition fueling the notion and necessity for individuals to sell themselves to others and themselves. Americans celebrate their individualism with the notion of a pioneering spirit conquering life’s obstacles. Compare this with the collective mentality that permeates the vast majority of the globe, highlighted in their focus on protecting and nurturing individual family ties and societal norms in general and the alien nature of US culture stands out.

It is the practices of US democracy that make America so unique and inherently a very poor model for states transitioning to a democratic form of government. But it is not American culture alone that impedes the promotion of democracy. As stated throughout this piece, several conditions are necessary for democracy to not only take root but find nourishment for continued growth. It takes an economic base that supports a growing middle class to sustain and fuel democracy. It takes a political will within the population to take control of their state and guide it in the direction they see fit. It takes a cultural acceptance of tolerance and patience in dealing with others within the state to foment collective management of their existing conflicts. It is this admixture of economic, political and cultural factors that provide impediments to the transitioning of a state to democracy.

[1] Nimer, Mohammad. “Prospects for an American Muslim Polity: Implicat5ions for Muslim World Democratization”. CSID 6th Annual Conference, Washington D.C. April 22-23, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.islam-democracy.org/documents/pdf/6th_Annual_Conference-MohamedNimer.pdf.

[2] Fukuyama, Francis. “Do we really know how to promote democracy?” Remarks made to the New York Democracy Forum on May 24, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.ned.org/nydf/francisFukuyama05.pdf.
[3] Ibid.
[4] US Census Bureau News Release. http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/voting/004986.html.
[5] Iraqi Elections. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_legislative_election,_December_2005.
[6] Fukuyama, Francis. “Do we really know how to promote democracy?” Remarks made to the New York Democracy Forum on May 24, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.ned.org/nydf/francisFukuyama05.pdf.
[7] Ibid.
[8] CIA World Factbook. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html.

2006-03-10T22:29:00.000Z

Reconciliation

In the post Cold-War environment, inter and intrastate conflict resolution and reconstruction has faced some new and some old challenges to success. Whenever a third party is brought into the process, whether invited or not, the largest challenge and biggest burden to success is their ability to understand the nature of the conflict, to include its root cause as well as the enabling factors that contribute to the crisis.

This understanding is further expanded on the capabilities of the players and the roles that they try to play. Therefore, it is necessary of actors involved in conflict resolution, more specifically reconciliation, to interact not only with each other, but also with the primary parties of the conflict. So what challenges can these actors expect and how can they balance these challenges between one another as they divvy the responsibilities of reconciliation?

First and foremost, before the roles can be divvied up, it must be understood what reconciliation is, and more importantly what it is not. Reconciliation cannot be an excuse for impunity or exist in opposition of or as an alternative to truth and justice. It is not a quick solution, an excuse for forgetting crimes or simply a matter of forgiving. It is finding a way to live with one another with a vision of the future. It revolves around building, or as necessary rebuilding, relationships between the contested parties as they come to terms with the past. It must incorporate all of affected society as it matures into a long term process for changing perceptions and attitudes. It involves acknowledgement, remembrance and historical understanding. Most importantly, it must be voluntary.[1]

When actors examine reconciliation, it is necessary to differentiate punitive and reconciliatory measures as well as balance the approach of each. There are essentially four elements to be considered: restorative justice, reparations, healing and truth-telling. The first two are punitive measures where as the last two are reconciliatory steps[2].

But these cannot take place in a vacuum. They require coexistence, which requires the cessation of violence. It requires communication and the dissolution of stereotypes so as to overcome polarization. Through these it is possible to bridge together the parties as they manage their contradictions. Finally it results in a celebration of diversity as all involved reconstitute their relationship.[3] This requires the participation of the victims and the offenders as well as any beneficiaries.

So for justice to occur, which includes both the punitive and reconciliatory measures, it must bring the conflict before the parties. Forgive and forget is not a policy, rather it is denial and it inherently fertilizes future conflict. The other extreme is vengeance, which simply perpetuates the conflict as it fuels misgivings and feeds the negative image the opposing side maintains. The parties must find the center and publicly deal with the grievances to provide the justice sought and to prevent the suppression of the problem.[4]

In addressing the elements of reconciliation, it therefore becomes a case of tangible versus intangible. This falls along the lines of punitive versus reconciliatory.
Punitively, there is a focus on restorative justice made up of four primary elements: retributive through prosecution; restorative via mediation; historically with truth commissions and economically by reparations[5]. The punitive elements come more from international, national and local judicial bodies focused on the prosecution of perpetrators for crimes committed. But the need for care exists here in that if prosecution is overzealous, then the possibility exists for re-victimization, which counters the premise of reconciliation. The opposite is also true as under-prosecution does not address the needs for accountability with the victims.

Reconciliatory measures revolve around the notion of healing the individual and societal wounds caused by the conflict. It is a long term process focused on the psychological welfare of the victims as it helps move everyone involved towards closure. It is intangible in that there are few measurable quantities that can be used, rather it examines the general atmosphere of the parties involved and attempts to focus on certain aspects as they rise and fall. Some of the same tools used to punitively address the process can also be used in healing. For example, truth commissions allow victims to know the truth of what occurred and why, preventing false reconciliation. The punitive element s themselves provide for healing that they allow a notion of justice to be ascribed to the victim, but the overarching goal of the healing process is to allow for closure and forward progression from the conflict.

The nature of these components of reconciliation also inherently impacts the role of the actors involved. It is important to first identify the base characters, the victims and perpetrators, followed with an identification of the parties that can contribute to the reconciliation process. It is important to note the perspective and capabilities of the problem solving parties, which should constitute a collage of perspectives and capabilities and vary between supranational institutions such as the United Nations, national bodies like parliaments and social and religious non-governmental organizations.

The division of labor should then be partitioned based on the access, acceptance, and capabilities of the party. Supranational institutions, such as the United Nations, enjoy a capability of seeing the entire conflict in its fullest context. They therefore have the ability to view the crisis in a manner that doesn’t inject a biased emotional perspective. These types of institutions are also in the unique position of being able to coordinate global resources from multiple states and bring in non-partial security forces to secure a peaceful environment for the reconciliation process to grow out of. A key service the international community, and the supranational institutions in particular, can provide inter/intrastate conflicts is non-violent forums for dispute.

It is, however, the host nation(s) of the conflict that must carry the brunt of the responsibility in fully nurturing the environment of reconciliation. While the international community can provide support, the host nation(s) must ensure important governmental services such as effective civil services, fair judiciaries and efficient legislative structures exist. It is on the national level, most effectively through a parliament, that truth, justice and compensation can be handed out.[6]

But governmental bodies, both supranational and national, are not always perceived in a good light and so their access may be limited. This is where NGO’s have an advantage in supporting the process. NGO’s in general can support reconciliation in two ways. One, the can provide some checks and balances towards the elements involved that are capable of escalating the conflict back into violence, like governments or rebel groups. Two, they can often garner access to areas where the government may be limited or unaccepted, allowing them to more expeditiously deliver aid to those in need[7]. Faith-based groups also have a role to play in the reconciliation process as they can be especially effective in religious conflict, even though they will often follow secular policies. However their religious nature can shape their support to the process, so this element must be taken into consideration when using them to support reconciliation.[8]

Reconciliation is a long term process with the end goal of providing a environment that sustains peace. It requires the involvement of both the victims and the perpetrators and is constituted with both tangible and intangible benchmarks. Those involved in the reconciliation process must work together in a concerted effort to prevent the conflict from erupting back into violence.Supranational institutions are uniquely capable of fully coordinating and monitoring the reconciliation process with the national governments establishing and maintaining the environment necessary for the process to fully mature. NGO’s provide a more appeasing face of the process to the people and can therefore be a more effective conduit for success. These elements, when all exercised in a coordinated and cooperative environment, enjoy a much better chance of success in reconciling the parties involved and fostering long term peace.

[1] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 14. Box 1.1. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.
[2] Ibid, Pg 24.
[3] Ramsbotham, Oliver; Tom Woodhouse; Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 2nd Edition. Polity Press. Cambridge. 2005. Pg. 232. Table 10.1.
[4] Ibid, Pg. 235 Table 10.2.
[5] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 97. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.
[6] Mongbe’, Rene’ Valery; Robert del Picchia. “Promoting International Reconciliation, Helping to Bring Stability to Regins of Conflict, and Assisting with Post-Conflict Reconstruction”. Inter-Parliamentary Union 110th Assembly. Mexico City 15-23 April 2004. Pg. 11.
[7] “The Role of NGOs, National and International in Post-War Peacebuilding”. Report of a seminar held on 1st November 2001 at Islington Town Hall, Upper Street, London. Committee for Conflict Transformation Support Newsletter 15. 9 Feb 2006. http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts15/seminar.htm.
[8] “Faith-Based NGOs and International Peacebuilding”. US Institute of Peace. Special Report 76. 22 Oct 2001. 9 Feb 2006. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr76.html.

The Land of the Two Rivers: A 2006 Assessment of Iraq

2005-12-19T18:03:00.001Z

The Land of the Two Rivers:
A 2006 Assessment
By
B.E.N.
December 15, 2005

2006 will be a turning point year for Iraq. The Iraqi conflict, and the elements that constitute it, will continue to match past trends as it steadily moves towards a peaceful resolution. This piece intends to look at the constituting elements and how they impact the conflict as well as provide an assessment for 2006 in Iraq.

[1]Looking at the political landscape of Iraq, and its relationship to the ongoing conflict there, it is important to examine the host of agendas that exist between the three major groups. While definitive differences exist between the major sects, unifying commonalities are also present and support shared goals between the groups that will contribute to near term stability.

For instance, the Kurds will be focused on the concept of Kurdistan. At the very least they will wish to maintain the autonomy they have enjoyed for the last decade, but will never truly lose sight of their desire to have an independent state. This will foster cooperation between the Sunni and Shi’ah political leadership as they aspire to prevent Kurdish independence and claims to resources in the north.

The Shi’ah will be focused on realizing political power that continues to be representative of their numbers within the Iraqi population. While the Shi’ah are not per se sympathetic to Iran, they are by far the best avenue for Iran to affect influence on the state of Iraq. Because of this, the Sunnis and the Kurds will ally to contain Iranian influence as much as possible.

The Sunni, a minority within Iraq, is by far the majority in the global Islamic community and in particular the other neighboring Arab states. This can grant the Sunnis a disproportionate amount of international legitimacy within the region and be a force multiplier with regards to their influence in the Iraqi government. This disproportionate legitimacy supports their aim of reestablishing themselves as the dominant force in the Iraqi government. The Kurds and Shi’ah will want to mitigate this and will pool resources to prevent Sunni dominance within Iraq.

These varying secular agendas will create an environment focused on balancing one sects agenda against the unified efforts of the other two groups; highlighting the importance of reconciliation and cooperation between the Shi’ah, Sunni and Kurds.

Cairo Conference…
Recently the Arab League, backed by the U.S., held a preparatory conference for Iraqi national reconciliation. In the final statement of the conference, three main points were presented. One, the Iraqi people will decide on the future of Iraq. Two, foreign troops must leave and a timetable for their departure must be developed- based on the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Finally, the document stated that resistance is legitimate; however, terrorism is not legitimate resistance.

Initial examination of the final statement highlights what appears to be a negative regard for Coalition forces’ continued involvement in Iraq. But is this really the case? Upon closer examination, and within the context of other significant events, the Cairo conference reinforced Coalition policy and presented an acceptable and manageable exit from Iraq for the Iraqis as well as the coalition members.

Democracy…
The first element of the Cairo conference statement revolved around the notion that the Iraqi people will decide the future of Iraq. This is to be realized through the vehicle of democracy and several key events have taken place since the 2003 invasion and transfer of sovereignty that support the democratic process.

The January ‘05 elections were a monumental occasion in that they placed an Iraqi face to the Iraqi government and reflected a monumental change in the way that Iraq would be managed and led in the future. But they were not perfect. The Sunnis by and large did not participate, marginalizing them and fostering a large amount of resentment towards the Shi’ah and Kurds, who enjoyed an enormous amount of power, as well as towards their own leadership for leading them in what proved to be the wrong direction.

The elections also brought to light a failing in that because of the Sunni non-participation, the Kurds were able to gather a disproportionate amount of seats in the transitional national assembly. However, through magnanimous efforts to extend an olive branch to the Sunni community in spite of their failings, the Iraq Interim Government managed to persevere and crest the next major obstacle to their goal of democracy- a national constitution.

The Constitution was voted on by the Iraqi people in a national referendum on 15 October, 2005. Over all, 78% of the Iraqi people voted for the document and 21% voted against it. Two of Iraq’s 18 provinces rejected the constitution, one province short of the requirement for veto.[2] With this, the constitution passed.

Several arguments can be made about the Constitution, both for and against it, but they are irrelevant now in light of the referendums passage. What is key is how the Constitution further paves the way towards democracy in Iraq and lays the groundwork for democracy in the future.
As the December 15[3] elections for the Iraqi national assembly approach, several political considerations must be examined; specifically, the situations facing the three major groups within Iraq.

The Shi’ah are going to experience some political fractionalization, which will weaken a previously united political front. With Ahmed Chalabi’s departure from the current ruling coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and his formation of a separate political alliance, the National Congress Coalition, he will pull some seats away from the current regime. However, this will not be enough to completely fractionalize the Shi’ah and they will maintain a political majority in the assembly as well as provide the next Prime Minister.

For Iraq and the West, the best that can be hoped for is the selection of Iyad Allawi as prime minister. This is due to his secular beliefs and associations with varying Kurd and Sunni political leaders, so it is possible that he would garner their support and put together a government. But Allawi does carry some baggage that may affect his ability to form a ruling coalition. For one, he was the interim Prime Minister during the second Fallujah operation, something the Sunni will be slow to forget. Second, his strong position against Iranian influence will hamper any support from the pro-Iranian elements within the Shi’ah, like the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which have a strong standing in the current government.

Most likely though, the next prime minister will be one of the two serving Iraqi Vice Presidents, Adel Abdul Mahdi. He is the candidate put forward by the SCIRI and does not carry the same negative political connotations that Allawi does. The worst case scenario would be the selection of Ahmed Chalabi, one of Iraq’s deputy prime ministers, as prime minister; however, he is a bit of a dark-horse in that he carries an enormous amount of baggage, both from the West as well as from the region itself, and he would be opposed by some within the Shi’ah community and especially from the other major sects.

Interestingly, following an agreement between the current Grand Ayatollahs in Iraq to refrain from politics, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani[4] recently issued a fatwa calling on the Shi’ah community to not waste their vote and to focus on a party that is influenced by the teachings of Islam. This implies that the smaller alliances should be ignored and that they should vote for the current ruling coalition and does so without directly endorsing them. The ramifications of this are yet to be seen, but will likely heavily impact the other Shi’ah political alliances and their ability to garner votes. Regardless, the Shi’ah will loose some political cohesiveness but not enough to greatly impact their standing in the current government.

As mentioned previously, due to the lack of Sunni participation in the January elections, the Kurds received a disproportionate number of seats in the current national assembly. Couple this with the separation of the Islamic Kurdish Union from the Kurdish alliance and the Kurds are going to end up losing seats in the next national assembly. They will attempt to cauterize the political hemorrhaging by maximizing their political leverage in the formation of the national government with the hope of, at the very least, attaining a major ministerial position. Therefore, they will side with any coalition that will grant them the most in political capital making them somewhat of a wildcard. However, they are not going to have the ability to generate any political momentum and will be forced to react to political events.

[5]By far, the Sunni will come out the best in the December elections. With full participation this time around in the political process, they have the numbers to become the second largest body in the national assembly. They will take advantage of this political momentum and seek to influence the selection of the governmental leadership as well as set the near term political agenda for Iraq. They will support secular candidates such as Allawi for prime minister over the other pro-Iranian Shi’ah candidates.

This is further supported by the fact that the Sunni religious leadership in Iraq has issued fatwas calling on the Sunni community to fully participate in the elections and condemning any interference with the voting process. Obviously, this is in an effort to maximize their political gains in the election but will also allow the Shi’ah and Kurds to fully participate.

Throw in the future provincial elections to take place in February of 2006 and the road to democracy continues to march forward in Iraq. This is all towards the underlying requirement, by the Iraqi government and the Coalition Forces, that the Iraqi people decide the future of Iraq and that democracy must prevail.

Removal of Foreign Forces…
The second element in the final statement of the Cairo Conference was the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. The only real caveat revolved around the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces.
In the beginning of June 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1546, which provided a UN mandate to the Coalition Forces in Iraq. The expiration of the mandate was contingent on either the expiration of the timeframe within the document itself, or at the will of the Iraqi government. In early November of 2005, the mandate was again extended till June 15th of 2006. Following the national assembly elections and the formation of the next Iraqi government, it will be very easy for the government of Iraq to simply do nothing and allow the mandate to expire. This will, of course be dependant on the level of violence in Iraq at the time.

The Sunni will force to the forefront the removal of Coalition forces from Iraq following the expiration of the UN mandate. They will be able to receive support from elements within the Shi’ah community, like Muqtada al Sadr, but they will be opposed by the Kurds. Depending on the success of the national elections, the formation of the government and the level of violence in Iraq at the time, the Sunni will be successful in, at the very least, the development of a timetable that forces some Coalition forces to withdraw.

It will also be dependant on the status and capabilities of the ISF. 2005 saw the ISF mature at an incredible pace, laying the groundwork for an effective and capable security apparatus. For instance, at the beginning of the year, there were a handful of trained and combat ready Iraqi battalions, whereas now there are over 120. Of these, 80 are currently engaged alongside Coalition forces with 40 acting as lead elements controlling their battle space.[6]

Their combat effectiveness is also improving. During the Fallujah operation, 9 Coalition force battalions were engaged with 6 Iraqi battalions supporting them. This was reversed during the Tel Afar operation later in the year with 11 Iraqi battalions being supported by 5 Coalition battalions.

There is only one Iraqi battalion that is fully independent, but the definition of independence is important. To qualify, the battalion must be able to supply their logistics, airlift, intelligence, command & control, etc. There are NATO battalions that don’t qualify under this definition, so this achievement is to be congratulated.

The Shi’ah will also attempt to force the Sunni into fully supporting the ISF through the next government and will also augment the ISF with the various dissolved militias. This augmentation will dramatically increase the size of the ISF and will incorporate Sunni participation and cooperation in ISF operations.

Resistance and Terrorism…
The final point made in the Cairo Conference statement was the legitimacy of the “insurgency”. The document states that, “resistance is a legitimate right for all nations; terrorism does not represent legitimate resistance.”[7] The document even went so far as to define terrorism as “acts of violence that target civilians, humanitarian and civilian institutions and houses of worship.”[8]

Therefore, when examining the anti-Coalition forces, the lexicon used to describe them becomes crucial. The statement spoke to the legitimacy of resistance, referring to the insurgency, but differentiated between resistance and terrorism. In order to fully understand the statement and its context, a differentiation must be made between insurgents and terrorists.

A central goal of any insurgency is the establishment of a separate ‘government’ intended to eventually usurp the legitimacy of the state government and ultimately supplant it. However, this has not occurred in Iraq. In fact, the deficiency of this element has exacerbated the standing of the main ‘insurgent’ faction, Al Qaeda in Iraq, in the eyes of the Islamic community.

Nothing highlights this better than the captured letter that Ayman al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two leader, sent to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the letter, Zawahiri criticizes Zarqawi for targeting the Shi’ah and for not establishing a Caliphate in territory that AQIZ controlled. Because Zarqawi has been deficient in this governmental establishment, he has not been able to foster any legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqis or the general Islamic community.

The resistance comment in the conference statement further expounds on this by addressing the means of the resistance rather than the ends, which are embodied in the establishment of a Caliphate. By targeting terrorism, and defining it as such, they delegitimize over half of Zarqawi’s operations in Iraq. They also focus on the massive casualty events, which are responsible for the bulk of Iraqi deaths since initial major combat operations in 2003 ended.

