The International Community and Bosnia: When Actions- or the Lack Thereof- Kill

The International Community and Bosnia:
When Actions- or the Lack Thereof- Kill
By B.E.N.
November 25, 2005


In the fall of 1991, the first in a string of nationalist events occurred in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These events, in the form of provincial declarations of independence, forced a chain of events that sparked a tinderbox of unresolved animosities that had smoldered under the surface of Yugoslavian society for decades.

These animosities, based on self-imposed identities under the guise of ethnicity, easily lent themselves to political expedience on the part of the nationalists and culminated some of the worst human tragedies since World War II, which could only be justified by the most extreme of self-delusions. Yet on top of these internal elements of the conflict, which had generated and perpetuated extreme violence, external factors also played key roles in the tremendous loss of life as well as the delay in, at the very least, the ending of the violence.

Three events in particular, initiated on the part of the international community, are significant either for their impact, or lack thereof, on the conflict. These events are the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia, for its impact on the warring parties, and the Vance-Owen and Contact Group plans, for their lack of impact on the Bosnian conflict.

The Arms Embargo
"If you confront us with the choice -- either UN blue helmets or weapons -- we choose weapons. They at least guarantee our people's survival."- Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian President

Following the declaration of independence made by Slovenia and Croatia, and the subsequent violence that ensued, the European Community (EC) on the 5th of July, 1991, imposed an arms embargo on all the provinces in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The United Nations followed suit on the 25th of September with UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 713, which placed its own embargo on the former state.

While at first glance this seems like a logical action, it should have been reviewed and assessed for its effectiveness and validity. Its initial development should have also taken into consideration several key facts.

For one, Belgrade was in control of the vast majority of the former Yugoslavian army, therefore it was in a unique position of possessing the bulk of the stockpiles as well as the defense industry’s infrastructure. Second, 14,000 tons of military weaponry had been purchased from the Middle East prior to the implementation of the arms embargo, therefore making it exempt from the weapons ban.[1] While the Serbs had this massive arsenal, the Bosnian government “had no artillery, no tanks, no planes, no missiles.”[2] In fact, the Serbian military commanders bragged that they had weapons and ammunition enough to continue the war for six or seven years.[3]

The situation was worse than poor for the Bosnians, who were estimated in September of 1992 to have acquired two tanks and two armored personnel carriers (APCs) where as the Serbs had “300 tanks, 200 APCs, 800 artillery pieces and 40 aircraft.”[4] Needless to say, the embargo actually helped the Serbs as it allowed them to maintain military superiority without spending limited funds on an arms race with the Bosnians.

What is troubling is that Great Britain seems to have prompted the former Yugoslavian Foreign Minister, Budimir Loncar, into recommending the arms embargo- playing perfectly into Serbian hands and contributing to the massive imbalance of forces.[5]

Finally, it is questionable as to the legality of the arms embargo placed against Bosnia. Three key elements in particular challenge the legal nature of the embargo. First, it violated Bosnia’s right to self-defense per Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter. Second, the UNSC did not provide the “action necessary to maintain international peace and security.” The UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) could not effectively protect themselves, as witnessed in numerous hostage situations, and their mandate authorized the use of force for self-defense and did not extend to the defense of the Bosnian citizens. Finally, it likely violated the UN Convention on Genocide as it prevented the Bosnian government from defending its nationals against foreign sponsored aggression that qualified as genocide and war crimes per the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.[6] Further more, the embargo was initially requested by and placed against Yugoslavia, but following Bosnia’s acceptance into the UN in May of 1992, the embargo should have no longer applied.

The Vance-Owen Plan
"Because I'm paid to engage in the absurd." (US State Department spokesman when asked how Clinton can expect the Serbs to agree to a just peace without facing a threat of force)

A product of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which took place in Geneva in early September 1992, the Vance-Owen plan presented a three part package of 10 constitutional principles, an immediate end to hostilities and a confederation of 10 provinces with three each controlled ethnically.

The plan was accepted by the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, with slight territorial changes, but the Bosnian Serbs, who controlled 70% of Bosnia and were militarily superior, did not want to accept the 43% of territory allocated to them in the plan.[7] Their rejection of the plan came in the face of strong pressure from Serbia, who wanted a settlement as soon as possible to alleviate the sanctions they were under. For the Serbs, any territorial gains from the province of Bosnia were good, while the Bosnian Serbs, who were primarily located rurally, wanted to establish their own state or unite with Serbia with their lands.

Because the Bosnian Serbs had rejected the plan, the international community decided to step up pressure, and thus passed UNSC resolution 820, which froze the assets of the Serbs and stopped the movement of hard currency into Serbia. In essence, it completely isolated Serbia financially and pushed Slobodan Milosevic to increase pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and abandon his goal of a ‘Greater Serbia’, thus proving the sanctions successful.[8]

The plan also highlighted some key differences between the frame of mind of the Permanent 5 (P5) members of the UNSC. The US looked at the situation as unfair and one-sided, thus it pushed for a leveling of the playing field. The leveling was to come from the ‘lift and strike’ plan, which called for the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and sent air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs/Serbian forces. Europe on the other hand, and France in particular, objected to any lifting of the embargo believing that it would simply prolong the conflict. Another core dispute within the P5 was the Vance-Owen plan itself, which the US felt was an appeasement to Serbia as they were to receive 43% of the territory when they only made up 30% of the population.

