McWorld vs. McJihad

By B.E.N.
September 28, 2005

A primary argument used by the proponents of jihad is the encroachment of Western culture on the Muslim world. The McWorld concept of: big corporations, box stores, fast food, name brands, services and products now, now, now; all of which conflict with the general sense of belonging and existence in the Muslim world, specifically in the Middle East.

The gist of the argument against commercialized Western society is that the Arab culture is fading away under the imagery and volume of Western values; primarily through the sense of materialism that is overly portrayed in the capitalistic segment of the society and its overall non-Islamic nature.

Couple this with the radical interpretation of the Qur’an and haddith and the development of an anti-Western, pro-violence movement based on Islam materializes. But this isn’t new. The confrontation of Islam and the Middle East with the West has been occurring for decades, and has been documented by many theorists and scholars. This piece doesn’t intend to look per se at the cultural conflict itself, but rather at the underlying fundamentals of the cultures, and how they must be taken into account to reconcile the differences between the two.

McJihad and Al Qaeda…
With the transformation, intended or not, of Al Qaeda into a horizontal institution, the operational capability of the organization has diminished greatly. However, the ideological message is still very much alive. In fact, the organization has become the ideological beacon used by jihadist groups around the world. This franchisement, or McJihad, of the ideology allows for the internationalization of local jihadist groups and has become the primary modus operandi of the current Al Qaeda organization. Couple this with the advancements of the information age and the ability to spread technologies and techniques quickly, and the threat manifests itself in a new light.

At the same time we see the prominence of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi grow in Iraq as he continues to lead the effort against Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people in general. With his ascension, we see what could be construed as a decline in influence of the primary Al Qaeda leadership, which begs the question- is Zarqawi the new Bin Laden?

Before we can answer this, several things must be addressed. First, Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq is typically labeled as an insurgency, however, is it really? The objectives of insurgencies are usually measured in a zero sum manner against the government; i.e. diminish the government while increasing that of the insurgency. Common insurgent objectives generally revolve around the capability to provide public services, the generation of popular support, international relations, organizational legitimacy, the ability to impact the confidence of the government, the control of coercive force, etc. Has Zarqawi made an effort to establish any of these precedents in Iraq?

With absolute certainly, no he has not. Granted, he has tried fairly successfully to impact the capability of the government to provide public services, but he hasn’t tried to replace this void with his own organization. So we see the support of the coalition partners to replace above and beyond the losses inflicted, translating into short term gains for Zarqawi. He is most certainly not interested, nor engaged, in generating popular support, but rather he seems to be instead obsessed with fostering fear in the Iraqi population- the Shi’ah in particular. He has no legitimate international support and he has not tried to generate in any way a semblance of domestic legitimacy. As to the self-confidence of the government, his actions appear to have only strengthened the resolve of the Iraqi leadership and that of most of the coalition partners. Finally, Zarqawi certainly hasn’t captured the initiative or the entitlement of sole ownership of the use of coercive force in Iraq, rather he has engendered the Iraqi government and the coalition forces to ramp up their capabilities and operational tempo. So in regards to common insurgent objectives, Zarqawi’s “insurgency” has been a resounding failure.

But Zarqawi is not the soul leading element in line for Bin Laden’s current position. Aymen al-Zawahiri is currently Bin Laden’s #2 and is likely the ideological inspiration of the Al Qaeda movement. Most assess that he is the primary driving force in the organization, providing the inspiration to expand operations on a global scale. This is a very important consideration, because if he is the ideological leader of the group, and the group has been transformed into an ideological institution, then it would naturally follow that Zawahiri would replace Bin Laden.