By attacking the means, they indirectly attack the end goal of a Caliphate, and allow the Sunnis to be able to further legitimize themselves by clamping down on the support network for the insurgency, regardless of their complicity in it. This grants them the ability to influence the ISF and its formation and operations, and as a byproduct, leverage themselves into positions of power within the Iraqi leadership. This also serves to legitimize the resistance components of the insurgency, but not the terrorist elements, providing an out for, for lack of a better term, the moderate elements of the insurgency.

The US Plan for Victory in Iraq…
All of these events must be viewed in light of US policy, considering that it is the leading force in the occupation of Iraq. The White House recently released a document called the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and it lays out three tracks for success: political, security, and economic. The political track calls for the development of democracy in Iraq and the political engagement of all the groups within Iraq. The security track focuses on the rebuilding of the ISF and the removal of the insurgent/terrorist elements. The economic track explains the importance of rebuilding their infrastructure and the need to reform the Iraqi economy on a free and open framework.[10]

The political track’s focus on democracy mirrors the desires of the Iraqi people in their decision to decide their own future and has been repeatedly stated by the Coalition force leaders and the international community at large. The security track is another echo of Coalition and US policy. President Bush has stated numerous times that “coalition forces will stand down as the Iraqi people stand up.”[11] And the economic track will be inherently supported by the improvement in the security situation and the desire for success by the Iraqi people themselves.

Conclusion…
Iraq is on the verge of rounding a major corner towards peace and resolving the internal conflict that has plagued it for the last two and half years. Violence will continue and it is unreasonable and irresponsible to think that the violent elements in Iraq will simply disappear because of the progress made thus far; however, it is safe to assume that the worst is over.

With the full participation of the Sunni population in the Iraqi political process, a major supporting element for the ‘insurgency’ has vanished. Couple this with the growing capabilities of the ISF and the expanding legitimacy and power of the Iraqi government and the final statement of the Cairo Conference portends a successful 2006 for Iraq.

It also presents the Iraqi people, as well as the Coalition leadership, with an exit strategy for Coalition Forces. This exit strategy is going to resemble something similar to the plan put forward by US Congressman John Murtha, but for much different reasons than what he stated.
Coalition forces will draw down, starting with 30,000 US troops who were maintained for added security during the December elections. US forces will continue to draw down and by the end of 2006 will number somewhere around 75,000 with another 20-30,000 positioned in Kuwait as a Quick Reaction Force. The other Coalition partners will also withdraw forces, most of the smaller participants completely, but the more significant contingents, like the United Kingdom, following the US lead and drawing down to about half of their current numbers. This will result in the ISF being given control of more and more territory and Coalition visibility reduced to a supporting force for Iraqi operations.

The prognosis for Iraq in 2006 looks good. With the advancements of the political process, the improvement of the security situation and the removal of Coalition forces, the Iraqi conflict is finally seeing some light at the end of the tunnel. If the Iraqi people can continue the steady and persistent march towards democracy as well as moderate and mitigate their various extremist elements, then they will be able to emerge as a strong, united state well on their way to joining modern society.

[1] Figure 1 diagram created by the author.
[2] The Iraqi Constitution. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Constitution.
[3] December 15, 2005.
[4] Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani is the most senior grand ayatollah in Iraq, and arguably in the Shi’ah world. He commands the following of millions and his positions are extremely influential in the Shi’ah community, especially in Iraq where the Shi’ah population by and large follows his teachings.
[5] An unclassified diagram from an operation order for Iraq.
[6] Fact Sheet: Training Iraqi Security Forces. White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130.html.
[7] Final Statement of National Accord Conference. http://democracyrising.us/content/view/373/151/.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Al-Shishani, Murad. “Al-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets”. Volume 3, Issue 22 (November 17, 2005). 15 Dec 2005. http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369831&printthis=1.
[10] National Security Council. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. November 2005. 15 Dec 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html.
[11] Paraphrase of President Bush in numerous speeches over the last two years.

The International Community and Bosnia: When Actions- or the Lack Thereof- Kill

2005-12-19T17:55:00.001Z

The International Community and Bosnia:
When Actions- or the Lack Thereof- Kill
By B.E.N.
November 25, 2005

In the fall of 1991, the first in a string of nationalist events occurred in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These events, in the form of provincial declarations of independence, forced a chain of events that sparked a tinderbox of unresolved animosities that had smoldered under the surface of Yugoslavian society for decades.

These animosities, based on self-imposed identities under the guise of ethnicity, easily lent themselves to political expedience on the part of the nationalists and culminated some of the worst human tragedies since World War II, which could only be justified by the most extreme of self-delusions. Yet on top of these internal elements of the conflict, which had generated and perpetuated extreme violence, external factors also played key roles in the tremendous loss of life as well as the delay in, at the very least, the ending of the violence.

Three events in particular, initiated on the part of the international community, are significant either for their impact, or lack thereof, on the conflict. These events are the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia, for its impact on the warring parties, and the Vance-Owen and Contact Group plans, for their lack of impact on the Bosnian conflict.

The Arms Embargo
"If you confront us with the choice -- either UN blue helmets or weapons -- we choose weapons. They at least guarantee our people's survival."- Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian President

Following the declaration of independence made by Slovenia and Croatia, and the subsequent violence that ensued, the European Community (EC) on the 5th of July, 1991, imposed an arms embargo on all the provinces in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The United Nations followed suit on the 25th of September with UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 713, which placed its own embargo on the former state.

While at first glance this seems like a logical action, it should have been reviewed and assessed for its effectiveness and validity. Its initial development should have also taken into consideration several key facts.

For one, Belgrade was in control of the vast majority of the former Yugoslavian army, therefore it was in a unique position of possessing the bulk of the stockpiles as well as the defense industry’s infrastructure. Second, 14,000 tons of military weaponry had been purchased from the Middle East prior to the implementation of the arms embargo, therefore making it exempt from the weapons ban.[1] While the Serbs had this massive arsenal, the Bosnian government “had no artillery, no tanks, no planes, no missiles.”[2] In fact, the Serbian military commanders bragged that they had weapons and ammunition enough to continue the war for six or seven years.[3]

The situation was worse than poor for the Bosnians, who were estimated in September of 1992 to have acquired two tanks and two armored personnel carriers (APCs) where as the Serbs had “300 tanks, 200 APCs, 800 artillery pieces and 40 aircraft.”[4] Needless to say, the embargo actually helped the Serbs as it allowed them to maintain military superiority without spending limited funds on an arms race with the Bosnians.

What is troubling is that Great Britain seems to have prompted the former Yugoslavian Foreign Minister, Budimir Loncar, into recommending the arms embargo- playing perfectly into Serbian hands and contributing to the massive imbalance of forces.[5]

Finally, it is questionable as to the legality of the arms embargo placed against Bosnia. Three key elements in particular challenge the legal nature of the embargo. First, it violated Bosnia’s right to self-defense per Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter. Second, the UNSC did not provide the “action necessary to maintain international peace and security.” The UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) could not effectively protect themselves, as witnessed in numerous hostage situations, and their mandate authorized the use of force for self-defense and did not extend to the defense of the Bosnian citizens. Finally, it likely violated the UN Convention on Genocide as it prevented the Bosnian government from defending its nationals against foreign sponsored aggression that qualified as genocide and war crimes per the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.[6] Further more, the embargo was initially requested by and placed against Yugoslavia, but following Bosnia’s acceptance into the UN in May of 1992, the embargo should have no longer applied.

The Vance-Owen Plan
"Because I'm paid to engage in the absurd." (US State Department spokesman when asked how Clinton can expect the Serbs to agree to a just peace without facing a threat of force)

A product of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which took place in Geneva in early September 1992, the Vance-Owen plan presented a three part package of 10 constitutional principles, an immediate end to hostilities and a confederation of 10 provinces with three each controlled ethnically.

The plan was accepted by the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, with slight territorial changes, but the Bosnian Serbs, who controlled 70% of Bosnia and were militarily superior, did not want to accept the 43% of territory allocated to them in the plan.[7] Their rejection of the plan came in the face of strong pressure from Serbia, who wanted a settlement as soon as possible to alleviate the sanctions they were under. For the Serbs, any territorial gains from the province of Bosnia were good, while the Bosnian Serbs, who were primarily located rurally, wanted to establish their own state or unite with Serbia with their lands.

Because the Bosnian Serbs had rejected the plan, the international community decided to step up pressure, and thus passed UNSC resolution 820, which froze the assets of the Serbs and stopped the movement of hard currency into Serbia. In essence, it completely isolated Serbia financially and pushed Slobodan Milosevic to increase pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and abandon his goal of a ‘Greater Serbia’, thus proving the sanctions successful.[8]

The plan also highlighted some key differences between the frame of mind of the Permanent 5 (P5) members of the UNSC. The US looked at the situation as unfair and one-sided, thus it pushed for a leveling of the playing field. The leveling was to come from the ‘lift and strike’ plan, which called for the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and sent air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs/Serbian forces. Europe on the other hand, and France in particular, objected to any lifting of the embargo believing that it would simply prolong the conflict. Another core dispute within the P5 was the Vance-Owen plan itself, which the US felt was an appeasement to Serbia as they were to receive 43% of the territory when they only made up 30% of the population.

This illustrates another difference between the US position on Bosnia and that of the EC and the UN - there existed a moral concern. Holbrooke called the Bosnian conflict “the greatest failure of the West since the 1930s” and did not cavalierly speak of Bosnian options. On the other hand, Europe seemed to possess an amoral attitude towards the war.[9]

In the end however, the plan was never adopted yet it remained the goal of the international community and the model for which future plans would be based on. The premise behind the plan does make perfectly clear one startling revelation- Bosnia was not to exist any longer. The plan carved up the state- a member of the UN- and simple geography shows the end result. The Muslims would be broken and isolated with indefensible and disconnected provinces constituting a state pillaged and raped by its neighbors. This represents an abandonment of the Bosnian people and completely goes against the UN Charter by rewarding aggressor states. The plan does not represent a high point for the international community.

The Contact Group Plan
A "bewildered bunch which does not know how to solve the war." (Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb President, referring to the 'contact group': US, Germany, France, Britain and Russia)

The Contact Group was an attempt by the international community to present a unified front and prevent the Serbs from playing one member against the other. It was also a means for bringing in the US and Russia into the conflict and get them fully involved, something both wanted.

Their plan, based on the Vance-Owen plan, again called for the partition of Bosnia, though on a more favorable level to the Bosnians. The Bosnian Muslim-Croat federation was to receive 51% of the territory where as the Bosnian Serbs were allocated the remaining land. The Muslim-Croats unconditionally accepted the agreement, even though it continued to reward the Bosnian Serbs for aggression and violence. The Bosnian Serbs on the other hand called for further negotiations, of which the Contact Group took as tantamount rejection of the plan.

Serbia and Russia pushed the Bosnian Serbs towards accepting the plan, however, the Bosnian Serbs accurately assessed that the major powers would not use their full spectrum of power against them and held firm. Serbia, desperate by now to get some relief from the international sanctions, was forced to accept international monitors along the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. In exchange for this, the UNSC passed a resolution reopening the Belgrade Airport to all civilian traffic, resume ferry operations to with Italy and permitting the Serbs to participate in international sporting and cultural events.[10]

Again the US found itself on the other side of the issue from the European members of the group. The US wanted to step up pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and increase the use of force in protecting the ‘safe areas’, locals that were anything but safe. However, the US encountered resistance, which in the end led to the US deciding to no longer enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia- the first time a NATO policy that had been unanimously accepted had been unilaterally breached.[11]

In truth, this had no real impact since the US had no forces on the ground, but diplomatically it highlighted a growing rift between the NATO members. It also reasserts the moral concern the US had in the Bosnian conflict, but they lacked the political will necessary to unilaterally engage to the degree required to solve the crisis. Coupled with the policy of containment, which the EC and UN favored, and the Bosnian’s continued to find themselves in a very precarious situation.

Conclusions…
"It's like pornography. We'll know it when we see it." (Clinton's Bosnia exit strategy as whispered by 'top White House official' to Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-VT)

Bosnia and the response of the international community show the importance of political will. The Bosnian Serbs were, by no stretch of the imagination, an equal to the major powers, yet they managed to manipulate and dictate the policies and processes that the powers would adopt for nearly half a decade.

It also showed the ease at which intelligent and powerful institutions can glob onto an oversimplified justification for violence, regardless of how erroneous it may be. This is seen by the many attempts by the international community to develop solutions based on ethnicity as opposed to creating solutions based on accuracy.

Most importantly, Bosnia laid bare the ineptness of the various security institutions following the Cold War. Their inability to unite under a single voice and their incompatible attitudes towards the plight of the victims in the crisis prevented them from decidedly addressing the conflict. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 150,000 people died in the Bosnian War, 70% of which were Muslim.[12] Thousands of women were raped, many gang raped, with some as many as 150 times. The atrocities of the Bosnian conflict were the worst since the discovery of the final solution implemented by the Nazis in World War II. And it shook the international community to its core.

The international community’s actions or lack thereof, killed thousands of Bosnians. While they may not have pulled the trigger, and the ultimate responsibility of the atrocities lies with the Serbs, the major powers allowed the conflict to fester into a lethal sore that continues to plague the Balkans to this day.

[1] Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A short History. London: Macmillan. 1994. Pg. 243.
[2] Thompson, Mark. A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. London: Vintage. 1992. Pg. 328.
[3] Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A short History. London: Macmillan. 1994. Pg. 243.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hodge, Carole. “Hesitation to use force gave Milosevic green light”. Bosnian Institute. 9 Oct 2001.23 Nov 2005. < http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=1549 >.
[6] Williams, Paul R. “Why the Bosnian Arms Embargo Is Illegal”. Public International Law and Policy Group. 15 Jun 1995. 24 Nov 2005. < http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/editorials/Bosnian%20Arms%20Embargo.htm >.
[7] Sloan, Elinor S. Bosnia and the New Collective Security. London: Praeger. 1998. Pg. 48.
[8] Owen, David. Bosnian Odyssey. New York: Harcourt Brace. 1995. Pg. 153.
[9] Rieff, David. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1996. Pg. 257.
[10] Sloan, Elinor S. Bosnia and the New Collective Security. London: Praeger. 1998. Pg. 62.
[11] Ibid, Pg. 64.
[12] Dervišbegovic, Nedim. “Revised death toll for Bosnian war”. Bosnian Institute. 23 Dec 2004. 25 Nov 2005. < http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=1985 >.

Who Am I? The Roles of Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism

2005-12-19T17:38:00.001Z

Who Am I? The Roles of Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism
In the Yugoslavian Conflict
By B.E.N.
October 30, 2005

When examining the genesis of an intrastate conflict, in this case the Balkans and specifically the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the driving originating factors must be assessed and acknowledged. The rallying dynamic, whether it is religious, ethnic or economic, etc, must be broken down into the core elements and examined for their role in mitigating or exacerbating the crisis. This article intends to look at the roles ethnicity and religion play in nationalism, and determine whether they are drivers or enablers to the conflicts experienced in Yugoslavia.

Ethnicity…
Ethnicity, according to the Random House College Dictionary, is defined as, “belonging to or deriving from the cultural, racial, religious, or linguistic traditions of a people or country.”[1] Members of an ethnic group are usually readily distinguishable from other non-members with these distinguishing features holding commonality to the ethnic group claiming them.

Ethnic groups share common origins, possess a continuity of time- in both the past as well as in the future- and maintain an intergenerational transmission of these common traits. A key point about ethnicity is that it is a social concept, which differentiates it from race, which is a biological concept. While race can be part of an ethnic group, it is not the driving factor behind the formation of the group.

Religion…
Referring once again to the Random House College Dictionary, religion is defined as, “a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe.”[2] This is especially important when the members of different religions use it to define their roles and positions in the universe. Since religion is an intellectual element, the groups based on it are not limited by ethnic or geographical characteristics.

An important and interesting phenomenon that comes with religion is the sense of family that it creates. From the paternal feelings that exist between the supernatural and the corporeal to the lexicon that exists within the institution; there is a strong familial aura that surrounds religion. And religion, in a sense, serves the same purpose that family does. As members within a family benefit from a present tense feeling of “social welfare security”, members of religious ideologies receive a future tense feeling of “social welfare security.”[3]

The impact and importance of this, as will be seen later, cannot be overstated, especially when this phenomenon is used to justify religious member actions. As was wisely put, “no matter how apolitical the act of worship itself may seem, the institutional infrastructure of religion is invariably politicized.”[4]

Nationalism…
So when we focus on the development of nationalist movements, we have to understand what the required elements of a nation are. What are the factors that constitute a nation, and how are these factors determined.

Anne-Marie Thiesse explains in her piece Inventing National Identity[5] that to create a national identity, several key factors must be nourished and universally established. These include a history, to include historical monuments; heroes who embody the national values; language, culture and folklore which characteristically develop a specific national mentality; but most importantly for the purposes of a state is the ties to a distinctive geographical feature or location.

Upon examination of the required elements of nationalism, a similarity to ethnicity is apparent. The definition of nation is typically explained as, “a body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or possess a government peculiarly its own.”[6] This is important because nation is usually synonymous with state, which is defined as, “a politically unified population occupying a specific area of land.”[7] While they are similar in their political overtones, they are different, primarily in the notion of territorial possession. States occupy territory where as nations are associated with territories. This becomes important in examining heterogeneous states and the development of nationalist movements within.

To take this one step further, a major difference between a nation-state and an ethnic group is sovereignty; nation-states have it while ethnic groups may seek it, through nationalist movements.

Kingdom of Yugoslavia…
To properly examine the Yugoslavian situation, a proper starting point in time is necessary. In this case, the best is probably the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918.

A result of the Paris Peace Conference, the kingdom was created and ruled by then Prince-Regent Alexander, son of the former king of Serbia, Petar. The kingdom consisted of Serbia, Montenegro, the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A host of factors complicated the state’s attempt to politically integrate the government, which will be a common goal of the ruling regimes throughout the state’s history, to include: a diversity of languages, nationalities and varying religions as well as differing histories of the regions and an uneven distribution of economic development between the provinces.[8]

The kingdom was plagued by political crisis after political crisis, but the state managed to pass a Constitution in 1921, which established a unitary monarchy that became very Serbocentric. Croatian resistance experienced political oppression, which climaxed with a member of the governing majority shooting five members of the Croatian Peasant Party including the leader Stjepan Radic, two dieing on the floor and Radic four months later. As a result, the Croatian opposition completely withdrew from parliament and King Alexander on January 6th, 1929, prorogued the Constitution and dismissed the Parliament, establishing what became known as the 6th of January dictatorship. The name of the state also changed at this time to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Macedonian revolutionaries, in collaboration with the Croatian Ustashe, assassinated King Alexander, a Serbian hero, on October 9th, 1934. He was replaced by a regency council of three which was headed by Prince Pavle. This sets the stage for a series of events that will have an enormous impact on the Yugoslavian conflict of the 90s.

World War II and Nazi Germany…
During the Second World War, several events occurred that reverberates today. Germany invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, divided the country and established a puppet Croat regime, the Ustasha, in the newly created Independent State of Croatia. Two primary opposition groups formed; the Cetniks, who were mostly Serbian royalists supporting the exiled monarchy, and the Partisans, who were a communist group and opposed both the Ustasha and the Cetniks.

The Partisans, under the leadership of Josip Tito, were very effective in conducting a guerilla campaign against the Nazi’s, who gave the Ustasha a free hand in suppressing the insurgency. This resulted in a massive loss of civilian life. 10% of the Yugoslavian population or 1.7 million people, primarily the Serbs of Bosnia and Croatia who had been the major supporters to the rebel forces.