This illustrates another difference between the US position on Bosnia and that of the EC and the UN - there existed a moral concern. Holbrooke called the Bosnian conflict “the greatest failure of the West since the 1930s” and did not cavalierly speak of Bosnian options. On the other hand, Europe seemed to possess an amoral attitude towards the war.[9]

In the end however, the plan was never adopted yet it remained the goal of the international community and the model for which future plans would be based on. The premise behind the plan does make perfectly clear one startling revelation- Bosnia was not to exist any longer. The plan carved up the state- a member of the UN- and simple geography shows the end result. The Muslims would be broken and isolated with indefensible and disconnected provinces constituting a state pillaged and raped by its neighbors. This represents an abandonment of the Bosnian people and completely goes against the UN Charter by rewarding aggressor states. The plan does not represent a high point for the international community.

The Contact Group Plan
A "bewildered bunch which does not know how to solve the war." (Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb President, referring to the 'contact group': US, Germany, France, Britain and Russia)

The Contact Group was an attempt by the international community to present a unified front and prevent the Serbs from playing one member against the other. It was also a means for bringing in the US and Russia into the conflict and get them fully involved, something both wanted.

Their plan, based on the Vance-Owen plan, again called for the partition of Bosnia, though on a more favorable level to the Bosnians. The Bosnian Muslim-Croat federation was to receive 51% of the territory where as the Bosnian Serbs were allocated the remaining land. The Muslim-Croats unconditionally accepted the agreement, even though it continued to reward the Bosnian Serbs for aggression and violence. The Bosnian Serbs on the other hand called for further negotiations, of which the Contact Group took as tantamount rejection of the plan.

Serbia and Russia pushed the Bosnian Serbs towards accepting the plan, however, the Bosnian Serbs accurately assessed that the major powers would not use their full spectrum of power against them and held firm. Serbia, desperate by now to get some relief from the international sanctions, was forced to accept international monitors along the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. In exchange for this, the UNSC passed a resolution reopening the Belgrade Airport to all civilian traffic, resume ferry operations to with Italy and permitting the Serbs to participate in international sporting and cultural events.[10]

Again the US found itself on the other side of the issue from the European members of the group. The US wanted to step up pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and increase the use of force in protecting the ‘safe areas’, locals that were anything but safe. However, the US encountered resistance, which in the end led to the US deciding to no longer enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia- the first time a NATO policy that had been unanimously accepted had been unilaterally breached.[11]

In truth, this had no real impact since the US had no forces on the ground, but diplomatically it highlighted a growing rift between the NATO members. It also reasserts the moral concern the US had in the Bosnian conflict, but they lacked the political will necessary to unilaterally engage to the degree required to solve the crisis. Coupled with the policy of containment, which the EC and UN favored, and the Bosnian’s continued to find themselves in a very precarious situation.

Conclusions…
"It's like pornography. We'll know it when we see it." (Clinton's Bosnia exit strategy as whispered by 'top White House official' to Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-VT)

Bosnia and the response of the international community show the importance of political will. The Bosnian Serbs were, by no stretch of the imagination, an equal to the major powers, yet they managed to manipulate and dictate the policies and processes that the powers would adopt for nearly half a decade.

It also showed the ease at which intelligent and powerful institutions can glob onto an oversimplified justification for violence, regardless of how erroneous it may be. This is seen by the many attempts by the international community to develop solutions based on ethnicity as opposed to creating solutions based on accuracy.

Most importantly, Bosnia laid bare the ineptness of the various security institutions following the Cold War. Their inability to unite under a single voice and their incompatible attitudes towards the plight of the victims in the crisis prevented them from decidedly addressing the conflict. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 150,000 people died in the Bosnian War, 70% of which were Muslim.[12] Thousands of women were raped, many gang raped, with some as many as 150 times. The atrocities of the Bosnian conflict were the worst since the discovery of the final solution implemented by the Nazis in World War II. And it shook the international community to its core.

The international community’s actions or lack thereof, killed thousands of Bosnians. While they may not have pulled the trigger, and the ultimate responsibility of the atrocities lies with the Serbs, the major powers allowed the conflict to fester into a lethal sore that continues to plague the Balkans to this day.

[1] Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A short History. London: Macmillan. 1994. Pg. 243.
[2] Thompson, Mark. A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. London: Vintage. 1992. Pg. 328.
[3] Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A short History. London: Macmillan. 1994. Pg. 243.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hodge, Carole. “Hesitation to use force gave Milosevic green light”. Bosnian Institute. 9 Oct 2001.23 Nov 2005. < http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=1549 >.
[6] Williams, Paul R. “Why the Bosnian Arms Embargo Is Illegal”. Public International Law and Policy Group. 15 Jun 1995. 24 Nov 2005. < http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/editorials/Bosnian%20Arms%20Embargo.htm >.
[7] Sloan, Elinor S. Bosnia and the New Collective Security. London: Praeger. 1998. Pg. 48.
[8] Owen, David. Bosnian Odyssey. New York: Harcourt Brace. 1995. Pg. 153.
[9] Rieff, David. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1996. Pg. 257.
[10] Sloan, Elinor S. Bosnia and the New Collective Security. London: Praeger. 1998. Pg. 62.
[11] Ibid, Pg. 64.
[12] Dervišbegovic, Nedim. “Revised death toll for Bosnian war”. Bosnian Institute. 23 Dec 2004. 25 Nov 2005. < http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=1985 >.