This brings us to a very key question, and one that must be answered to properly determine a solution to Al Qaeda. If Al Qaeda is going to attempt to transition back into an operational organization, then Zarqawi is the natural choice for the leadership position in a post-Bin Laden world. His operational experience in Iraq highlights him as a warrior, and inspires other like minded jihadists to join the movement. However, if Al Qaeda maintains the current role of an ideological institution, then Zawahiri will most likely ascend to the top as it is his vision and leadership that is better geared towards advancing stated Al Qaeda political goals. Regardless, there is likely to be a struggle, followed by a splintering of the Al Qaeda leadership in the event of Bin Laden’s death.

Another important consideration is the fact that Zarqawi does not take orders well, which is apparent when examining his operational history. For example, his usurpation of the leadership role held by his mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, while in a Jordanian prison as well as his refusal to swear allegiance to Bin Laden, which was typically required by the Taliban, when he established his training camp in Afghanistan; these all go to show his desire to dominate his own actions. So why has he now sworn an oath of allegiance to Bin Laden following months of operations in Iraq? It is apparent that Zarqawi’s relationship with Al Qaeda is a marriage of convenience between the two organizations. Al Qaeda and Bin Laden get to claim operational credit for successful attacks in Iraq, prolonging their operational lifespan, while Zarqawi gains access to the global network of Al Qaeda contacts and supporting elements.

But the transparency of the relationship is obvious. Al Qaeda has already claimed credit for other attacks, like the London and Madrid bombings, which they had no part in. Rather, their involvement was limited to the ideological justification that their movement provides for these types of operations. And Zarqawi has not benefited all that much, on a logistical or operational basis, with his association with the Al Qaeda organization. Which again highlights the dilemma of the future of Al Qaeda- is it an operational entity or an ideological one? The short answer is that no one knows yet. If Al Qaeda goes operational again and under the leadership of Zarqawi, then he will consolidate control- essentially verticalizing the organization. This will jeopardize the group in that if Zarqawi is killed or captured, then the organization will collapse with a multitude of loose ends.

However, if the group remains horizontal and ideologically based, then it will be Zawahiri’s inspiration that will guide the movement. This will complicate the destruction of the group in that it will take more than kinetic force to defeat Al Qaeda, it will take an ideological one.

Ideology versus Geo-Politics…
The defeat of terrorism in general, is going to have to happen in the ideological front. The use of kinetic force can eliminate tangible aspects of terrorist groups, but it cannot destroy the founding motivations that fostered the movement in the first place. The problem is that the West does not think per se in an ideological manner, rather, the West’s approach is more geo-political. This is a fundamental difference in the Western culture versus that of the Middle East.
In the West, the traits revolve around individualism, the ability to adapt, ingenuity, certain inalienable freedoms and a sense of justice. Westerners feel that they are the masters of their own destinies. In the Middle East, it is much different. There, the focus is on collectivism, honor, generosity, hospitality and eloquence. They are fatalistic and associate both good and bad with the will of god. These traits are not necessarily mutually exclusive; however, they do not translate directly together. So the statements and actions of one are rarely placed in the proper context by the other.

This is extended in the way both cultures address problems. In the West, rationality is the paradigm used; what is the problem, what are the elements of the problem, and how can it be solved, thus eliminating the problem. This is not how the Middle East deals with adversity; there it is emotionally based. How does this problem make you feel, how can you address this to make you feel better, what is the action you can take to eliminate the bad feelings.

Thus, in the West, a solution may be generated for a problem that is unpopular, but it is the only way to properly address the issue, so it is implemented. This does not happen in the Middle East. If the solution appears worse than the problem, even if the negative aspects are short term, then the solution will not be accepted and another solution that is not as difficult to accept will be generated.

Enter the conflict of Iraq, which is considered wise or foolish dependent on the paradigm used to address problems. An argument can be made by those that focus on a strategy of ideology that the conflict in Iraq is providing, to use a borrowed term, political oxygen to the radical ideological movement. Many from this side of the argument vehemently contend that Iraq has exponentially complicated the situation and has sown the seeds of the next generation of jihadi fighters.