The Partisans were the de facto rulers of liberated Yugoslavian territory and following the expulsion of Axis forces from Serbia in 1944 and the rest of Yugoslavia in 1945, they established the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and Tito, now a national hero, was named the prime minister. In 1963, Yugoslavia was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Tito became the President for Life, which ended on May 4, 1980.
Creating Problems vs. Supporting Them…[9]

In an effort to create unity and overcome the obvious differences of the Yugoslavian population, Tito pushed Yugoslavia towards a Yugoslavian identity and tried to suppress the various ethnic, provincial identities. He was only partially successful in this as he was able to minimize conflicts between the various groups, however, he was not able to supplant the different identities with the state identity.

This is the crux, and the genesis, of Yugoslavia’s conflict- identity. Several factors perpetuated the crisis, all of which revolved around the notion of identity. For one, the identities of the parties involved were persistent. They are possible because of, “socialization with the group and from suffering from discrimination and exclusion by other ethnic groups.”[10] The primacy of an identity is also a contributing factor. The significance of the various identities of the participating groups was a central element of the conflict. Because of the significance of these identities, no one group was willing to compromise on their identity. Because there was no willingness to nurture a collective identity, there was no hope of constructive collaboration or successful settlement.

Two other important elements of identity must also be examined. One is nationalism, which asserts that, “nations or groups of people who share a common history and destiny have the right to have a territory or state of their own.”[11] This becomes especially powerful when the nationalist movement is ethnocentric. The other element is notion of victimhood. This stems from the notion that a certain group, both real and imagined, has been the repeated victim of oppression or domination. It fosters distrust of other non-group members and can generate pre-emptive actions, which then perpetuate the conflict.

So how do these different factors affect the conflict in the Balkans, in particular the former Republic of Yugoslavia? The internal factors of leadership and experience go a long way. The experiences of the Croats, who have been discriminated and oppressed by the Serbs, fostered a victim relationship in their collective identity. However, the Croats treatment of the Serbs during World War II cemented a feeling of victimhood with the Serbian populations and painted them as violent oppressors.

Leadership factors have also impacted the conflict. Consider the message of tolerance espoused by Cardinal Strossmayer that called on the Catholic Croats to have tolerance for the Serbs and the Eastern Orthodoxy. Compare that with the nationalist zeal of Arch Cardinal Stepinac, who supported the growth of the Ustasha, who hated communism and who supported collaboration with the Nazi’s for nationalist reasons.

This spilled over into the relationship the groups had with one another. A history of violence and oppression exists, toughening the resolve the groups and raising the bar for the level of force needed to break that resolve. How the varying ethnic communities characterize one another also impacts their ability to reach peace. Dehumanizing other ethnic groups removes barriers that might normally exist for committing violence on human beings, but if the groups are considered less than human then the same restraints no longer exist.

Finally, the social context for the groups and their thought process impacts the situation. Therefore the parameters and paradigms established by intellectual elements, like religion, go a long ways in the justification of group actions. Religion is especially important in this, as it allows for the indoctrination of a core premise, which is reinforced by regular contemporary updates conveniently translated into current events. Couple this with a self-determinist attitude within a group, and the identity factors become amplified.

Conclusions…
Tito managed to suppress the various ethnic groups enough to prevent these conflicts of identity, and because of this strength, there did not appear any real hope of attaining the goals of self-determination. But at his death, the door of nationalism flew open, and the seeds planted long ago began to sow in the various ethnic communities.

So what is the genesis of the conflict in the Balkans? Ethnicity and nationalism. These groups have fostered, nurtured and strengthened their identities. History in the region only goes to support the different premises they hold. The Croats feels they’ve been oppressed throughout time by the Serbs, the Serbs feel that the crimes committed at Jasenovac by the Croats have never been properly atoned. The Serbs feel that the Bosnian conversion to Islam during Ottoman rule was a sell out, and implied a lack of unity and strength, and so on and so forth. The point is that these groups have not let anything go, so when they examine one another, they dredge up their accounts of history and apply it to the present- whether it is applicable or not.

The conflict in the Balkans has revolved around identity and the nationalist goals these identities maintain, therefore ethnicity is a driver in this conflict. Religion allows a venue for mobilizing and justifying the nationalist identity. It also provides an avenue for expanding the identity of the support base without changing the parameters of the ethnic groups and is therefore an enabler to the conflict. The Balkans conflict is an ethnic conflict.

[1] Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, New York 1982, Pg. 454.
[2] Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, New York 1982, Pg. 1114.
[3] Liotta, P.H., Anna Simons. “Thicker than Water? Kin, Religion, and Conflict in the Balkans”. Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly. Winter 1998. 27 Oct 2005. < http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98winter/liotta.htm >.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Thiesse, Anne-Marie. “Inventing National Identity”. Le Monde Diplomatique. June 1999. 25 Oct 2005.< http://mondediplo.com/1999/06/05thiesse >.
[6] Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, New York 1982, Pg. 886.
[7] Ibid, Pg. 1282.
[8] Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Wikipedia. 27 Oct 2005. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_yugoslavia >.
[9] The bulk of this section is based on the writings of Louis Kriesberg and his piece on Identity Issues. I consider this article a great example of how identity affects conflict.
[10] Kriesberg, Louis. Identity Issues. July 2003. 27 Oct 2005.< http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/identity_issues.jsp >.
[11] Ibid.

McWorld vs. McJihad

2005-09-30T02:12:00.001Z

By B.E.N.
September 28, 2005

A primary argument used by the proponents of jihad is the encroachment of Western culture on the Muslim world. The McWorld concept of: big corporations, box stores, fast food, name brands, services and products now, now, now; all of which conflict with the general sense of belonging and existence in the Muslim world, specifically in the Middle East.

The gist of the argument against commercialized Western society is that the Arab culture is fading away under the imagery and volume of Western values; primarily through the sense of materialism that is overly portrayed in the capitalistic segment of the society and its overall non-Islamic nature.

Couple this with the radical interpretation of the Qur’an and haddith and the development of an anti-Western, pro-violence movement based on Islam materializes. But this isn’t new. The confrontation of Islam and the Middle East with the West has been occurring for decades, and has been documented by many theorists and scholars. This piece doesn’t intend to look per se at the cultural conflict itself, but rather at the underlying fundamentals of the cultures, and how they must be taken into account to reconcile the differences between the two.

McJihad and Al Qaeda…
With the transformation, intended or not, of Al Qaeda into a horizontal institution, the operational capability of the organization has diminished greatly. However, the ideological message is still very much alive. In fact, the organization has become the ideological beacon used by jihadist groups around the world. This franchisement, or McJihad, of the ideology allows for the internationalization of local jihadist groups and has become the primary modus operandi of the current Al Qaeda organization. Couple this with the advancements of the information age and the ability to spread technologies and techniques quickly, and the threat manifests itself in a new light.

At the same time we see the prominence of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi grow in Iraq as he continues to lead the effort against Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people in general. With his ascension, we see what could be construed as a decline in influence of the primary Al Qaeda leadership, which begs the question- is Zarqawi the new Bin Laden?

Before we can answer this, several things must be addressed. First, Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq is typically labeled as an insurgency, however, is it really? The objectives of insurgencies are usually measured in a zero sum manner against the government; i.e. diminish the government while increasing that of the insurgency. Common insurgent objectives generally revolve around the capability to provide public services, the generation of popular support, international relations, organizational legitimacy, the ability to impact the confidence of the government, the control of coercive force, etc. Has Zarqawi made an effort to establish any of these precedents in Iraq?

With absolute certainly, no he has not. Granted, he has tried fairly successfully to impact the capability of the government to provide public services, but he hasn’t tried to replace this void with his own organization. So we see the support of the coalition partners to replace above and beyond the losses inflicted, translating into short term gains for Zarqawi. He is most certainly not interested, nor engaged, in generating popular support, but rather he seems to be instead obsessed with fostering fear in the Iraqi population- the Shi’ah in particular. He has no legitimate international support and he has not tried to generate in any way a semblance of domestic legitimacy. As to the self-confidence of the government, his actions appear to have only strengthened the resolve of the Iraqi leadership and that of most of the coalition partners. Finally, Zarqawi certainly hasn’t captured the initiative or the entitlement of sole ownership of the use of coercive force in Iraq, rather he has engendered the Iraqi government and the coalition forces to ramp up their capabilities and operational tempo. So in regards to common insurgent objectives, Zarqawi’s “insurgency” has been a resounding failure.

But Zarqawi is not the soul leading element in line for Bin Laden’s current position. Aymen al-Zawahiri is currently Bin Laden’s #2 and is likely the ideological inspiration of the Al Qaeda movement. Most assess that he is the primary driving force in the organization, providing the inspiration to expand operations on a global scale. This is a very important consideration, because if he is the ideological leader of the group, and the group has been transformed into an ideological institution, then it would naturally follow that Zawahiri would replace Bin Laden.

This brings us to a very key question, and one that must be answered to properly determine a solution to Al Qaeda. If Al Qaeda is going to attempt to transition back into an operational organization, then Zarqawi is the natural choice for the leadership position in a post-Bin Laden world. His operational experience in Iraq highlights him as a warrior, and inspires other like minded jihadists to join the movement. However, if Al Qaeda maintains the current role of an ideological institution, then Zawahiri will most likely ascend to the top as it is his vision and leadership that is better geared towards advancing stated Al Qaeda political goals. Regardless, there is likely to be a struggle, followed by a splintering of the Al Qaeda leadership in the event of Bin Laden’s death.

Another important consideration is the fact that Zarqawi does not take orders well, which is apparent when examining his operational history. For example, his usurpation of the leadership role held by his mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, while in a Jordanian prison as well as his refusal to swear allegiance to Bin Laden, which was typically required by the Taliban, when he established his training camp in Afghanistan; these all go to show his desire to dominate his own actions. So why has he now sworn an oath of allegiance to Bin Laden following months of operations in Iraq? It is apparent that Zarqawi’s relationship with Al Qaeda is a marriage of convenience between the two organizations. Al Qaeda and Bin Laden get to claim operational credit for successful attacks in Iraq, prolonging their operational lifespan, while Zarqawi gains access to the global network of Al Qaeda contacts and supporting elements.

But the transparency of the relationship is obvious. Al Qaeda has already claimed credit for other attacks, like the London and Madrid bombings, which they had no part in. Rather, their involvement was limited to the ideological justification that their movement provides for these types of operations. And Zarqawi has not benefited all that much, on a logistical or operational basis, with his association with the Al Qaeda organization. Which again highlights the dilemma of the future of Al Qaeda- is it an operational entity or an ideological one? The short answer is that no one knows yet. If Al Qaeda goes operational again and under the leadership of Zarqawi, then he will consolidate control- essentially verticalizing the organization. This will jeopardize the group in that if Zarqawi is killed or captured, then the organization will collapse with a multitude of loose ends.

However, if the group remains horizontal and ideologically based, then it will be Zawahiri’s inspiration that will guide the movement. This will complicate the destruction of the group in that it will take more than kinetic force to defeat Al Qaeda, it will take an ideological one.

Ideology versus Geo-Politics…
The defeat of terrorism in general, is going to have to happen in the ideological front. The use of kinetic force can eliminate tangible aspects of terrorist groups, but it cannot destroy the founding motivations that fostered the movement in the first place. The problem is that the West does not think per se in an ideological manner, rather, the West’s approach is more geo-political. This is a fundamental difference in the Western culture versus that of the Middle East.
In the West, the traits revolve around individualism, the ability to adapt, ingenuity, certain inalienable freedoms and a sense of justice. Westerners feel that they are the masters of their own destinies. In the Middle East, it is much different. There, the focus is on collectivism, honor, generosity, hospitality and eloquence. They are fatalistic and associate both good and bad with the will of god. These traits are not necessarily mutually exclusive; however, they do not translate directly together. So the statements and actions of one are rarely placed in the proper context by the other.

This is extended in the way both cultures address problems. In the West, rationality is the paradigm used; what is the problem, what are the elements of the problem, and how can it be solved, thus eliminating the problem. This is not how the Middle East deals with adversity; there it is emotionally based. How does this problem make you feel, how can you address this to make you feel better, what is the action you can take to eliminate the bad feelings.

Thus, in the West, a solution may be generated for a problem that is unpopular, but it is the only way to properly address the issue, so it is implemented. This does not happen in the Middle East. If the solution appears worse than the problem, even if the negative aspects are short term, then the solution will not be accepted and another solution that is not as difficult to accept will be generated.

Enter the conflict of Iraq, which is considered wise or foolish dependent on the paradigm used to address problems. An argument can be made by those that focus on a strategy of ideology that the conflict in Iraq is providing, to use a borrowed term, political oxygen to the radical ideological movement. Many from this side of the argument vehemently contend that Iraq has exponentially complicated the situation and has sown the seeds of the next generation of jihadi fighters.

Iraq also did not address the ideology of radical Islamic extremism. There is little argument on the evils of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and he was more or less an accepted, if contained, malevolent force by the surrounding Arab states. So on a political level, Saddam was not loved by anyone, rather quite the opposite, and even on a religious level, he was considered by most in the Islamic community to be a poor Muslim, even an apostate in certain fundamentalist circles. So why is there such a huge backlash against the U.S. for removing Saddam from power?

This goes back to how the West deals with problems and how the Middle East deals with problems. In the Middle East, a problem will be allowed to smolder until it either literally dies or an appropriate solution can be developed. Ideological confrontations are dealt with through ideological means. This is not to say that ideological conflicts are only a war of ideas, since they sometimes use their ideology as a justification of violence, which is then applied through their ideological doctrine- a might makes right mentality. But the emotional aspects of a problem will be at center stage, to include the periphery elements associated with certain solution sets. In essence, the Middle East will allow a long term solution to gradually present itself, inshallah[1].

The West on the other hand, is much more proactive in their focus on addressing problems. They are typically not as long term and they will tackle a situation in the most rationally effective and efficient manner possible, which means that an ideological problem may not have an ideological solution.

For example, when examined from the geo-political side, Iraq was a key cog in the global war on terror. Its ability, as a pro-Western democracy, to influence Iran- the number one sponsor of global terror- cannot be ignored. Consider this, 65% of Iran’s population is 25 years old or younger. They do not identify with the 1979 revolution and are increasingly dissatisfied with the current system of government in Iran, to include a desire for an improvement in relations with- not interference from- the U.S. There is increasing signs that another revolution will occur in Iran within the next five to ten years, and Iraq will only expedite this.

A pro-Western democracy in Iraq will have an enormous impact on Syria- the number one sponsor of terror in the region. Bashar Assad already holds tenuously his grip on power in Syria. He does not have the power nor the charisma of his father, Hafez, or the grooming for power that his late brother Basil received. Ethnically, he comes from an estranged sect of Islam- the Alawites- which isn’t universally recognized by the Shi’ah community let alone the 74% majority of Sunni’s within the republic. The effects of Iraq are already apparent in Syria’s forced withdrawal from its 30 year occupation in Lebanon.

Finally, a pro-Western democracy in Iraq impacts Saudi Arabia- the number one private financier of global terrorism. While the U.S. did not invade Iraq for oil, its oil capacity, which is arguably as much as Saudi Arabia, allows it to present itself as a relief valve to pressure on the Saudi regime. The U.S. gets roughly 13% of its oil from the Middle East, where as Europe and Asia get 75% and 60% respectively. U.S. support of Saudi Arabia has been in effort to support the global economy, because if the oil market is destabilized, it could potentially collapse the European and Asian economies, both of which the U.S. is heavily interwoven with. But a pro-Western democracy in Iraq allows a gradual increase of pressure on the al-Saud regime to crack down on the financial contributors as well as address the radical ideology that comes from the religious segment of the society.

So in a geo-political sense, the conflict in Iraq was infinitely wiser as it allows one conflict to address three threats- and prevents three conflicts. The problem with Iraq is that it was a politically offensive operation geared towards state sponsorship of terrorism. It was a geo-political solution rather than an ideological one and the West has failed to translate this into the proper context understood by the Middle East. The missing key to the Iraq conflict is the Western information campaign focused on engaging the Middle East directly through their media so as to counter misinterpretations and disinformation promulgated throughout the Arab world. This has become the center of gravity for Western success in the global war on terrorism.

Strategic Development…
To effectively deal with the threat of terrorism, three basic strategies must be developed: defensive, offensive and a core. These strategic solution sets are individual as well as symbiotic, and must be developed to coexist and support one another. This three-part approach allows for an assessment of vulnerabilities and the development of a crisis management plan, as well as a short and mid term effort focused on targeting terrorist threats directly and the expansion of a long term solution that focuses on the root causes of terrorism in general.

The defensive strategy has two primary objectives: protect the people and the critical infrastructure necessary to care for them and respond to terrorist initiatives. The problem of this strategy is that it results in a cycle of violence; the terrorists attack, the state falls into crisis management and then the state responds to the attack, which is then followed by another attack and so on and so forth. It fails to address the generating factors of terrorism.

The offensive strategy on the other hand is geared around three primary goals: kill or capture terrorists, disrupt their operations and defeat their organizations. This requires the state to be able to anticipate and pre-empt terrorist acts through the integration of law enforcement, military and political efforts that counter terrorist groups and aggressively disrupts the terrorist networks and thus forcing them to be reactive instead of offensive. However, this again fails to address the generating factors of terrorism.

To actually defeat terrorism, there must be an understanding of what the terrorist organizational makeup is. Terrorist groups are made up of a leadership corps and a support corps. The root causes that enable terrorist operations affects the support corps of terrorist groups. The leaders of Al Qaeda are not poor, uneducated individuals who were disenfranchised. They are wealthy, connected and educated with a driving motivation in their ideology, which cannot be practically targeted by the state. But their support corps is largely made up of a poor, uneducated following that have no recourse for change other than through violent activism. By targeting this segment of the terrorist organization, the terrorist group is transformed from an organization to a band of disgruntled individuals.

To accomplish this, the development of a core strategy is necessary. The core strategy will focus on the long term root causes that support terrorism, like poverty, radical or poor education and political disenfranchisement. This effort is primarily a political one and requires a media campaign, political integration of the disenfranchised elements of the population, and a generation of state legitimacy while delegitimizing the terrorist entity.

The most important aspect of all three strategies is the information campaign waged by the state. Because there is a cultural difference, complicated by the inability to easily translate solution sets, the West needs to be proactively engaged with the global media and the Middle Eastern media specifically. This should include, but not be limited to, interaction with the 3-5,000 foreign correspondents in the Western capitals by stating and explaining the policies and actions of the various Western states. Rather than letting the media come to the state of their own volition and with their own agenda, the state should be expounding and pushing its message to the various masses supported by these media outlets.

Hostile media outlets should be confronted and engaged. For example, Western leaders should face media sources like Al Jazeera, which routinely provide a forum for radical extremist propaganda and disinformation, and highlight the inaccuracies they report. This is also an opportunity to explain Western policy rational and more importantly foster the appearance of engagement with the Middle Eastern community. The goal is to draw the Arab culture into dialogue with the West and create a forum other than terrorism to argue ideological differences.

Conclusion…
The dilemma of Al Qaeda highlights the current status of global terrorism. The future of its leadership as well as its focus, whether ideological or operational, will go a long way towards its longevity and future as a terrorist organization. This translates to other global terrorist actors as they draw attention from multiple states and become a target of a concerted international effort. Is the future of global terrorist organizations an ideological or operational one?

Iraq also has a large part to play in the future of global terrorism. A failed Iraq will be a disaster for the West, culminating in an environment conducive to terrorist training, an operational safe-haven and validate geo-political support for radical extremist ideologies. A successful Iraq, however, will greatly hamper the ability of current state sponsors of terror to continue the status quo, it will prove the radical extremists wrong and it will serve as an example of global cooperation in combating the enabling factors of terrorism.

The key to defeating global terrorism lies in the development of a core strategy aimed at correcting the environmental elements that support it. This strategy must be developed with cultural differences in mind and it must be supported by the global international community. The most important element of the core strategy is the information campaign, as this presents the true face of the strategy and also for an engagement with the communities it is intended to impact.

The West thinks geo-politically while the Middle East thinks ideologically. Neither culture is likely to change this paradigm; therefore it is imperative to translate these policies and their messages into contexts that can be understood by both cultures. Until this is achieved, terrorism and counter-terrorism will remain growth industries.
[1] God willing.

Anticipatory Self-defense in the 21st Century

2005-06-11T09:16:00.001Z

Anticipatory Self-defense
In the 21st Century

By
B.E.N.
June 6, 2005

Thesis…
The events of 9/11 and the actions of the United States thereafter have thrust the issue of preemptive force to the forefront of international legal debate. The historical understanding of anticipatory self-defense revolves around conventional threats, but does this standard in a post 9/11 environment adequately deal with unconventional and catastrophic threats? Does international law have a special application in regards to the use of preemptive force towards terrorism and or weapons of mass destruction or should these be judged in the same light as conventional threats?

In the Beginning…
Legal justification for anticipatory self-defense goes back to the writings of Hugo Grotius in 1625. In his On the Laws of War and Peace, he states that, “when an assailant seizes any weapon with an apparent intention to kill me I have a right to anticipate and prevent the danger.” However, he qualifies this by pointing out that, “The danger must be immediate.”

Roughly a century later, Emmerich de Vattel penned in his The Law of Nations that the use of force is either an act of aggression, retaliation or, “to prevent one [war] which she [foreign force] is preparing to do, and thus avert a danger with which she seems to threaten us.” Vattel continues by justifying anticipatory self-defense with:

When a neighbour, in the midst of a profound peace, erects fortresses on our frontier, equips a fleet, augments his troops, assembles a powerful army, fills his magazines, — in a word when he makes preparations for war, — are we allowed to attack him, with a view to prevent the danger with which we think ourselves threatened? The answer greatly depends on the manner and character of that neighbour. We must inquire into the reasons of those preparations, and bring him to an explanation… and if his sincerity be justly suspected, securities may be required of him. His refusal in this case, would furnish ample indication of sinister designs, and a sufficient reason to justify us in anticipating them.

However, the modern model for the use of anticipatory self-defense was put forward by former U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster in his correspondence with Great Britain over the sinking of the Caroline by British forces in 1837. In his letters to Lord Ashburton, Webster concedes that states reserve the right to self-defense but that certain criteria must be met to justify the action. He asserts that the state must, “show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Webster further asserts that, “even supposing the necessity of the moment… the act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it,” thus adding that an element of proportionality exists for the action.

The United Nations and the Use of Force…
The Charter of the United Nations was developed in the aftermath of the Second World War with the intended goal of, “[saving] succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” One of the strongest articles within the document towards this end is article 2(4) which states that, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

The use of force is authorized within the charter in two locations and for two purposes only. The first is in article 42, which authorizes the UN Security Council (UNSC) to use force to enforce resolutions and or to restore peace in international conflict. It states:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”

The second lies in article 51, which deals with the issue of self-defense. It states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

So the charter clearly asserts that member states are not to use force ever in an aggressive manner, unless sanctioned and under the auspices of the UNSC or in self-defense. Of note in article 51, it asserts the right of a state to defend itself “if an armed attack occurs,” but does the statement imply that if and only if an attack occurs, which would thereby remove any justification for anticipatory action. Customary international law has supported a states right to anticipatory self-defense for centuries, so can it be assumed that states who sign the charter have surrendered this right? In the judgment of Hans Koechler, chairman of the Philosophy Department at the University of Innsbruck, article 51 limits defensive actions. He has said that he is, “skeptical about this possibility [for preemptive action], because the wording of Article 51 of the [UN] Charter, in my interpretation, relates to attacks post factum. I do not see how one might interpret Article 51 in a way as to justify preventive war or preventive strikes.”

Further complicating the issue, article 2(4) specifically prohibits the threat of force against “the territorial integrity or political independence” of a state, but the question that arises from this is if a state’s territory is not threatened, nor is its political independence, then is military action prohibited? This was the justification used by the British in their seizing of the Suez Canal with the French from the Egyptians in 1956. The United Kingdom argued that their action was in defense of the international waterway and was not intended to harm the territorial integrity of Egypt or affect its political independence and was therefore not in conflict with the UN Charter.

But as Terence Taylor, the President and Executive Director for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, has pointed out, states have been reluctant to justify their actions as anticipatory self-defense. For one he notes the US blockade of Cuba was justified under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which deals with regional arrangements and was claimed to be a regional peacekeeping effort. Even in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli 6-Day War, Taylor states that Israel justified it actions, not as anticipatory self-defense but instead announced that a state of war continued to exist between Egypt and Israel from the 1956 conflict. He continues that when Israel did claim anticipatory self-defense in its 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Osirak, “the international community roundly condemned them.”

The restrictionist view on anticipatory self-defense agrees with the literal translation that article 51, affirming that states must wait until an actual attack happens before the use of force is legitimized. Moreover, Dr. Christine Gray, a stern critic of preemptive force, asserts that the “[reluctance] expressly to invoke anticipatory self-defense is in itself a clear indication of the doubtful status of this justification for the use of force.”

Proponents of preemptive force claim, however, that the reference to an “inherent right” is evidence that the charter was not to replace conditions of self-defense established prior to the charter. As Judge Schwebel, formerly of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), quotes H. Lauterpacht in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua v. United States of America, “the right to use force… in self-defense constitutes a permanent limitation of the prohibition of recourse to force in any system of law.” Sir Humphrey Waldock, another former justice to the ICJ, continues that, “It would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending state to allow its assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow… To read Article 51 otherwise is to protect the aggressor's right to the first strike.”

Unfortunately, even though several opportunities have presented themselves to shed some more light on the guidelines of anticipatory action (such as the Nicaragua case); the international community has thus far sidestepped the issue. This has thus left a deficit in consensus on what constitutes a justification for anticipatory self-defense in the eyes of the United Nations and the international community in general beyond what was established in customary international law prior to the charter.

Necessity, Imminence and Proportionality…
As stated by Webster, necessity, imminence and proportionality are needed to justify the use of preemptive force. These criteria have continued to be echoed through the years by various academics with little change. However, where the change has come in, it has been in addressing threats of an unconventional or catastrophic nature.

The first step in determining whether anticipatory action is justified is by reviewing the nature of the threat. The conventional or unconventional/catastrophic character of the threat impacts the criteria of anticipatory self-defense, and must be addressed differently between the two.

Conventional Threats…
Conventional threats are typically personified in classical military forces and are the types of threats envisioned by Grotius and Vattel. They are the armies, navies and air forces of the world and are the primary element of force used by the sovereign. These threats are easily identified in that they offer traditional military markings and are usually overt in nature.

Since conventional threats are typically an element of state government, therefore the politics of the state and thereby the character of the threat can be examined through the state’s actions and rhetoric. For example, removing international peacekeeping troops or closing strategic shipping routes such as international straits can illuminate the intentions or mens rea if you will of the aggressor. It is important to note that rhetoric alone is not enough to judge state intentions entirely; however, they do provide an amplifying effect to observed state action.

It is also important to note what the repercussions of inaction would be. If the state did not act preemptively, how would the perceived threat impact the security of the state? This is important in that while no state should sit idly by while their interests are damaged, however, tactical impacts do not carry the same level of necessity that a strategic impact would.

The capability of the threat is also important in determining the need for preemptive action, for theoretically, 100,000 medics on the border do not pose the same threat that 100,000 marines do. Therefore, when dealing with conventional forces, it is important to understand the capacity of the enemy threat, as best as possible, prior to any action.

Once the capability of the threat has been determined along with its character or perceived intentions, the state must question the imminence of the threat. Importantly, what is the location of the threat? Based off of the previously determined capability, location provides the single most relevant element of information in ascertaining imminence of the threat.

Further more, based on the capability of the threat, have the proper steps to realize its full potential been taken by the enemy? For example, if a threat is in the form of a missile attack, but the missiles are still crated and have not been set up in working order, then there exists more a potential threat as opposed to a realized one. However, if the systems are active and online, then the threat can be said to be real. There must also be a level of immediate need to deal with the threat that prohibits a peaceful undertaking by both sides.

Finally when determining the proportionality of the preemptive force, will the action be limited to what is necessary to stop or prevent the threat and is every element of the preemptive force needed for the threat, and if not, what is the purpose of the additional forces?

In light of the needed criteria for preemptive action towards conventional threats, it has become much more difficult to justify the need for anticipatory self-defense. With the technological advancements of the 21st century, it is hard to imagine that a state could not find open communication or diplomatic channels to voice concern over. Further more, it is less likely, given the global satellite coverage- both commercial and government- that a state could amass a large enough force to cause concern without being noticed prior to the point of imminence.

Webster’s criteria for anticipatory self-defense seem to satisfactorily address conventional threats in the 21st century, but what about unconventional and catastrophic threats?

Unconventional and Catastrophic Threats…
Unconventional threats are by definition different from conventional ones. While they may contain elements of conventional forces such as military Special Forces (US Navy SEALs, British SAS, etc), they are typically comprised of state paramilitary forces or non-state actors and can consist of guerilla forces, terrorist organizations or state intelligence agencies.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) defines unconventional threats or war as a:

[Broad] spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces, who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.

When reviewing the criteria of anticipatory self-defense, it is important to understand the perceived threat that unconventional threats, particularly terrorism, and catastrophic threats, specifically Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons present.

The closest the international community came to defining terrorism was in the convention of the League of Nations in 1937, which never came into existence. It stated terrorism was, "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public." Today the international community relies on 12 conventions to loosely define terrorism, but many states have not yet signed the conventions or have yet to enact them. The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) defined terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” However, Alex Schmid, a terrorism expert, probably provides the best and most comprehensive definition of terrorism as:

… an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

While the international community has not settled on a definition of terrorism itself, it has, as far back as 1954, condemned the support of international terrorist organizations. In the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1954, written by the International Law Commission, it lists the following in article 2(4) as an offense to the peace and security of mankind:

The organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by the authorities of a State, of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the territory of another State, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct participation in or support of such incursions.

Meanwhile catastrophic threats have a clear definition and lie in the realm of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or CBRN. These threats cause large numbers of acute casualties, long-term disease and disability, psychological trauma and mass panic. Either conventional or unconventional forces can use these, with the definitive difference lying in the overt or covert delivery of the weapon along with a state sanction of the action.

Fueling the necessity of preemptive action is the inability to deter terrorist groups, specifically Islamic ones, which accept and practice suicide operations. How can a state deter an organization willing to die for its beliefs and actually uses the death itself as a combative tactic? Couple this with the force multiplying nature of CBRN weapons and the argument for necessary preemptive actions is strengthened.

The intention of these groups continues to elucidate the necessity of action. The ideological and religious fervor of the actors and their willingness to sacrifice all, including their lives, removes elements of pacific settlement in contentious situations. With a blind hatred and desire for total annihilation of the state, an atmosphere of kill-or-be-killed develops.
The criterion of imminence is further obscured as the clandestine nature of terrorist organizations greatly impedes a states ability to discern actions prior to their fruition. CBRN in the hands of these clandestine groups is especially devastating as these weapons are usually small in nature to begin with and can be easily concealed.

Based on the sacrificial nature of some terrorist threats, and the devastating capability of CBRN, it is difficult to determine what is the proportional amount of force to be used against these threats. Since terrorist groups are usually non-state actors, the complicity of the state where the groups exists must be reviewed. For example, the U.S. conflict in Afghanistan, while not anticipatory in nature, held that the ruling faction in Afghanistan was party enough to the terrorist act of 9/11 that it warranted war. However, the U.S., based off of the same terrorist act of 9/11, did not feel that Saudi Arabia was complicit in the act even though 15 of the 19 highjackers were from Saudi Arabia.

Assuredly, the use of preemptive force cannot be tit-for-tat in nature. If a terrorist group planned to use a nuclear weapon in a metropolitan area of America, the U.S. could not justifiably preempt the act with its own nuclear arsenal.

Unlike conventional threats, the devastating nature of CBRN and terrorism promote the need for anticipatory self-defense. However, the complicating element in the use of preemptive force doesn’t lie in the terrorist threat per se, but rather in the complicity of the host state.

Furthermore, it could legitimately be argued that the element of imminence is continuous based on the clandestine nature of terrorism and the devastating effects of WMD. At the least, a general threat alone could be enough justification. For sure, each case of preemptive force must be reviewed individually and not through a blanket doctrine of anticipatory action.

Preempting Unconventional & Catastrophic Threats in International Law…
While states are expected to present security threats to the UNSC for peaceful resolution, in a global environment of WMD and terrorism, the ramifications of delaying preemptive action may be more than states can afford. Rosalyn Higgins, current British justice to the ICJ has held the view that, “in a nuclear age, common sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a state to passively accept its fate before it can defend itself.”

This premise is pursued further in the 2002 U.S. NSS, which recognizes the sovereign right of a state to anticipatory self-defense, but contends that the classical criteria for the use of preemptive force is not up to the challenges of the 21st century. The document calls on the international community to, “adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries,” qualifying that the threats do not seek to use conventional means of force. “Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning,” and thus justifying a different set of criteria for preemptive action.

When is necessity clear when dealing with terrorist groups or CBRN weapons? The act of terrorism usually happens without warning and against poorly defended targets or soft-targets. Amplify this with WMD and how can a state reasonably address the threat prior to harming its populace? Common sense simply dictates that states address these threats prior to their full fruition.

But there is a slippery slope here. In the case of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, which have consistently and continuously attacked U.S. interests over the years, there isn’t a question of preemption. But what about groups that have not committed terrorist acts yet but intend to? Must the state wait until the attack is imminent before acting? If a an organization that has stated it intends to use CBRN weapons against a state, then begins to develop these types of weapons, does it then become a legitimate target of preemption by the state? Is lethality a mitigating factor in determining imminence or necessity?

Absolutely, states have not and do not wait for these types of threats to fully mature if possible prior to acting. While non-military elements (law enforcement, intelligence, etc) exist for states to cooperate and counter these organizations to a certain degree, states will be presented with opportunities to neutralize these terrorist factions and will use whatever means is necessary to do so. Especially when faced with the destructive capability of CBRN weapons, the need to proactively pursue and preempt these types of threats manifests itself.

Conclusion…
Grotius and Vattel laid the framework for Webster in defining the criteria needed to justify anticipatory self-defense, but they could not have ever envisioned the clandestine and sacrificing nature of modern day terrorism or the destructive capability of WMD. It is hard to imagine that if these elements of force existed in their time that the criteria for preemptive force would not be different between conventional military threats and unconventional/catastrophic ones.

In the words of Ramesh Thakur:

If preemption is strategically and morally justified (why should an American President wait for another mass murder, and be prohibited from taking prophylactic action?) but not legally permitted, then the existing framework of laws and rules- not the anticipatory military action- is defective.

International law is not static, but rather is dynamic and is based largely on state practice. With the evolution of these 21st century threats to state sovereignty and public safety, the need for states to proactively as well as collectively address the rules of engagement is immediate. There needs to be a separate application of international law to terrorism and WMD.

However, it is extremely important that the international community establish this criterion before states, under the guise or claim of preemptive force, engage in wars that are really preventive in nature. Global society need not address the question of the legality of anticipatory self-defense- it is and has been for centuries- but rather needs to discern the guidelines of such force in the future.

International Institutions and Legal Doctrine

2005-05-26T09:51:00.001Z

International Institutions
and Legal Doctrine

By
B.E.N.
May 25, 2005

In the beginning…
When reviewing the various international institutions and legal doctrines the appearance of international action on the part of states becomes clear. While it may be a matter of debate as to the effectiveness of these in the past, the question before society today is if these global institutions and doctrines can viably be used in the 21st century?

Doctrine…
There exist a vast number of bilateral and multilateral conventions and treaties that deal with the important issues of crime, human rights and the environment in the international community. The United Nations (UN) has taken a leading role in proactively pursuing the progressive development of international law and utilizing existing institutions to pursue this end.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime is, "mandated to assist Member States in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism." The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Convention against Corruption, and the Convention against the Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances are examples of well-established and effective legal doctrines providing substantial support towards the mission of the organization.

In early December of 1948, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) passed resolution 217 A (III), which proclaimed the "universal declaration of human rights." This document set out to state the, "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), whose mission is to "protect and promote all human rights for all" and is, "guided in its work by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights instruments." The UNHCHR goes on to states that, "there are seven core international human rights treaties," which are: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. The commissioner depends on all of these doctrines in its ability to address human rights in the world and further espouses the importance of all.

Global environmental concerns are addressed by the UN Environment Program (UNEP) guided by the legal provisions as laid out in the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration. These allow the organization to fulfill its mandate of coordinating a global environmental policy consensus.

All of these conventions and treaties provide a sound international legal doctrine for contending with international crime, human rights abuses and protecting the environment. Legal doctrine in hand, are international institutions up to the challenge of enforcing these laws and provisions?

Institutions…
There are several international institutions that provide support in the enforcement of international law. Couple these institutions with the efforts of municipal agencies and the growing role of non-governmental organizations and a vast network of viable organizations appear.

International institutions such as Interpol, which can boast of 182 member states, use the above doctrines for fulfilling its stated mission of being, "the world’s pre-eminent police organization in support of all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is preventing, detecting, and suppressing crime."
But the key element in enforcing international law is the individual state’s municipal agencies. For example, the U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "advises the President, Secretary of State, other bureaus in the Department of State, and other departments and agencies within the U.S. Government on the development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime." This and organizations like it, coordinate together in support of the international provisions laid out in international legal doctrines, some of which are mentioned above.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), while not official enforcers of international law, are becoming more and more important in their support of international legal doctrine. Their ability to bring pressure on violators is sometimes more effective than the normal channels. This is especially true in the arena of the environment where groups like the Greenpeace, The World Conservative Union, and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research all work with states and the international community in the development of as well as the enforcement of global policy.

There is also the question of how the international community can punish and resolve disputes involving international law, human rights abuses and the environment. The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a means of promoting, "the rule of law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished." It continues with, "the ICC will be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions," which further shows the importance of municipal judiciary systems.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is a viable system for dealing with environmental law as well as the abuses of human rights. With its ability to call tribunals to deal with heinous situations like what occurred in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, it has a strong avenue for dealing with such human rights atrocities. On the environmental level, the ICJ decision on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project is a good example of how the court can deal with these types of cases as well.

Each of these institutions and organizations contribute to the enforcement and arbitration of criminal, environmental and human rights abuses in the international community. Their ability to work hand in hand strengthens this ability and ensures a proactive and progressive coordination between all concerned. These institutions are up to the challenges of the 21st century.

Conclusion…
The doctrine exists, the institutions are built, the need is apparent- the remaining question is are the individual members of the international community ready to meet these challenges of protecting the international environment, punish global criminals and address the abuses to universal human rights? No universal policeman exists, so it is incumbent on the participation of the international community to come together and collectively address these issues. It can be argued that the signs bode well for dealing with these threats, and one can only hope that the realization of global interdependence will focus all on supporting these legal doctrines and international institutions in their missions sooner rather than later.

Jus Gentium

2005-05-13T09:16:00.001Z

Jus Gentium:
The Law of Nations

By
B.E.N.

April 21, 2005

In the Beginning…
For centuries, states have known and observed an obscure and vastly unstructured element of civil guidance. With no single developer, enforcer or mediator, this guidance has wandered through history slowly coalescing into what we know today as international law. Its development includes the contributions of treaty, doctrine- both religious and political, as well as learned theory and opinion. Courts at almost every level of society, though some more than others, have had opportunities to impact its progression through the ages. International law, once the only restriction existing for the nation-state, is quickly becoming an element that is affecting the lives of everyday people; individuals throughout the world are now forced to contend with the rules of the international society.