Iraq also did not address the ideology of radical Islamic extremism. There is little argument on the evils of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and he was more or less an accepted, if contained, malevolent force by the surrounding Arab states. So on a political level, Saddam was not loved by anyone, rather quite the opposite, and even on a religious level, he was considered by most in the Islamic community to be a poor Muslim, even an apostate in certain fundamentalist circles. So why is there such a huge backlash against the U.S. for removing Saddam from power?

This goes back to how the West deals with problems and how the Middle East deals with problems. In the Middle East, a problem will be allowed to smolder until it either literally dies or an appropriate solution can be developed. Ideological confrontations are dealt with through ideological means. This is not to say that ideological conflicts are only a war of ideas, since they sometimes use their ideology as a justification of violence, which is then applied through their ideological doctrine- a might makes right mentality. But the emotional aspects of a problem will be at center stage, to include the periphery elements associated with certain solution sets. In essence, the Middle East will allow a long term solution to gradually present itself, inshallah[1].

The West on the other hand, is much more proactive in their focus on addressing problems. They are typically not as long term and they will tackle a situation in the most rationally effective and efficient manner possible, which means that an ideological problem may not have an ideological solution.

For example, when examined from the geo-political side, Iraq was a key cog in the global war on terror. Its ability, as a pro-Western democracy, to influence Iran- the number one sponsor of global terror- cannot be ignored. Consider this, 65% of Iran’s population is 25 years old or younger. They do not identify with the 1979 revolution and are increasingly dissatisfied with the current system of government in Iran, to include a desire for an improvement in relations with- not interference from- the U.S. There is increasing signs that another revolution will occur in Iran within the next five to ten years, and Iraq will only expedite this.

A pro-Western democracy in Iraq will have an enormous impact on Syria- the number one sponsor of terror in the region. Bashar Assad already holds tenuously his grip on power in Syria. He does not have the power nor the charisma of his father, Hafez, or the grooming for power that his late brother Basil received. Ethnically, he comes from an estranged sect of Islam- the Alawites- which isn’t universally recognized by the Shi’ah community let alone the 74% majority of Sunni’s within the republic. The effects of Iraq are already apparent in Syria’s forced withdrawal from its 30 year occupation in Lebanon.

Finally, a pro-Western democracy in Iraq impacts Saudi Arabia- the number one private financier of global terrorism. While the U.S. did not invade Iraq for oil, its oil capacity, which is arguably as much as Saudi Arabia, allows it to present itself as a relief valve to pressure on the Saudi regime. The U.S. gets roughly 13% of its oil from the Middle East, where as Europe and Asia get 75% and 60% respectively. U.S. support of Saudi Arabia has been in effort to support the global economy, because if the oil market is destabilized, it could potentially collapse the European and Asian economies, both of which the U.S. is heavily interwoven with. But a pro-Western democracy in Iraq allows a gradual increase of pressure on the al-Saud regime to crack down on the financial contributors as well as address the radical ideology that comes from the religious segment of the society.

So in a geo-political sense, the conflict in Iraq was infinitely wiser as it allows one conflict to address three threats- and prevents three conflicts. The problem with Iraq is that it was a politically offensive operation geared towards state sponsorship of terrorism. It was a geo-political solution rather than an ideological one and the West has failed to translate this into the proper context understood by the Middle East. The missing key to the Iraq conflict is the Western information campaign focused on engaging the Middle East directly through their media so as to counter misinterpretations and disinformation promulgated throughout the Arab world. This has become the center of gravity for Western success in the global war on terrorism.

Strategic Development…
To effectively deal with the threat of terrorism, three basic strategies must be developed: defensive, offensive and a core. These strategic solution sets are individual as well as symbiotic, and must be developed to coexist and support one another. This three-part approach allows for an assessment of vulnerabilities and the development of a crisis management plan, as well as a short and mid term effort focused on targeting terrorist threats directly and the expansion of a long term solution that focuses on the root causes of terrorism in general.