But what is international law and how is this different from what we observe everyday in our local communities? And how effective is international law? This essay intends to look at what makes up international law, explaining its difference with the domestic codes we are all familiar with, as well as look at it’s effectiveness in the international community.

Jus Gentium…
Jus gentium or the law of nations has been around since the Roman Empire and was considered "common to all men," and was used by Roman authorities for application to foreigners when Roman law was inappropriate. This is an example of how two thousand years ago there existed the premise that a universal law provided guidance to society, above and beyond what the local governments regulated.

Jus gentium was further expanded by the notion of jus gentium publicum and jus gentium privatum, or public and private law. Public international law revolves around the "political interactions of states", and it is the guidance for how they operate and conduct high politics (diplomacy, national security, etc). Private international law on the other hand relates to legal elements of the global economy as well as the interaction of national legal systems.

So what is the difference between domestic, or municipal, law and international law? Two immediately come to mind- the jurisdiction of the law and the source of the law. Obviously the jurisdiction for municipal law is within the confines of the state, while international jurisdiction is just that, international. All states are obligated to govern themselves within the limits of international law, to include their internal legislation. Therefore, municipal law falls within the jurisdiction of international law and must comply accordingly.

The second difference is the source for the law. In the case of municipal law, it has a central source, typically the law making body. For example, in the US it is Congress, which is guided by the US Constitution. International law, however, is derived from several sources to include the various bilateral and multilateral treaties, customary practice, natural law and general principles thereof.

The Source of Law…
Treaty is by far the most direct of the international law sources. The Vienna Convention defines treaty as, "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law." Further more, it is what is within the document or agreement specifically that matters and is applicable to those who have signed the treaty, thus signaling their obligation and support for the provisions therein. An example of treaty, and its supremacy over municipal law, is evident in Asakura v. City of Seattle.

In this case, Asakura- a Japanese citizen living in Seattle, was a pawnbroker. The city of Seattle passed a law in 1921 saying that pawnbrokers had to have a license, which would only be issued to US citizens. Asakura claimed that this violated a previous treaty signed in 1911 between the US and Japan covering trade and the US Supreme Court agreed. The Court stated that, "The ordinance violates the treaty. The question in the present case relates solely to Japanese subjects who have been admitted to this country."

What we see here is how municipal law has been trumped by international law through the form of treaty, but we also see that the Seattle law was not found void. International law created an exception to the ordinance, applicable only to Japanese citizens. So the effectiveness of the treaty is quite clear, but in a general sense covering a broader spectrum, it is not nearly as successful. Therefore we learn the first key lesson of international law, different sources provide various levels of clarity as well as various levels of applicability, inherently affecting the effectiveness of the law.

Customary law, while not as direct as treaty, is another source of international law. It is comprised of, in the words of Supreme Court Justice Story, "the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing the law." So with customary international law, no single element provides all of the answers, rather its generally a collection of the above showing a commonality in international practice. Amerada Hess v. Argentine Republic is an excellent example of such.

Amerada [Hess Shipping Corp.] leased the oil tanker HERCULES to transport oil from Alaska to the US Virgin Islands for refining. It was in transit from the Virgin Islands back to Alaska and was traveling around South America, invariably taking it near the conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina [the Falklands War]. The US Maritime Administration transmitted a list naming the HERCULES as well as all US flagged vessels, which were neutral to the situation, that would be traveling near the conflict but in international waters and out of the exclusion zones declared by both parties. However, the HERCULES was attacked without warning by Argentine aircraft suffering extensive damage but managed to make it to port in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Upon inspection, it was found that an unexploded bomb was in one of the fuel tanks and that the risk was too great to remove it, therefore the ship was taken out to sea and scuttled.

The US Second Circuit Court found that, "customary rule of international law underscores the longstanding nature of this aspect of freedom of the high seas. Where the attacker [Argentina] has refused to compensate the neutral [Amerada], such action is analogous to piracy, one of the earliest recognized violations of international law." The court listed a variety of international accords, judicial decisions as well as US federal law in citing its decision.

While no direct international document existed to cover this specific situation, a host of applicable sources were used to show a common assumption of all states towards to treatment of neutral vessels. This brings us to the second key lesson of international law, that while no single source may deal with the situation specifically, an understanding of common practice exists and is binding on all states. This greatly expands the effectiveness of international law as well as its applicability to such.

Jus cogens or higher law, is an example of natural law, and is yet another source of international law. As Mark Janis explains jus cogens is, "by its nature and utility, a rule so fundamental to the international community of states as a whole that the rule constitutes a basis for the community’s legal system." Examples of topics covered by jus cogens would be genocide, slavery, or in the opinion of the International Court of Justice, force. The court found that, "the law of the Charter [United Nations Charter] concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens."

Judge Fletcher of the US Ninth Circuit Court describes jus cogens in this way, "Whereas customary international law derives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms constituting jus cogens transcend such consent," which leads us to the third key lesson in international law. There exists certain elemental norms within international law that cannot not be absolved or restricted by other societal inventions. Simply put, states cannot legalize things like murder and still be within the confines of international law, which again strengthens the effectiveness of international adjudication.

Another important source of international law is the element of general principle. As Janis points out, it is, "the basic notion…that a general principle of law is some proposition of law so fundamental that it will be found in virtually every legal system." This becomes an important tool when dealing with situations where no treaty or agreement exists and no customary law can be established. When this occurs, the establishment of a general principle of universal legal acceptance garners immediate importance. General principles can be seen especially in the rules of war, for example, with the principle of proportionality of force. An example of a case relying on general principle is AM&S Europe LTD v Commission [Commission of the European Economic Community].

The AM&S case dealt with the concept of privileged communications. The Commission on the European Economic Community was seeking certain documents from AM&S Europe Ltd. who felt that the documents were protected under lawyer-client privilege. Since the concept of privilege was not covered under the Common Market Treaty the European Court of Justice decided to take, "into account the principles and concepts common to the laws of those States concerning the observance of confidentiality, in particular, as regards certain communications between lawyer and client."

The importance of the general principle concept, and the fourth key lesson in international law, is that it can establish legal norms common to foreign jurisdictions within the international community. An added benefit or aspect of general principles is that they can be valuable in establishing customary international law.

The Tie that Binds…
As shown here, international law is literally a melting pot of legal opinions, decisions, legislation and agreements. The effectiveness of international law lies with the willingness of the international community to accept it. With the growing interdependence of the world and a continued push towards supranational organizations to fill the role of global manager, the effectiveness and participation of the global community is assured.

Granted, by the very nature of international law, there will continue to be examples of how international law has failed or was irrelevant. Filartiga is a prime example of this, but the vast acceptance of international decisions as law will continue to bind states and regulate the world community according to the tools and sources mentioned above. The point of no return has been reached, and it is up to the global community to accept and nurture international law into what the world society wants and expects accordingly.

Critical Theory & Dependency Theory: A critical Review Through the Lens of Neo-Realism

2005-05-13T09:12:00.001Z

Critical Theory & Dependency Theory:
A Critical Review Through the
Lens of Neo-Realism

By
B.E.N.

Critical and dependency theories provide an interesting alternative to the mainstream concepts of realist and liberal international relations. In their development, they were designed to address specific issues that their authors did not think were properly covered by older schools of thought. In addition, their development, while around specific issues, was expanded to present an overall theory in international relations while primarily addressing their core issues.

Critical Theory
Robert Cox and his alternative premise of critical theory specifically looks at the development and implementation of change. His essay Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory examined established international relations theories and set out to challenge their ability to deal with change. He challenged these theories in three ways, 1) while appreciating the holistic intent of some theories (realism & world systems theory) he warns against treating abstract conclusions as material as this may prevent the development of a true holistic approach. 2) Cox felt that state and social forces must be considered jointly to properly gauge the trajectory created by historical processes and 3) there needs to be a empirical-historical methodology developed to accommodate and explain change more effectively.

For Cox, there are two types of theory: problem solving and critical theory. Problem solving focuses on the existing theoretical framework and political conditions to isolate and address issues. Critical theory focuses on rejecting existing social and political order to favor an ideology instead of the status quo. With this said, he primarily supports the concept of critical theory while allowing for the periodic need of problem solving theory.

He then lays out five purposes for critical theory with the first being that, "action is never absolutely free." Second, theory and action are both shaped by the problematic and, "the task of theorizing can never be finished in an enclosed system but must continually be begun anew." Thirdly he states that, "the framework for action changes over time and the principle goal of critical theory is to understand these changes." Next is the point that frameworks have the form of historical structure helping them to influence action. Finally, Cox explains that the framework is to be examined from outside in terms of conflict so as to open the possibility of transformation.

Cox’s critical theory and its focus on change provide a valuable tool for addressing the specific, but as a general theory for international relations its attributes are not so appealing. The concept of rejecting existing social and political orders to effect change in support of a specific ideology every time an issue arises is simply not practical. Besides the fact that the solution to an issue may not require the changing of the system in the first place, but rather just the actions within the system. While Cox states that problem-solving theory is necessary, he feels that it is vastly inferior to critical theory. This places entirely too much emphasis on the later while not supporting the advantages of the former.

Critical theory does provide a thorough and detailed roadmap in developing solutions completely foreign to existing frameworks. An example of this trait might be the interaction of foreign cultures, especially on the economic level. This is the strong suit of critical theory in its ability to create frameworks that address different systems and bridge them together.

However, with the expansion of globalization and the vast global interaction that exists today, the need for this aspect of critical theory is questionable. With the ever-expanding global capability of communication, cooperation and coordination through current frameworks, the need to bridge dissimilar systems together is quickly fading. In reality it is the problem-solving theory that is what will provide the necessary tools for dealing with issues in today’s globalized society.

Dependency Theory
Dependency theory, as espoused by Thomas Lynch in Foundations of Radicalism, again provides a general theory to international relations that revolves around a single element. His heavy draw on Marxism and the ideological focus of class structure within the economics of the state call for a general theory on international relations while focussing on a specific issue.

Like realism or neo-realism, Marxism- the main contributor to dependency theory- is focused on the motivations and instincts of man stating that man’s fundamental nature is pre-disposed towards conflict. Unlike realism or neo-realism, dependency theory builds upon the notion of economically divergent classes looking specifically at the inequality of states based on international economic requirements of capitalism.

The social critique within dependency theory is that industrialized states in the capitalist system require the exploitation of impoverished colonies to survive economically. This inequality feature is a permanent element of the capitalist system, causing tension and conflict on a continual basis or until the end of this system. Couple this with the concept of dependent development were 3rd world states depend on 1st world states for technology, financing, and knowledge to such a degree that their growth is totally dependent on the "vicissitudes" of an economic system designed to abuse them. Based on this premise, dependency theory calls for the violent overthrow of capitalism with the justification of the parasitic nature of 1st world states on the 3rd world.

There are three Marxist fundamentals included in dependency theory: 1) is the ideology requiring the impoverished class, in this case 3rd world states, to rise up and seize power in the form of a revolution. 2) Calls for a blueprint or roadmap for brutal and oppressive/repressive political and economic actions to sustain the accomplishments of the revolution and 3) is the promotion of an appealing view of the future to placate the masses to allow for the consolidation of the new anti-capitalist system.

The overall-driving goal of dependency theory is first and foremost the destruction of the capitalist system, followed by the redistribution of wealth in the international economic system. The concept completely disregards the notion of power in that it inherently calls for a reorganization of the system anytime one-state gathers more power than any other does. This structure is therefore extremely violent and calls for continual repression on human rights.
One element similar to neo-realism in that it subscribes to the concept that states are not equal in their capabilities, but it diverges greatly in its solution to the discrepancy. Since the theory was developed during the bipolar system between the capitalist United States and the communist Soviet Union, it has since witnessed the demise of the communist system and the vast expansion of capitalism placing dependency theory in a highly questionable state as to its validity.

A Tale of Two Theories…
Critical and dependency theories both focus primarily on specific issues within the international system, providing a framework that addresses a certain ideology. This element of ideology is the first obvious difference to neo-realism and realism in general. But more importantly, these concepts are designed to address and support states that have failed to prosper in the current system. In essence, since these states cannot succeed under the current rules per se, these theories simply call for new rules that are in favor of the failing states.

This mentality is ludicrous in that examples of 3rd world success in the capitalist system exist, providing great challenge to the soundness of their arguments. States like the four tigers (Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea) have managed to adapt their internal economic systems to take advantage of certain elements within the global economy. More striking yet is the fact that communist China, the strongest and most powerful communist state in the world today, is transforming its economic system to a more capitalist economy because it no longer has faith in the communist mantra. These states have become successful in the capitalist system not through changing the system or through revolution but rather by focusing on the current framework and applying its structure to their strong suits.

These theories may have continued life if they are refined to focus on their specific issues or elements instead of trying to force them into a general theory covering the vast school of international relations. Critical theory provides an excellent framework for states on a domestic level to reassess their current system and adjust to it. With this in mind, it can provide a viable tool for improvement to both realist and liberal theorists, especially neo-realists who need to focus on a state’s inability to meet certain needs, specifically security, and develop corrective action. However, the problem-solving element must not be discarded as it provides solution development once a new security system has been installed.

Dependency theory, however, is highly questionable in its ability to deal with not only its specific issue of economic disparity but also as a general structure in the international system. With the overwhelming and undeniable collapse of the communist system and the massive trend towards capitalistic tendencies, the arguments and solutions presented by Lynch seem not only outdated but also simply wrong. It would even be a stretch to try and claim any improvement on liberalism in general with this premise based again on the vast number of shortcomings and the extreme limitation of noting successful examples of the theory. Based on this, the employment of this theory would be regressive rather than an improvement.

Therefore, based on the analysis of the two theories, the former should be adapted and refined to the specific with the later being completely discarded. Critical theory has much to offer international relations when focused on its specialty, and is particularly useful for the neo-realist concept as they develop new security strategies for the state.

Cooperation and Neo-Realism

2005-05-13T09:10:00.001Z

Cooperation and Neo-Realism

By
B.E.N.

Cooperation is normally referred to as a liberal idea and is often seen as an opposite to the realist or neo-realist mindsets in regards to international theory. However, I do not think this premise or assumption is entirely correct because all international theories provide for some form of cooperation, especially in neo-realism. When the premise of cooperation is examined, this element becomes more obvious to the analyst and allows then the application of some of these characteristics of cooperation to the neo-realist premise.

Collective Security
The idea of collective security, a form of cooperation, is not unique to liberal theorists. In the theory of neo-realism, collective security becomes increasingly apparent when dealing with the balance of power or even bandwagoning. While the former is always preferred to the later, the element of collective agreements remains the same.

Inis Claude Jr. stated several valuable points to collective security, which are applicable to the neo-realist theory on international relations. First, Claude pointed out that collective security is a specialized instrument of international policy intended to forestall arbitrary and aggressive use of force and was not intended to provide enforcement mechanisms for international law in general. What this says is that collective security is focussed purely on the premise of state security, which is the single driving goal for neo-realists.

He continues by stating that, in regards to world order, collective security provides restraint of military action instead of guaranteeing respect for international law. Collective security is not an ideal, but rather a tool used in an anarchic system to help provide security to states that feel they are incapable of dealing with their threats individually. Collective security uses diplomatic, economic and military sanctions as equipment to induce a rational decision of avoiding national damage.

Collective security is designed to provide the certainty of collective action in the face of aggression. It reassures the victim and deters the aggressor, ensuring that the resources of the community are mobilized. Again this supports the elements of balance of power in neo-realism and supports the premise that states will balance against powerful nations rather than bandwagon with them.

Cooperation and International Regimes
Robert Keohane has argued several points about cooperation and international regimes that apply to the neo-realist premise as well. Keohane’s first point is that cooperation can only come from conflict or the potential for conflict. This is supported by the neo-realist theory because the world is in an anarchic state with all states focussing on the need for security from threats to state survival. Based off of this, discord therefore stimulates interaction, which will intern either foster cooperation or more discord.

Second, international regimes, also known as alliances, focus on global conflict and provide a pattern that allows for states to look at different situations with some semblance of predictability. These patterns of cooperation or discord therefore highlight situations and connect them to past occurrences, thereby keeping them from being isolated events. Neo-realists, while they believe there is no difference in the function of the units or states, do believe there are vast difference in the capabilities of these units so the makeup of regimes and their ability to deal with conflict becomes increasingly important.

Another element of regimes, supported by neo-realism, is that the norms and rules of regimes have an effect on the actions of states, even if self-interested units focussed on mutual adjustment use them. States pursue policies that support their security, regimes are collective tools towards that end. Since few regimes actually compete against one another directly, this narrows the number of units competing against one another. When the number of main actors in the system decreases, which regimes do, then the system becomes less anarchic and therefore more stable in neo-realist theory. Therefore regimes are an important element of neo-realism and help promote state security.

Tit for Tat
Robert Axelrod promotes a theory of reciprocity. Responses to other states are to be reciprocal to their actions, and therefore, if a state acts in good faith, then the response should be an act in good faith. The same applies to acts in bad faith as well as their responses; this is a very realist premise. He also promotes the interaction of smaller groups as he feels that the members of these groups interact more than larger groups.

While the concepts of Axelrod are premised on game theory and are limited in their structure and development, the belief of reciprocity and interaction of smaller units in the face of adverse situations shows a theory that thrives in the face of negativity, providing benefits, while striving for a better paradigm. This strongly supports the idea of neo-realism while holding out for better situations.

The Ties that Bind
By looking at the elements of the collective security, cooperation and international regimes and game theory we can effectively provide a strong, thorough understanding of the cooperative nature of neo-realism and see how these separate and independent theories on international relations make up a large portion of the neo-realist mindset.

Game theory really provides the foundation for the cooperative element of neo-realism. The concept of reciprocity is extremely important and is not to be underestimated. For states to consider cooperation, two things are assured- they are either very weak or very strong; there is no middle ground. This is important to understand as the repercussions of defection or the benefits of cooperation are on the opposite ends of the spectrum. If a state cooperates but the other defects, then that state is severely hampered while the other is greatly rewarded. This really affects the expectations that the participating states will have on the interaction, so the expectation of cooperation is low and states will do what is safe- defect, thus at least getting some benefits even though they could have gotten more.

This ties into the neo-realist theory as this type of interaction happens in an anarchic system with no central authority that ensures all states play "fair". As stated earlier, weak states must make the effort to cooperate so as to garner as much benefit as possible while powerful states will participate as they can afford to take the chance on defection.

The element of reciprocity involved in game theory also plays a large part of neo-realism. States, in an environment of cooperation, must be able to trust the actions and intentions of the other participating states. While the dependence exists, there must also be an element of enforcement for when that trust is broken, meaning that when one state defects it should and does expect the other to respond in kind, thus ending the cooperative regime or alliance.

This brings us to the cooperation concept of collective security. Collective security is a focus on security, pure and simple, and it is the goal of neo-realists to attain maximum security. The tools of collective security are diplomatic, economic and military, which are all elements of power. Power is the primary tool used by neo-realists to attain security, therefore, collective security uses the power of the collective to attain security for the collective.

Collective security is achieved through cooperation by states and is typically in the form of collective security regimes. These international regimes provide a vehicle for states that on their own, could not withstand a particular threat. Members of the regime face the same threat and each one independently could not ensure their own security in the face of it, so it is the mission of the regime to collectively pool together the resources and capabilities of the members to effectively counter and defeat the threat. The regime provides the security that the individual members could not attain independently, thus balancing power in the system. These collective security regimes also reduce the number of main actors in the system, thus providing a stabilizing factor as prescribed in the neo-realist theory.

Conclusion
Cooperation is an important tool used by neo-realists and liberals alike, but is particularly an important piece in the neo-realist theory. The premise of reciprocity, collective security, and the effects of international regimes all contribute important characteristics to neo-realism. These elements all provide tools to the state, which then uses them in its pursuit of security in the international system. Without cooperation, security would be a goal well out of the reach of most states and an enormous obstacle when attempting to balance the power of others. Its absence would leave the world as a very volatile, destabilized and violent environment with little need for diplomacy and little hope for peace.

Waltz on Morgenthau: Neo-Realism vs Realism

2005-05-13T09:06:00.001Z

Waltz on Morgenthau:
Neo-Realism vs. Realism

By
B.E.N.

Realism has been the dominant theory for international relations for the last 2500 years. Ever since Thucydides analyzed the Peloponnesian War, theorists like Machiavelli, Bismarck, Hobbes, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz have all added something to the premise of realism. However, it was the writings of Politics Among Nations by Hans Morgenthau in 1948 that is truly credited with espousing the full parameters of realism as an international theory. Morgenthau’s theory of international politics is based on fixed premises and has six main principles.

The first principle is that, "political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature." Since human nature does not change, and these objective laws are based on human nature, then we can state that these objective laws do not change. This is necessary to distinguish, "between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgement, divorced from the facts as they are informed by prejudice and wishful thinking."

The second principle is that "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power." Statesmen will pursue policies that gather more power for the state.

Thirdly, "realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power in an objective category which is universally valid," means that politics always has interests in gathering more power, however, because of the variables associated with states, the interests or means for gathering power may not necessarily be the same.

The fourth principle revolves around the moral significance of political action. Meaning, "realism maintains that universal moral principals cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place." While morality can drive the actions of both the state and the individual, an individual can sacrifice themselves in the name of an ideal while a state can do no such thing. Morality for a state, therefore, must be balanced by the prudence of state survival.

Fifth is the principle of how, "political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe." State actions in the "name of God" are indefensible and history has shown these to lead towards self-destruction.

Finally, Morgenthau’s sixth principle is that, "the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere." In other words, political realists think in terms of power just as economists think in terms of wealth or lawyers in terms of laws. Realism is an intellectually independent frame of mind.

Based on these principles, the realist tends to have a rather pessimistic view on human nature and since state action is based on human nature this transitions into a negative view on state strategy. States are selfish, competitive and exist in a global community in a constant state of anarchy. Nations are only interested in increasing their power in both real terms as well as relative to other nations. There is no "good" nation or "bad" nation per se, rather there are powerful nations and weak nations with the powerful states attempting to maintain the status quo while the weaker states are trying to change it.

In 1979, Kenneth Waltz attempted to present a more scientific approach to realism to try to answer some of the criticism of the classic definition of realism with his book titled Theory of International Politics. Waltz set out to explain the anarchic nature of the international system and why it tends to reproduce itself. He premised that the international system had three pieces to its structure.

The first was the principle ordering of the political units within a system. The system is anarchic not in a sense of chaos but because there is no central authority to order it. Due to this lack of authority, states are forced into a mindset of self-help in their quest for survival. This is generally done through military capability and forces all states to perform in the same role, even if they do not have the ability to do so.

Because of the anarchic nature of the system, Waltz states in his second principle that the functions of the differentiated units is self reliance, or all states fill the same function- survival. Because the international system has no order, each state must be a separate, autonomous and equal unit counting only on its own resources because it cannot rely on other to provide them.
Finally, his third principle is that while states cannot be differentiated by their function, they can be separated by their capabilities. Because the capabilities of states are unequal and ever shifting, the measurement of capabilities can define the relative power of states with others. This can also allow for behavior prediction of a state with regards to the balance of power in the system.

Waltz continues by pointing out that when states are confronted with balance versus bandwagon, they will always prefer to balance against power rather than bandwagon with it. This is because the power of others is always considered a threat. This is not to say bandwagoning does not happen, but it tends to be very weak states that are in no position to balance against any power.

Looking at both theories, we begin to see one of two key differences. While both theories expect policymakers to act in a rational manner, Morgenthau’s classical view of realism (classical realism) follows the line of thought that state behavior is power-oriented whereas Waltz’s new view of realism (neo-realism) views the actions of states in terms of security.

The other difference, based on the first, is the effect of certainty on the international system. For classical realists, since state actions are based on the desire for power, the certainty of the system results in more conflict because threats can be more easily ascertained and accounted for. Therefore, a bipolar system would be more prone to conflict because the threat from other powers is minimal, while a multi-polar system would be less prone to conflict because the threat of the other powers forming coalitions is greater.

Neo-realists, however, believe in just the opposite. Because their focus is on security rather than power, the more simple the system is, the more stable it becomes and therefore less prone to conflict. So a bipolar system is less prone to conflict while a multi-polar system is more prone to violence.

History tends to support the neo-realist argument on conflict. Europe, since the Battle of Hastings, has had multiple powers all fighting for supremacy simultaneously. The history of conflict between France, England, Prussia and Austria is long and bloody. Conflict is nothing new to the European continent starting with the 100 years war in the 14th century or the 30 years war in the 17th century. The world saw violence in the seven years war in the 18th century that expanded off of the European continent, Napoleon’s conquests, Bismarck’s unification, the First World War and finally ending with the Second World War when the European powers had finally managed to pound themselves into dust. This timeline of multi-polarity was plagued with war almost on a constant basis with all the European powers vying for control and dominance in the European Theater. While different states managed to have the upper hand for certain periods of time, the jockeying for power, influence and security dominated the strategies of all the major states.

Following the Second World War, only two global states still had the military prowess, economic infrastructure and global stature to drive international affairs- the United States and the Soviet Union. This was the birth of the bipolar system as the European powers of earlier centuries were in no position to stand against either power. It is also at this time that major conflict trends downward with wars remaining within regions as opposed to spreading globally.

Reviewing the differences between classical realism and neo-realism, it is evident that international relations has fallen inline more with the neo-realist premise than the other way around. Pre-WWII, the global system was in a constant state of multi-polarity and it was only after this conflict that the global system was able to transition into a new paradigm. This new paradigm of the bipolar system confirmed the premise behind the neo-realist mindset- certainty leads to peace. Instead of a push for power, states began making moves that supported security. Whether it was the development of arms in the West and the East, the political jockeying in the United Nations or bilateral diplomacy between the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact, or even economic expansion with the ideology of capitalism competing against communism, states were positioning for security.

Of course, examples of more power-oriented moves can caveat the discussion, but these are the exceptions as opposed to the rule. With the global playing field being completely leveled with the exception of two, and with the rest of the global player’s development completely dependent on the will of the remaining powers, the global system transitioned into a new paradigm that confirmed the neo-realist concept. Morgenthau’s expansion on realism has provided many students of international relations with the ground work for understanding realism in general, however, Waltz’s expansion on his premise was necessary to fully understand and accurately see the global system for what it is and how it functions.

The United Nations: Peace in the 21st Century

2005-05-13T02:28:00.001Z

The United Nations:
Peace in the 21st Century

By B.E.N.
May 11, 2005

In the Beginning…
The statement, "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;" defines the purpose of the United Nations (UN). It is this purpose, along with the vast membership of the body that bestows the solemn responsibility of maintaining and projecting peace through the international system on the UN. But is it up to the challenge of maintaining peace in the 21st century? This essay will show that the UN, per international law, is responsible for global peace, but under the current designs, it is not living up to its obligations.

What’s in a Charter…
There are 191 members to the UN, all of which have signed the UN Charter. The only state to have not joined the UN is the Vatican City, therefore, every nation (with the exception of the Vatican) in the world has become a signatory to the charter; a treaty obligating these states to the provisions stated within. So with the universal acceptance of the UN charter, what does this document state, and how does this impact the institution’s ability to maintain global peace?
As stated earlier, Article 1 Section 1 (Article 1(1)) of the charter states the purpose of the UN- to maintain international peace and security. Article 2(2) states that members "shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter" with Article 2(3) requiring states to solve their differences "by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered," which is amplified by Article 2(4) that calls for the members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." So all members are required to observe the charter, which further demands that states pursue peaceful means of settling disputes and requires states additionally to refrain from the use of force.

There are few exceptions to the use of force. Article 51 states that, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." But this seems to state that the attack must have either already occurred or is imminent. While this allows force for self-defense, it also states clearly the intention for the UNSC to address the issue if it threatens international peace. Article 24(1) clearly specifies that "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." Article 25 then cements this role, which states, "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

So thus far it is evident that the UN is responsible for international peace and every state in the world, save one, has acknowledged this role. Furthermore, states have agreed to refrain from the use of force unless it falls specifically within the stated exceptions for such. Moreover, the UNSC has been designated as the institutional organization responsible specifically for the task of maintaining global peace and all states have agreed to accept and carry out the decision of the Council. All of this falls neatly into treaty law, by far the most binding of international law. But has it worked?

A Shaky Track Record…
Since the UN was established in 1945, there have been 74 conflicts with 34 of those falling within the parameters of civil war. Of the twenty most devastating wars of the 20th century, nine of them have occurred following the institution’s creation. Some of the wars have UNSC resolutions addressing them, however most do not. But why the flagrant violation of international law? With few exceptions like the Korean War, which acted under the auspices of the UNSC, the majority of these wars were in direct violation of the agreed UN Charter. Therefore the question remains, is the institution up to the task of maintaining global peace?

The first use of UN Peacekeepers came in 1956 following the Suez Campaign. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was placed along the Egyptian border with Israel and saw relative peace for nearly 10 years, however, the force remained at the will of the Egyptians according to the UN Secretary General (UNSG) U Thant. When the Egyptians asked the UNEF force to withdraw from Al Sabha and Sharm Al Sheikh, U Thant (without consulting with the UNSC or the General Assembly (GA)) informed the Egyptians that it was all or nothing. With that, on May 19 the entire UN peacekeeping force withdrew with war between Israel and Egypt starting on June 5th.

This is obviously a failure on the part of the UN to maintain the peace in the region. First off, per the UN Charter it is the UNSC that controls matters of troops and their insertion or withdrawal; therefore the UNSG over stepped his authority. More to the point, the force was placed there specifically to ensure peace and the UN was obligated by international law, per the UN Charter, to maintain the force for this purpose. Egypt and Israel were also obligated under international law, specifically the UN Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the UNSC. The ramifications of this failure are still felt today.

A more recent example of UN peacekeeping is seen in the Bosnia campaign. Bosnia requested the UNSC to supply UN monitors between it and Serbia but the UNSC denied the request citing that there existed "no precedent for preemptive peacekeeping." However, following Serbian attacks on civilians and Bosnian cities that was classified by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as genocide, the UNSC sent in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Unfortunately, this force had a weak mandate that complicated its ability to defend the Bosnian population and eventually had to be supplemented with NATO forces.

This is another failure by the UNSC because per Article 1(1) the UN is required to "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." The concept of precedent is irrelevant as the Charter specifically mandates the UN, and specifically the UNSC, to prevent hostilities through collective measures. Further complicating the matter, NATO acted to stop the genocide with force and without a mandate from the UNSC. Therefore, NATO states were technically violating the UN Charter as the UN didn’t transfer authority from UNPROFOR to the NATO led force until after the fact in resolution 1031.

Finally, a matter affecting global security and peace is the current situation in North Korea. North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. Per the treaty, they could not develop nuclear weapons. However, in October of 2002, North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear weapons program that was in direct violation to a 1994 bilateral agreement between it and the United States as well as the NPT. North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT under Article X of the treaty, which states, "Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." But because North Korea violated the treaty prior to withdrawing from the NPT, it is still in violation of international law and threatens the global peace. Therefore the UNSC should act to prevent and remove this threat to global peace.

However, North Korea has stated that any resolutions from the UNSC concerning its nuclear weapon programs will be taken as an act of war. This is obviously incorrect and is not in accordance with international law as North Korea was a willing party to the NPT when it violated the provisions therein as well as a current member of the UN and is therefore obligated to accept and carry out the decisions of the UNSC per Article 25. If the UN is to fulfill its obligations under the charter, it must act against the threat to global peace that North Korea currently poses. This is yet another test for the UN in its responsibility to the maintenance of international peace.

Validity of the Charter…
In addition to the examples provided thus far, the sheer number of violations to international peace that have occurred since the creation of the UN casts doubt on the validity of certain provisions of the UN Charter. When several states continually violate a treaty over a prolonged period of time, that treaty has been cast into a state of desuetude, or a state of disuse. Therefore, it could be argued that the provisions on the use of force within the UN Charter are no longer valid. This would greatly damage the resolve and capability of the UN to enforce international peace through the UN and its charter.

The Way Ahead…
Obviously, the UN has not only failed live up to its responsibility of maintaining international peace, but its inability to proactively address the many cases of global peace and security have greatly undermined its position to address the subject in general. If the UN is to regain its rightful position of global peacemaker/sustainer, it must address these deficiencies.

First, the UN must enforce its charter against its member states. States found to be in violation of the charter and threatening the peace and security of the international community must be resolutely addressed and not cowed to. If states are unwilling to correct violations, then the UN has several avenues available to it to redress the situation to include: preventative diplomacy and peace making, peace keeping, peace building, disarmament, sanctions and enforcement.

Secondly, the current UNSG has proposed an Agenda for Peace, which outlines a series of changes to the way the UN will address threats to global peace through the avenues mentioned above. A high level panel has also developed a report recommending changes and expanding the UNSC in an effort to make it much more effective.

These changes should be embraced by the UN and its members, for without some change in the current system, the UN is doomed to go the way of the League of Nations in its ability to prevent global conflict. The UN is the sole international body responsible for international peace and security, as specified through the law of treaty. If the UN does not take on this responsibility, there is no other body to replace it and the international community will be once again be back into an age of ‘might makes right.’ The UN must adjust or it will not be able to meet the challenge of maintaining peace in the 21st century.

The 2002 National Security Strategy: A Transition

2005-05-10T19:23:00.000Z

In the Beginning…
In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act called on, "[t]he President [to] transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States." This report has thus become an annual requirement of administrations to provide Congress with a roadmap for U.S. strategic security.

These reports are typically amplifying in nature, rarely revealing anything new. Instead these documents consolidate together a general strategic security picture that the administration is currently focused on. Additionally, these reports have always been developed during times of peace, however, in September of 2002, for the first time, a national security strategy (NSS) was developed and presented to Congress during a time of war- the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
It was this report, a product of a post-9/11 mindset, which was faced with a proverbial fork in the road. It could either continue with the status quo of presenting a generic strategic plan restating existing positions or it could lay the groundwork for what would be the evolution of a new U.S. security doctrine, following in the footsteps of Presidents like Wilson and F. D. Roosevelt.

This essay will look at the Bush Administration’s initial report, the National Security Strategy of the United States, and examine the core values, priorities and threats envisioned within. An analysis will be made on the principles and positions of this document with an effort made to deconstruct key messages on processes, ideals, tactics and the concept of dealing with risk. This piece intends to show several key structural differences, the first being the core values, followed by an examination of the document’s security priorities, succeeded by the focus on strategic threats and the perceived solutions as presented by the strategy, and concluding with the cohesiveness of the document in general and the overall strategic picture laid out.

In the end, it will be evident that Bush’s NSS shows a dramatic focus on war-time goals and a true strategic picture for dealing with the current GWOT. When viewed in the same light as the other NSS’s that have been promulgated over the years, Bush’s strategy looks ideological, radical and aggressive. However, when viewed through the lens of war, the document presents an asymmetrical, multilateral approach to global security.

Adapting to Constraints…
Before delving into the specifics of the strategic plan, the perspective for which it is to be reviewed needs explanation. As stated earlier, the impact of history is enormous on Presidents and their developments in national security. Just as important is the ideological perception they have on international relations. Couple this with the enormity of the position as well as their capacity in rational decision making and a coherent security policy posture for deciding action becomes apparent.

It is this posture, using Alexander George’s value-conflict resolution model within the analytical mode of value-complexity along with his uncertainty device of ideology & general principles as guides to action that will provide the focus on the document’s base-point and strategic mindset. This will allow for an accurate critique of how Bush deals with the known and unknown respectively, and presents this solution in the NSS. Clausewitzian concepts such as center of gravity, the culminating point of victory and the asymmetrical relationship between offense & defense will also be used in defining key areas of the strategy.

The Semantics of Goals and Objectives-Core Values…
The Bush NSS consists of 12,748 words in 35 pages. It has a three page introductory letter from the President followed by a two-page overview of America’s international strategy, which is then divided and addressed in eight sections. The document presents two distinct frames of minds, one being a decidedly power-based tone involving the U.S. military, intelligence, and national assets for homeland defense. The second is its ideological tone, focusing on moral and value issues. These two elements of the document are then meshed together in a rather symbiotic relationship, both supporting and elevating each other.

The first sentence of the document boldly states that, "[the] great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom - and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." While this looks to be simple rhetoric, it emphatically states that not only is the Cold War over, but the post-Cold war era of uncertainty is also at an end. The statement also points out one model of "national success" through the values of freedom, democracy and free enterprise.

In fact, the word freedom is used fives times in the first paragraph alone. Couple this with the other words of liberty, democracy, free enterprise, etc; all of which literally saturate the beginning of the document with moral values, calls for the removal of borders for such values and charges that these values, "are right and true for every person, in every society." It then affirms, "the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages." This becomes the over-arching goal of the document and the strategy in general.

The second paragraph presents how this goal will be achieved through two key elements of the strategy; one is the affirmation of the United States’, "unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence" and proposes to, "create a balance of power that favors human freedom." This obviously proclaims and intends to perpetuate America’s role as a global hegemon with the stated objectives, the second element of the strategy, being to, "defend this just peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants… preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers… [and] extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."

These first two paragraphs proscribe the goal of the U.S., the strategic environment necessary for this goal, and the objectives for shaping this environment accordingly. Specifically, the NSS presents a goal of universal liberty and freedom-the core values, through U.S. global hegemony-its priorities, that will defend, preserve and extend world peace from terrorism & tyrants- the threat.

Hegemony Stability Theory (HST) at Work-Priorities…
John Lewis Gaddis presents an interesting analysis on the subject of hegemony. According to Gaddis, an innovation within the NSS is its development on great power cooperation. He breaks it up into two parts, the first being, "that other great powers prefer management of the international system by a single hegemon as long as it's a relatively benign one." The second part is that, "U.S. hegemony is also acceptable because it's linked with certain values that all states and cultures—if not all terrorists and tyrants—share." He backs up his second point with a quote from the NSS stating, "[n]o people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police." Gaddis states that based on a speech Bush gave at West Point on June 1st of 2002 along with the language of the NSS, this, "association of power with universal principles…that will cause other great powers to go along with whatever the United States has to do to preempt terrorists and tyrants, even if it does so alone."

This is an interesting premise that Gaddis presents, but not entirely accurate, both on a theoretical level as well as based on language within the document itself. There is agreement with the analysis that Bush wants and needs to maintain U.S. hegemony, he states as much in the second paragraph of the introduction. However, the qualifier of being benign seems inadequate when the document contains language focusing on preventing any other state, "from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States," or U.S. military development objectives for dissuading future military competition. Benign or not, the U.S. considers its position in the world as a national interest and its focus is to maintain that position.

On the theoretical level, even though the document uses some words repeatedly and thus presenting the core values of the strategy, the school of thought guiding this security strategy is very clear. For instance, "freedom", "liberty" and "prosperity" are used throughout the document 46, 11 and 11 times respectively. "Security", "terrorism" and "defense" dominate the NSS 70, 32 and 27 times respectively. Other terms used in the document are as follows: "peace"- 28 times; "threats"- 19 times; "intelligence"- 18 times; "economics"-40 times; "multilateral", "bilateral" and "unilateral"- 10, 12 and 6 times respectively. The Bush NSS is a neo-realist document that does not ignore the concept of power, far from it, but revolves around security. These words within the document present the core values of the United States, the concept of liberty and freedom are dearly held by the American people, but the focus of security in the strategy cannot be overstated. More importantly, HST is obviously a major priority in the strategic plan laid out. HST allows the U.S. to decisively lead and proactively participate in multilateral coalitions, it permits a simpler path to unilateral action when necessary, and it grants additional capabilities for asymmetrical warfare.