The defensive strategy has two primary objectives: protect the people and the critical infrastructure necessary to care for them and respond to terrorist initiatives. The problem of this strategy is that it results in a cycle of violence; the terrorists attack, the state falls into crisis management and then the state responds to the attack, which is then followed by another attack and so on and so forth. It fails to address the generating factors of terrorism.

The offensive strategy on the other hand is geared around three primary goals: kill or capture terrorists, disrupt their operations and defeat their organizations. This requires the state to be able to anticipate and pre-empt terrorist acts through the integration of law enforcement, military and political efforts that counter terrorist groups and aggressively disrupts the terrorist networks and thus forcing them to be reactive instead of offensive. However, this again fails to address the generating factors of terrorism.

To actually defeat terrorism, there must be an understanding of what the terrorist organizational makeup is. Terrorist groups are made up of a leadership corps and a support corps. The root causes that enable terrorist operations affects the support corps of terrorist groups. The leaders of Al Qaeda are not poor, uneducated individuals who were disenfranchised. They are wealthy, connected and educated with a driving motivation in their ideology, which cannot be practically targeted by the state. But their support corps is largely made up of a poor, uneducated following that have no recourse for change other than through violent activism. By targeting this segment of the terrorist organization, the terrorist group is transformed from an organization to a band of disgruntled individuals.

To accomplish this, the development of a core strategy is necessary. The core strategy will focus on the long term root causes that support terrorism, like poverty, radical or poor education and political disenfranchisement. This effort is primarily a political one and requires a media campaign, political integration of the disenfranchised elements of the population, and a generation of state legitimacy while delegitimizing the terrorist entity.

The most important aspect of all three strategies is the information campaign waged by the state. Because there is a cultural difference, complicated by the inability to easily translate solution sets, the West needs to be proactively engaged with the global media and the Middle Eastern media specifically. This should include, but not be limited to, interaction with the 3-5,000 foreign correspondents in the Western capitals by stating and explaining the policies and actions of the various Western states. Rather than letting the media come to the state of their own volition and with their own agenda, the state should be expounding and pushing its message to the various masses supported by these media outlets.

Hostile media outlets should be confronted and engaged. For example, Western leaders should face media sources like Al Jazeera, which routinely provide a forum for radical extremist propaganda and disinformation, and highlight the inaccuracies they report. This is also an opportunity to explain Western policy rational and more importantly foster the appearance of engagement with the Middle Eastern community. The goal is to draw the Arab culture into dialogue with the West and create a forum other than terrorism to argue ideological differences.

Conclusion…
The dilemma of Al Qaeda highlights the current status of global terrorism. The future of its leadership as well as its focus, whether ideological or operational, will go a long way towards its longevity and future as a terrorist organization. This translates to other global terrorist actors as they draw attention from multiple states and become a target of a concerted international effort. Is the future of global terrorist organizations an ideological or operational one?

Iraq also has a large part to play in the future of global terrorism. A failed Iraq will be a disaster for the West, culminating in an environment conducive to terrorist training, an operational safe-haven and validate geo-political support for radical extremist ideologies. A successful Iraq, however, will greatly hamper the ability of current state sponsors of terror to continue the status quo, it will prove the radical extremists wrong and it will serve as an example of global cooperation in combating the enabling factors of terrorism.

The key to defeating global terrorism lies in the development of a core strategy aimed at correcting the environmental elements that support it. This strategy must be developed with cultural differences in mind and it must be supported by the global international community. The most important element of the core strategy is the information campaign, as this presents the true face of the strategy and also for an engagement with the communities it is intended to impact.

The West thinks geo-politically while the Middle East thinks ideologically. Neither culture is likely to change this paradigm; therefore it is imperative to translate these policies and their messages into contexts that can be understood by both cultures. Until this is achieved, terrorism and counter-terrorism will remain growth industries.
[1] God willing.