The 3 T’s-Threats…
Refocusing on the premise of hegemony, the NSS looks to use the environment of U.S. global hegemony to deal with what Jean-Yves Haine’s and Gustav Lindstrom’s call in their An analysis of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the 3T’s- terrorism, tyranny and technology. The symbolism and simplicity of the 3T’s is an excellent tool for analyzing the NSS, therefore this essay will adopt it for this purpose. The NSS diverts from past security strategies in that it states that the nature of the enemy has changed. It points out that, "[e]nemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank." It continues with, "[t]he gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction…" Finally the document specifies that, "[t]he United States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them."
Clausewitz wrote in his strategic manual On War, considered by many to be the quintessential military strategic guide today, about a concept associated with momentum and strategic focus. He called it the Center of Gravity or Schwerpunkt in his native Prussian tongue, and it generally means the most important source of that side's strength. On a strategic level, it can be the enemy’s military forces, his capital, or something less tangible like the common interest of an alliance or even public opinion. This strategy considers the interrelation of terrorism, tyranny and technology to be the enemy’s center of gravity. The focus of the document is to identify the relationship between each and essentially divide and conquer.

Terrorism
"The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents." This statement defines the exact nature of the enemy while maintaining enough ambiguity to be far reaching. It accepts and proposes a definition of terrorism and specifies who and what a terrorist is. On a tactical level, this is the most important sentence within the strategy. It addresses every element of the 3T’s and as alluded earlier, it supports the premise of how the nature of the enemy has changed from standard, conventional state armies to an underground network of individuals.

The document specifies three actions for disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations. The first is by, "direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power," focusing immediately on, "those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors." Terrorism is the vehicle of attack for the enemy. It focuses on creating catastrophic damage, less so on a material level as on a psychological one. It is a scare tactic of immense proportions, with the intention of crushing the will of the people and forcing them to capitulate to the demands of the terrorist group. Therefore, this first action is to focus on the vehicle of the 3T’s and remove that capability of the enemy.

The second action is an extremely controversial one, as it calls for, "defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders," immediately implying the use of force overseas. However, it is the following, which is qualified with a preference of international support, that draws concern and it is the element of preemption- "[w]hile the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country." This is the first time the concept of preemption is used in the NSS. Because of the controversial nature of preemption, it will be covered in more depth later on, but in short here, it calls for the use of force against threats before they fully materialize.

Finally, the third action calls for, "denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities." This is an important element of the strategy in that it automatically ties the state to the terrorist group, and their actions, or for that matter inaction, can make them culpable for the terrorist act.

Tyranny
While terrorism is the vehicle, tyranny is the fuel. America’s disdain of tyrannical states and actors is not new, but in the post 9/11 mindset of the document, it creates an environment that is no longer acceptable. Specifically, this strategy focuses on the shift from powerful tyrants to weak ones. This example is made in the NSS, "The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders." Destitution, lack of hope, and no ability to change a people’s future creates a setting in which terrorist groups are capable of recruiting members, financial support and protection. This is another important element, further showing the alliance of tyranny with terrorism.

Rouge states are given special consideration in the NSS with the document giving some examples of their tyranny by stating that, "[tyrannical] states: brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands." The actions that constitute tyranny are in direct conflict with the core values of the NSS, and show the ideological struggle between tyranny and liberty- supporting and strengthening the casus belli for the GWOT.
"We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends." This "comprehensive strategy to combat WMD" is to use the following methods: "Proactive counter-proliferation efforts; Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction; and Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states." The fuel of tyranny has spawned terrorism globally, making the fear of these disgruntled and violent groups acquiring WMD very real.

Technology
As mentioned earlier, the document states that the enemies of the U.S. have, "declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction," and that this cannot happen. The strategy reminds the reader that during the Cold War, when there was a massive WMD build up, the aim of WMD’s was to be a deterrent for aggression. A concept developed of mutually assured destruction or MAD and it ensured that rational actors maintained peace and stability. However, the NSS points out the reliance on MAD is no longer applicable against terrorist groups- "Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness."

Another strategic tool called for in the NSS is the development and installation of a missile defense shield. The document states that, "Our response [to the threat of WMD] must take full advantage…[of] the development of an effective missile defense system…" This shield is to provide protection from rogue states and prevent them from threatening or blackmailing the international community.

While the vehicle of terrorism is fueled by tyranny, it is the destructive capability of WMD that can provide the catastrophic results desired by the terrorists. It is this destructive capability, coupled with the successes of past terrorists groups, and with the support of rogue states that has forced the security strategy to focus on this specific threat to the degree that it does.
Preemption-Priorities…

The actual word preemption is mentioned in the document two times. The first presents a classical definition stating that, "[l]egal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat -- most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack." The second qualifies the use in general by explaining that, "[t]he United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression." The overarching justification for the use of preemption in general is premised around the fact that, "[t]raditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents," and that it is the, "overlap between states that sponsor terror [tyrants] and those that pursue WMD [terrorists] [that] compels us to action."

Therefore, because of the nature of terrorists, as previously defined, the odds of their mounting a conventional military confrontation is very low because, "[t]hey know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terrorism and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction - weapons that can be easily concealed and delivered covertly and without warning." Due to the devastating effects of WMD, the NSS then justifies a new interpretation of preemptive action, pointing out that, "[t]he targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare." The NSS further states that, "[t]he United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security." Therefore, based on the conditions of terrorism and WMD along with the previous norms of U.S. security policy, the strategy presents a new meaning to preemption by affirming that, "[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction -- and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

The strategy then provides three elements to support preemption. One is to, "build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge," the second calls for, "coordinat[ing] closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats," and finally to, "continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results."

The concept of preemption is disturbing to many states, especially in light of the military superiority the U.S. enjoys over every other nation in the world. Couple that with the fact that the U.S. intends to use preemptive action against threats before they reach American shores and it is easy to see how the U.S. can be viewed through a lens of imperial aggression; a global bully. However, when viewed through the lens of the GWOT, especially with the focus being on WMD, it becomes the new element or force that can pose a deterrent to state sponsors of terrorism, if not the terrorists themselves. The NSS certainly implies that while it may not be mutual, it is assured destruction.

The controversial nature of preemption lies in the expansion of its definition and the international communities forced reliance on the good will of the U.S. to not abuse it. As Clausewitz would put it, this is the culminating point of offense for the NSS, meaning that if the offensive use of preemption is pushed too far, it will inevitably reach a point were the U.S. will have to take up the defense against the international community; essentially shifting the equilibrium against itself. By abusing this tool, the U.S. could easily transform itself from the victim to the villain and therefore should tread lightly.

Diplomacy and International Coordination-Priorities…
The document from the very beginning acquiesces to the fact that, "no nation can build a safer, better world alone," and realizes the ability of how, "[a]lliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations." It then affirms America’s commitment to, "lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances." In addition to these well-established organizations, "Coalitions of the willing" can be a great asset in their ability to, "augment these permanent institutions." Regardless of the structure, a key portion of the strategy lies in the fact that it expects, "[i]n all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously," discarding symbolic gestures as useless.

Of the eight sections that make up the bulk of the NSS, seven of them focus specifically on diplomacy and multilateral coordination within the global community. In the Overview of America’s International Strategy (Section I), the document states that, "The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests." The focus within the strategy is that by defending and securing the international community, the U.S. inherently protects itself. This daunting task is to be achieved through international cooperation, in which the U.S. will: "champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century." It is in fact these goals that make up the eight sections in the NSS.

In regards to the core values of freedom, liberty and democracy, the NSS states that, "the national security strategy of the United States must…look outward for possibilities to expand liberty." It then stipulates that U.S. "decisions about international cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation of [our] resources," will be guided by these core values, which will also, "guide our actions and our words in international bodies." Actions to be carried out by the U.S. include: "speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to advance freedom; use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take; make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future; and take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments."

The international aspirations of human dignity, as laid out by the NSS, go hand in hand with the core values of the U.S. strategy and are the goal of the document. This ideological sense in the strategy conveys a feeling that U.S. national security hinges on the ability to export these concepts and have them take hold throughout the international community.

The NSS also calls for international support in maintaining U.S. hegemony in that it states, "all nations have important responsibilities," declaring all, "[n]ations that enjoy freedom must actively fight terror," as well as those, "that depend on international stability must [also] help prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction." The strategy, not depending per se, is looking for international cooperation in securing the environment necessary for achieving the NSS goal of universal liberty and freedom. America’s role as a global hegemon is to coordinate these forces and create a "balance of power that favors human freedom."

Economics and Expanding the Circle of Development…
The NSS provides an economic strategy for achieving U.S. goals along with addressing the key threat in the document- terrorism. As mentioned earlier, tyranny is the fuel for terrorism, however, poverty and corruption are the tinder. To counter this, the strategy calls for, "[a] strong world economy [that] enhances our national security by aspiring prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world."

This economic change is necessary as, "[i]t allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty." The promotion of this is to be achieved through seven actions calling for: pro-growth legal and regulatory policies; tax policies…that improve incentives for work and investment; rule of law and intolerance of corruption; strong financial systems that allow capital to be put to its most efficient use; sound fiscal policies to support business activity; investments in health and education; and free trade.

Economic improvement in the global community is intended to change the environment breeding terrorism. Again showing the relationship between values and security, the document presents economically liberal values to support a strategically secure environment.

The Home Front…
The NSS also calls for the need for improvement in defending the homeland. The document states the Administration’s call for, "the largest government reorganization since the Truman Administration…[and is] [c]entered on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public and the private sector." Counter-proliferation is to be integrated into homeland defense as well as strengthened intelligence warning and analysis to provide threat assessments for domestic security. Above all, the defense of the American homeland is called the most important priority and the creation of this new department is to address that specifically.

Values, Priorities & Threats: A Symbiotic Transition towards Security…
The NSS goal of universal liberty and freedom- core values- through a U.S. global hegemony- priorities- whose objective is to defend, preserve and extend world peace from terrorism & tyrants- threat- is sound and cohesive. The document devises a course of action that addresses the complex question of terrorism and how to deal with it accordingly.

Terrorism is truly a value-complex question. The balance of liberty and freedom against security and defense lies at the heart of it, and any solution to such must be sensitive to both sides less it looses itself and the terrorists succeed. Value-conflict resolution, the pinnacle in dealing with value-complexity, is in the words of Alexander George, "a formidable task." However, this NSS meets the task by presenting an ideological goal supported by a realist structure.

The document is amazingly cohesive in that it repeatedly ties together the ideal with the real. The core values, ideological in nature, support the realist need for security and provide a catalyst for such in the global environment. Preemption, multilateral coordination and military intervention create a realist "balance of power" that encourages ideology of liberty and freedom. On and on throughout the document these two elements symbiotically coexist.

Clausewitz spoke of the asymmetrical relationship of attacking versus defending, pointing out that on a strategic level, the attack or offense is weaker than the defense but is positive in that it seeks to increase strength, power or security where as defense, being the stronger, is negative because it is focused on self-preservation. The NSS has found a balance between the offense and the defense by pursuing two paths simultaneously. One is unilateral and defensive in nature, using tools such as preemption, missile defense, and restructuring domestic institutions for homeland defense. The second path is multilateral, offensive and by far more present in the NSS. It calls for on a grand scale the use of international institutions and requires the international community to interact in the GWOT.

The history of 9/11 has caused this administration to present a security strategy that focuses on that threat. The neo-realist perception of the administration on international relations, as well as the very nature of the document itself, has called for all actions to revolve around the nation’s security. But at the same time, the core values presented in the NSS are ever present throughout and constantly support the question of security and the solution therein.

While the document does not and cannot deal with every threat the U.S. faces, it ensures that through the values and objectives developed within, that a comprehensive strategy that is flexible and decisive will emerge and thereby deal with any uncertainty. This document has stepped up to the challenge of defining the new century, and addresses the threats the U.S. is likely to face. But more importantly, it provides a solution that not only garners security but also improves the lives of the global community. The National Security Strategy of the United States emphatically presents itself with no apologies and welcomes the international community to the security provided within.

Secularism in India: A Society Facing Itself

2004-12-15T20:21:00.001Z

Secularism in India:
A Society Facing Itself

By

B.E.N.

December 15, 2004

While the Republic of India is fairly young, only 56 years old, the civilization of India goes back at least 5,000 years9. When viewed in this perspective, the “recent” independence of India from British rule on August 14, 1947 further complicates and diversifies a society that is already a collage of humanity and culture. The splitting of British India into two separate states, Muslim Pakistan and secular India created a quagmire of issues and an Identity crisis for millions. Even after all the bloodshed and the movement of nearly 11 million Hindus and Muslims over the border, almost half of the subcontinents Muslim population still remains in India.

Today as India’s largest religious minority it accounts for 12% of the current population of 1,045,845,226 (July 2002 est.). India is also the home to other religions such as Christians (2.3% of population), Sikh’s (1.9% of population), and other groups including Buddhists, Jain, and Parses which total 2.5% of the population. These groups, while very large in physical size, are tiny when compared as a percentage and accentuate the largeness of the Hindu’s who comprise 81.3% of the population5.

To content with this staggering diversity, India's Constitution sought to shape an overarching Indian identity while acknowledging the reality of pluralism. This was done by guaranteeing fundamental rights, in some cases through specific provisions for the protection of minorities. These included the freedom of religion in Articles 25-28; the right of any section of citizens to use and conserve their "distinct language, script or culture" with Article 29; and the right of "all minorities, whether based on religion or language," to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice with Article 30. The problem of caste was addressed in the Constitution by declaring the practice of untouchability as unlawful per Article 17. To compensate and open up some opportunity, a percentage of admissions to colleges and universities along with government positions were reserved for the Scheduled Castes (untouchables) and Scheduled (aboriginal) Tribes in Article 335. Also to ensure adequate political representation, Article 330 gives the Scheduled Castes and Tribes reserved seats in the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of Parliament, and in state legislatures proportionately to their numbers. These reservations were to have ended in 1960, but they have been extended every ten years by a constitutional amendment6.

India may be an officially secular state, but Indian society is controlled by religious identities and plagued by communal mistrust and hatred. The term communal, in India, refers mainly to the Hindu-Muslim conflict, and with memories of the “recent” partition still perpetuated, Hindu-Muslim tensions are constantly sustained by jealousy and fear. Year after year, several hundred incidents of communal violence and rioting are officially reported, with the number and intensity of late growing. December 1992’s destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya by Hindu fanatics led to rioting across the country and left some 1,200 people dead. In January 1993, Mumbai suffered a nine-day anti-Muslim campaign, which resulted in the death of more than six hundred people.

The radical Hindu political movement demands an official end to the secularism that India currently enjoys and wishes to replace it with a recognition of a Hindu state. This is a change in the basic principles of the Indian Constitution, which is a dramatic change from the original Indian ideal of a pluralist, tolerant and secular state.

Anti-Secularists contend that the problem with secularism is that it assumes that a secular state is essential for different religions to peacefully coexist within a nation. This premise contends that all religions are based on the idea of exclusivity and therefore will be hostile to one another. On top of this, they contend that the concept of organized religion is foreign to India. The English word religion does not have a literal translation in any Indian language. The closest Indian word is Dharma, which does not connote exclusivity. Even the term Hindu is a Persian word that refers to people living east of the Indus (Sindhu) river showing that the term Hindu in its original sense refers to all Indians. Therefore, Hinduism is not a homogenous religious group.

Secularism is a more comprehensive idea of a pluralist country compromising various religions, castes, languages and social cultures. Secularism allows a very important aspect of identity, that of a heterogeneous one.

With the rise of Muslim fundamentalism in India since the early 1980s, the Hindu consciousness has been heightened and has led Hindu nationalists to project India's massive Hindu majority as threatened. This nationalist movement is rooted in the late nineteenth century and is recently represented by a formidable list of organizations and parties. On this list is the powerful paramilitary Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), its revivalist associate Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the leading opposition political party. With a combined vision of a revitalized Hindu India, they content that India’s Hindu’s are treated unfairly by India's secularism2.

Hindu nationalists point out that unlike the Christians or the Muslims, they do not consider themselves to be the chosen race anointed by God to spread His Word. They do not think that all non-believers have been misled by Satan and will be damned to spend eternity in Hell. In fact, just as the concept of religion is alien to India, so too is the concept of Satan.
Secularism in India, however, does not separate church and state, instead it seeks to recognize and promote all religious communities. The Constitution guarantees freedom of worship and to establish and administer its own schools and traditions. The issue is to establish a fair democratic balance between the Hindu majority’s preference and the protection of the minority.
On the other hand, the anti-secularist movement contends that the fundamental problem with the idea of secularism is that it does not address the root problem of religious violence, which is religious bigotry. They point out that secularism has hardly made a dent in reducing religious bigotry. Case in point is that the Pope frequently states that all religions are not the same and that Christianity is the one true religion. Because of its failure to address the issue of religious bigotry, anti-secularists believe that secularism has not been successful in creating a society in which all religions can truly peacefully coexist7.

However, Hindu nationalists tend to project a majority that is in denial of the diversity that makes Hinduism, and India, what it is. The ideals of Hindutva, or Hinduness, would impose an oppressive conformity to individual Hindus as well to the other minorities. To achieve this political power, the Hindutva movement uses religion as its medium and claims that all Indians, regardless of their religion, are part of a Hindu nation. Whether by passing bills through the parliament to restrict mixed faith marriages, state sponsored reconversion campaigns or a movement to rewrite the history of India as a single Hindu utopia.

The movement has ambitions of political and cultural reform. Its rhetoric of Hindu supremacy, full of statements that foster the demonization of minorities and exaggerated threats to national identity, falls on sympathetic ears among many members of the conservative upper and middle classes8. This support has emboldened the movement and gained its ideologies into places of public office, from local government to Parliament.

The Muslim and Christian religions are coined as Semitic per the Hindutva theory of history and are foreign faiths introduced from outside of Hindu India by foreign aggressors. This isolationism of these faiths makes the Hindutva movement, philosophically, more than nationalistic but rather supremacist. This ideological definition of nationhood by membership in a specific race, culture, or religion is tantamount fascist4.

There are also some specific political characteristics that are associated with fascist movements. These characteristics include the use of violence, the victimization of a specific community within the population and the use of unconstitutional strong-arm tactics against certain groups for political gain.

Bal Thackeray, the leader of Shiv Sena and a Hindutva proponent, has explained that the use of mobs for extorting money for political use was understandable and stated that if Muslims, “behaved like Jews in Nazi Germany [there would be] nothing wrong if they were treated as Jews were in Germany1.”

The RSS (National Volunteers Union) is an ideological organization that has influence upon domestic conservative politics. During the Gandhi era, the head of the RSS, Madhav Golwalkar, once praised Hitler for demonstrating to the world, “how well nigh impossible,” it is for different races and cultures, “having differences going to the root,” to be assimilated into a national whole. Germany’s removal of the “Semitic Races,” Golwalkar goes on to say, “[is a] good lesson for us in Hindusthan [India] to learn and profit by3.”

While this is not widely publicized, Golwalkar is still a highly respected individual in Hindutva circles. The RSS continues to assert that in an India free of secularism, Muslims and Christians will return to their ancient faith and traditions of Hinduism. Those without the wisdom to do so would be suspect, and thus worthy of second-class citizenship. This unwillingness to accept Hindutva therefore would label those individuals not only as apostates but also as traitors.

The Hindutva activists try to recreate the past with a combination of fact and fantasy. Many contributions to Indian culture have been made from Islamic writers, musicians, painters and their works have all become completely integrated with those of the Hindus. This mixture of cultures is even evident in that Islamic theory and practice have influenced Hindu religious theory and practices. Islam has been practiced in India for so long that it must now be considered an Indian religion.

With the intensification of Hindu-Muslim antipathy, secularism in India will find itself challenged at all levels of society. India must face this challenge as a secular state to secure democracy, justice, and equality in a multicultural society. The political culture of mutual distrust and ever intensifying violence between Muslims and Hindus is an enormous danger for the state. Secularism as well as democracy is under attack in India by the communalism, excessive caste consciousness, and separatism that constantly threatens it. The state, in its response to this challenge, must not weaken the values of individual liberties that are at the core of its Constitutional commitment.

1. “The Threats to Secular India,” Amartya Sen, www.nybooks.com/articles/2621.
2. “International Religious Freedom Report,” US Department of State, www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5685.htm.
3. “The Danger of Hindutva to Secular India,” S.R. Welch, www.infidels.org/library/modern/features/2001/welch1.html.
4. “Is India Going the Way of 1930s Germany?” Arun Swamy, www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/commentary/2002/0203indhind_body.html.
5. CIA World Factbook 2002, www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html.
6. “India: The Dilemmas of Diversity,” Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., www.menic.utexas.edu/asnic/countries/india/Hardgrave.html.
7. “Why India Should not be Secular,” Raju Agarwal, www.indiapolicy.org/lists/india_policy/2000/Dec/msg00104.html.
8. HinduUnity.org homepage with general statement and Hindutva agenda, www.hinduunity.org/aboutus.html.
9. Encyclopedic discussion on India, www.wikipedia.org/wiki.India.

The Shade of Swords: Jihad in Islam

2004-12-15T17:54:00.001Z

Note: The comments in GREEN are various qoutes spread troughout the article referencing Jihad.

The Shade of Swords:
Jihad in Islam

B.E.N.
March 15, 2004

Jihad- A holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty; a bitter strife or crusade undertaken in the spirit of a holy war. - Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary

Few words in the last twenty years have raised as much emotion- both positive and negative- as the word jihad. It carries with it the mystique of ancient dedication as well as the notion of intolerance and hate. While the importance of this word is undeniable, the manner in which it has been used has generated much controversy. Both sides of the political front of Islam have used the word and both have pointed to Qur`anic verses for support, yet the conflict over its intended meaning still exists. Is the semantics of this word open to that much interpretation or is there a more clear intention and meaning to the word? And based on this answer, what influence will jihad have on the region and the world?
Defining a Term
Jihad has been defined in a variety of ways by a motley list of characters. Some offer a real intention of fairness while others show an obvious bias to the word and its institution. The Qur`an defines the word as, “holy fighting in the cause of Allah or any other kind of effort to make Allah’s word (i.e. Islam) superior[1].” It is also considered as one of the fundamentals of Islam. The Oxford Dictionary defines it as, “struggle, contest, specifically one for the propagation of Islam. A religious war of Mohammedans[2] against unbelievers in Islam, inculcated as a duty by the Koran and traditions[3].”

Jihad, from an Arabic verb meaning to struggle and persevere, denotes, in the history of Islamic civilization, religious war waged against heretics, unbelievers, and the enemies of the state or the community of Muslims. In early Islamic history “jihad” meant holy war, and, as a strictly Islamic phenomenon, it bears a strict relation to the spread of the faith by Muslim arms…among the descendants of the Kharijits…it was ranked as a sixth pillar of religion. – Collier’s Encyclopedia

In the Arabic language, Jihad literally means, “to strive,” and, “to struggle.” It has also been further sub-categorized into five other classifications: 1) jihad an-nafs or jihad against one’s self, 2) jihad ash-shaitaan or jihad against Satan, 3) jihad al-kaffar or jihad against the unbeliever, 4) jihad al-munafiqeen or jihad against hypocrites, and 5) jihad al-faasiqeen or jihad against corrupt Muslims.
This defining of jihad has led to two main interpretations of the term. One is that the term is intended as a peaceful resistance, resulting in force strictly for self-defense and is intended as an internal struggle rather than an external one, commonly referred to as the Greater Jihad.

“Islam wishes to destroy all States and Governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and program of Islam. Islam requires the earth- not just a portion, but the whole planet.” And that God’s Law (Shariah) should be enforced in the world “by force of arms.” Truth cannot be confined within geographical borders. “The allegiance of a Muslim does not rest on his domicile in the country which is his, but on the faith to which he belongs…wherever there is the rule of Islam, there is his own country. - S.A.A. Maududi “Jihad in Islam”

Dr. Robert Crane, former Deputy Director for Planning in the National Security Council under President Nixon and U.S. Ambassador to the United Arabs Emirates under President Reagan and current Chairman of the Center for Understanding Islam, points out that the Qur`an only refers to jihad in terms of, “intellectual effort to apply divine revelation in promoting peace through justice[4].” Crane continues that the media and Western polemists have attached themselves to the “phraseology” of extremists who distort mainstream Islamic teachings. This attachment of jihad with holy war is connected only with fringe elements rather than with the whole of Islam.
Submission.org, an Islamic site that attempts to bring understanding to the world in regards to Islam states that, “Jihad particularly involves change in one’s self and mentality. It may concern the sacrifice of material property, social class, and even emotional comfort solely for the salvation and worship of God alone[5].”

Jihad is a divinely ordained institution in Islam. By many authorities it is counted as one of the pillars of Islam. Theologically, it is intolerant idea: a tribal god, Allah, trying to be universal through conquest. Historically, it was an imperialist urge masked in religious phraseology.- Ram Swarup Understanding Islam through Hadis

Furthering this argument are the verses of peace within the Qur`an. For example, the Qur`anic verse 8:61 states, “but if they incline to peace, you also incline to it, and trust in Allah. Verily, He is the All-Hearer, the All-Knower[6].” Another example is the verse 4:90, which states, “Except those who join a group, between you and whom there is a treaty, or those who approach you with their breasts restraining from fighting you as well as fighting their own people. Had Allah willed, indeed He would have given them power over you, and they would have fought you. So if they withdraw from you, and fight not against you, and offer you peace, then Allah has opened no way for you against them[7].”
But this is by far the least accepted definition of jihad among most Western scholars as well as by the Ulama. There are over a hundred verses in the Qur`an that associate jihad with qitaal or fighting[8]. Bernard Lewis, the renowned Islamic scholar and Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies Emeritus at Princeton University, supports this argument pointing out that the Qur`an itself as well as many different hadith connect jihad with the military function of the word[9]. The Qur`an says, “Jihad is ordained for you though you dislike it, and it may be that you dislike a thing for which is good for you and that you like a thing which is bad for you. Allah knows but you do not know[10].”

Those who emphasize the personal meaning of Jihad as ‘the struggle against one’s evil inclination’ rather than its political definition as ‘the Holy War against infidels’, are simply perverting history by minimizing the primary significance of the concept.- Professor Walid Phares, Miami University

Dr. Al-Hilali, former Professor of Islamic Faith and Teachings, and Dr. Khan, former Director of University Hospital Islamic University in Medina, explain that jihad in Allah’s Cause is given the utmost importance in Islam and is one of its pillars (on which it stands). They continue that Islam is established through jihad and that this is how Allah’s word is made superior and his religion spread. “By abandoning Jihad Islam is destroyed and the Muslims fall into an inferior position; their honor is lost, their lands are stolen, their rule and authority vanish. In Sahih Al-Bukhari, Hadith number 2782 the importance of jihad is made very clear. The hadith states, “’O Allah’s Messenger! What is the best deed?’ He replied, ‘To offer the Salat at their early stated fixed times.’ I asked, ‘What is next in goodness?’ He replied, ‘To be good and dutiful to your parents.’ I further asked, ‘What is next in goodness?’ He replied, ‘To participate in Jihad in Allah’s cause.’ I did not ask Allah’s Messenger anymore and if I had asked him more, he would have told me more[11].” And finally, “And kill them wherever you find them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out. And Al-Fitnah is worse than killing. And fight not with them at Al-Masjid Al-Haram, unless they fight you there. But if they attack you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers[12].”

“Jihad has been decreed to repel aggression and to remove obstructions impeding the propagation of Islam in non-Islamic countries.” As Lt. Col. M.M. Qureshi points out in his “Landmarks of Jihad”, “only a war which has an ultimate religious purpose can be termed as jihad.”- Shayk Muhammad Abu Zahra, Egyptian member of the Academy of Islamic Research.

The Rules of Engagement
With the definition of jihad complete, let us now move on to the specific guidelines that have been associated with the term. First of all, jihad is technically a war against non-Muslims, specifically jihad al-kuffar (unbeliever) and jihad al-munafiqeen (hypocrites), as Muslims are forbidden to fight one another. The only exception to this rule is jihad al-faasiqeen (corrupt Muslims), which is intended to purify the ranks per say. An example of the latter rests in the assassination of Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt, following the signing of a peace treaty with Israel. His assassins used jihad al-faasiqeen in their defense at their trial[13].

“We- with Allah’s help- call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.”- Osama bin Laden’s fatwa for jihad against Americans

The fighting was to be limited, “And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits. Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors[14].” Sohail H. Hashmi, Alumnae Foundation Associate Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts, further explains that jihad is also limited in the months of the year that it can be carried out. “Verily, the number of months with Allah is twelve months, so was it ordained by Allah on the day when He created the heavens and the earth; of them four are Sacred (the 1st, 7th, 11th and 12th). That is the right religion, so wrong not yourselves therein, and fight against the Mushrikun (polytheists, pagans, idolaters, unbelievers, etc) collectively as they fight against you collectively. But know that Allah is with those who are Al-Muttaqun (pious)[15].”
Time is not the only limit to jihad. The limits are listed in the practices of the Prophet and the first four caliphs for whenever the Prophet sent out military forces, he placed certain restraints on the commander. This practice was continued by his successors, and the first caliph, Abu Bakr, listed them: “do not act treacherously; do not act disloyally; do not act neglectfully; do not mutilate; do not kill little children or old men, or women; do not cut off the heads of the palm-trees or burn them; do not cut down the fruit trees; do not slaughter sheep or a cow or a camel, except for food. You will pass by people who devote their lives in cloisters; leave them and their devotions alone. You will come upon people who bring you platters in which are various sorts of food; if you eat any of it, mention the name of God over it[16].”

“Each Muslim should have an ambition for martyrdom, be a lover of death. (Every martyr shall have seventy deer-eyed houris as his consorts.) ‘Jihad shall continue until the Day of Judgement.’ (Muhammad)”- S.A.A. Maududi & A.H. Siddiqi Jihad in Islam

In essence, Muslim combatants are not allowed to kill non-combatants. But there does exist a limit to the restrictions on a Muslim army. While the Muslim force is not allowed to completely raze a town for say, they are allowed to inflict enough damage to overcome the resistance. Abu Hanifa, founder of one of the four Sunni legal schools, then expanded this in the 8th century and allowed the use of catapults and flooding to defeat an enemy. He argued that if Muslims stopped attacking their enemies in fear of killing non-combatants, then they would not be able to fight at all because, “there is no city in the territory of war in which there is no one at all of these [non-combatants] … mentioned[17].” However, reciprocity is not allowed. If an enemy holds complete disregard for humane treatment of non-combatants [Muslim non-combatants] the Muslim force is not permitted to respond in kind.

“The only way to find out if it (Islam) teaches Jihad and what that word means is to examine reference works and official statements made by its representatives.
But what if you meet a Muslim who denies that Islam teaches Jihad or who gives a novel interpretation of it? His personal opinion has no logical or legal bearing on what the religion of Islam officially teaches concerning jihad. He may disagree with what Islam teaches but this cannot alter the fact that Islam teaches it.”- Dr. Robert Morey The Islamic Doctrine of Jihad

But before a Muslim army can attack another non-Muslim force, it must first call them to Islam. If they refuse to convert, then the Muslim army must then call them to pay the Jizya and submit to Sharia law. Again if they refuse, then the Muslim for may declare war on them and attack.
This brings us to another question of jihad- is it defense in nature, offensive, or a combination of both. The evidence of a defensive jihad can be found in the Qur`an. “But if they incline to peace, you also incline to it, and trust in Allah. Verily, He is the All-Hearer, the All-Knower[18].” Or in the verse, “And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits. Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors[19].”

We will be willing to die as martyrs until our flag flies over Jerusalem. No one should believe they can frighten us with weapons. We have much stronger weapons, the weapon of belief, the weapon of sacrifice, the weapon of jihad…We shall continue the jihad, the long jihad, a complex jihad, a jihad of attrition, of holy death. Warfare is our only way to victory. The path of glory, the path of jihad.”- Yasir Arafat, October 21, 1996

Rashad Ali, a journalist and contributor to Khilafah.com, comments that these two verses do not annul the 119 other verses in the Qur`an that allude to a more offensive nature to jihad. This long list of verses indicates a wide range of jihads listed primarily as follows: defensive war, offensive war, limited war, unlimited war and protective war[20]. Fir instance, “Fight against those who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth among the people of the scripture, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued[21].” Or in the verse, “O Prophet! Strive hard against the disbelievers and the hypocrites, and be harsh against them, their abode is Hell, - and worst indeed is that destination[22].”

“So obey not the disbelievers, but strive against them with the utmost endeavor with it.”- Surat Al-Furqaan 25:52

Conclusion
Whether the jihad is of an offensive or defensive nature, who can actually authorize it? This is a rather complex question considering several factors. For one, jihad is defined within the Qur`an and in the hadith, which would lean towards the religious aspect of it. Furthermore, jihad is a tool to be used to spread Islam to Dar Al-Harb or the non-Muslim world. However, Islamic states rule by Sharia, which is Islamic law- the same law that defines jihad. And the state is the institution that has an army, therefore, the states control of jihad would make sense.
To complicate matters more, does the Sunni community have to support a Shiite call to jihad or vice versa? And what impact does Sufi Islam have on the call to jihad, are all Muslims required to pursue the Sufi’s call for Greater Jihad? Obviously this paper is not going to be able to answer these questions as the Muslim community in general is still struggling over the questions let alone the answers.
But with the threat of global terrorism, the answers to these questions become extremely important. Does Osama bin Laden have the power to issue a fatwa to call forth jihad on America? It is difficult to know the answer to this question, and therefore places great strain on the religion of Islam. From examining the Qur`an and some hadith, a sense of conquest does exist within the definition of jihad. Syed K. Mirza, a fierce opponent to Islam, claims that to change this perspective, “they [Islamic community as a whole] had better change the Qur`an, hadiths and all those Islamic history books available in the library throughout the world[23].”

“Let those who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter fight in the Cause of Allah, and whoso fights in the Cause of Allah, and is killed or gets victory, We shall bestow on him a great reward.”- Surat An-Nisa 4:74

This concept of jihad has been harnessed by fringe elements of the religion to justify certain actions. Obviously, the attacks on 9/11 in New York and more recently in Madrid show complete disregard for the limitations of jihad as set forth in the Qur`an and in hadith. But what is the world at large to make of the call to jihad considering the frequency that it is made?
Michael Knapp, a Middle East/African analyst for the US Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville, Virginia, quite succinctly puts it, “there is no such thing as Islamic terrorism, but there have always been Muslim terrorists.” He continues, “Today there are many extremists who rely on their own resort to violence in protest against perceived injustice, rather than relying on the jihads of akbar, saghrir, and kabir, with the help of Allah and ecumenical cooperation in peacefully building a better world[24].”
These groups are guilty of two crimes. One is arrogance as they worship their own rhetoric rather than what is actually propagated from the Qur`an and through hadith. The second is harabah, which is legally defined as ‘spreading mischief through the land.’ Dr. Crane explains that it is used to describe public terrorism in a war against society and is precisely defined by Professor Khalid Abu el Fadl as, “killing by stealth and targeting a defenseless victim in a way intended to cause terror in society[25].” This is in essence the Islamic definition of terrorism and is in direct opposition to jihad.

“O people! Do not wish to meet the enemy, and ask God for safety, but when you face the enemy, be patient, and remember that Paradise is under the shade of swords.”- Salih Al-Bukhari 4:165

As we can see, the terminology exists and it is therefore up to the Islamic community to clarify the misuse of the term jihad. However, it is also incumbent on the West to garner a better understanding of the Islamic community. The West will never fully understand the full breadth of the Qur`an or of Islam as a whole, and the Muslim community will constantly have to drive home the semantics and difference of its terminology. But this is not an impossibility. It is unfair to the Muslim world that such a small minority has painted it with such a large brush and in such poor color.

“So enter the gates of Hell, to abide therein, and indeed, what an evil abode will be for the arrogant[26].”

Bibliography
1. Dr. Al-Hilali, M., Dr. Khan, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur`an in the English Language, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1998.
2. The Oxford Dictionary, vol. V, pg. 583.
3. Williams, John Alden, ed., Themes of Islamic Civilization, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972.
4. Lewis, Bernard, The Political Language of Islam, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois 1988.
5. Rashad Ali in Khilafah Magazine December 2001 edition http://www.khilafah.com/home/lographics/category.php?DocumentID=2817&TagID=2.
6. www.submission.org/muhammed/jihad/html
7. Sohail H. Hashmi, www.elca.org/jle/articles/
8. Syed Kamran Mirza, www.secularislam.org/jihad/exegesis.htm.
9. Michael G. Knapp www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/knapp.htm.
10. Dr. Robert D. Crane http://www.cuii.org/hirabah.htm.

[1] Dr. Al-Hilali, M., Dr. Khan, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur`an in the English Language, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1998.
[2] Mohammedans is a vulgar term used classically in reference to Muslims.
[3] The Oxford Dictionary, vol. V, pg. 583.
[4] Dr. Robert D. Crane http://www.cuii.org/hirabah.htm.
[5] www.submission.org/muhammed/jihad/html
[6] Dr. Al-Hilali, M., Dr. Khan, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur`an in the English Language, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1998, Surat Al-Anfal 8:61.
[7] Ibid. Surat An-Nissa’ 4:90.
[8] Rashad Ali in Khilafah Magazine December 2001 edition http://www.khilafah.com/home/lographics/category.php?DocumentID=2817&TagID=2.
[9] Lewis, Bernard, The Political Language of Islam, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois 1988, pg. 72.
[10] Dr. Al-Hilali, M., Dr. Khan, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur`an in the English Language, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1998, Surat Al-Baqarah 2:216.
[11] Ibid. note 1 to Surat Al-Baqarah 2:190.
[12] Ibid. Surat Al-Baqarah 2:191.
[13] The defense did not succeed, however, this does provide an example to this form of jihad.
[14] Dr. Al-Hilali, M., Dr. Khan, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur`an in the English Language, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1998, Surat Al-Baqarah 2:190.
[15] Ibid. Surat At-Taubah 9:36.
[16] Williams, John Alden, ed., Themes of Islamic Civilization, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972, pg. 262.
[17] Sohail H. Hashmi, www.elca.org/jle/articles/
[18] Dr. Al-Hilali, M., Dr. Khan, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur`an in the English Language, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1998, Surat Al-Anfal 8:61.
[19] Ibid. Surat Al-Baqarah 2:190.
[20] Rashad Ali in Khilafah Magazine December 2001 edition.
[21] Dr. Al-Hilali, M., Dr. Khan, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur`an in the English Language, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1998, Surat Al-Taubah 9:29.
[22] Ibid. Surat Al-Taubah 9:73.
[23] Syed Kamran Mirza, www.secularislam.org/jihad/exegesis.htm.
[24] Michael G. Knapp www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/knapp.htm.
[25] Dr. Robert D. Crane http://www.cuii.org/hirabah.htm.
[26] Dr. Al-Hilali, M., Dr. Khan, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur`an in the English Language, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1998, Surat An-Nahl 16:29.