The Land of the Two Rivers: A 2006 Assessment of Iraq

The Land of the Two Rivers:
A 2006 Assessment
By
B.E.N.
December 15, 2005

2006 will be a turning point year for Iraq. The Iraqi conflict, and the elements that constitute it, will continue to match past trends as it steadily moves towards a peaceful resolution. This piece intends to look at the constituting elements and how they impact the conflict as well as provide an assessment for 2006 in Iraq.

[1]Looking at the political landscape of Iraq, and its relationship to the ongoing conflict there, it is important to examine the host of agendas that exist between the three major groups. While definitive differences exist between the major sects, unifying commonalities are also present and support shared goals between the groups that will contribute to near term stability.

For instance, the Kurds will be focused on the concept of Kurdistan. At the very least they will wish to maintain the autonomy they have enjoyed for the last decade, but will never truly lose sight of their desire to have an independent state. This will foster cooperation between the Sunni and Shi’ah political leadership as they aspire to prevent Kurdish independence and claims to resources in the north.

The Shi’ah will be focused on realizing political power that continues to be representative of their numbers within the Iraqi population. While the Shi’ah are not per se sympathetic to Iran, they are by far the best avenue for Iran to affect influence on the state of Iraq. Because of this, the Sunnis and the Kurds will ally to contain Iranian influence as much as possible.

The Sunni, a minority within Iraq, is by far the majority in the global Islamic community and in particular the other neighboring Arab states. This can grant the Sunnis a disproportionate amount of international legitimacy within the region and be a force multiplier with regards to their influence in the Iraqi government. This disproportionate legitimacy supports their aim of reestablishing themselves as the dominant force in the Iraqi government. The Kurds and Shi’ah will want to mitigate this and will pool resources to prevent Sunni dominance within Iraq.

These varying secular agendas will create an environment focused on balancing one sects agenda against the unified efforts of the other two groups; highlighting the importance of reconciliation and cooperation between the Shi’ah, Sunni and Kurds.

Cairo Conference…
Recently the Arab League, backed by the U.S., held a preparatory conference for Iraqi national reconciliation. In the final statement of the conference, three main points were presented. One, the Iraqi people will decide on the future of Iraq. Two, foreign troops must leave and a timetable for their departure must be developed- based on the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Finally, the document stated that resistance is legitimate; however, terrorism is not legitimate resistance.

Initial examination of the final statement highlights what appears to be a negative regard for Coalition forces’ continued involvement in Iraq. But is this really the case? Upon closer examination, and within the context of other significant events, the Cairo conference reinforced Coalition policy and presented an acceptable and manageable exit from Iraq for the Iraqis as well as the coalition members.

Democracy…
The first element of the Cairo conference statement revolved around the notion that the Iraqi people will decide the future of Iraq. This is to be realized through the vehicle of democracy and several key events have taken place since the 2003 invasion and transfer of sovereignty that support the democratic process.

The January ‘05 elections were a monumental occasion in that they placed an Iraqi face to the Iraqi government and reflected a monumental change in the way that Iraq would be managed and led in the future. But they were not perfect. The Sunnis by and large did not participate, marginalizing them and fostering a large amount of resentment towards the Shi’ah and Kurds, who enjoyed an enormous amount of power, as well as towards their own leadership for leading them in what proved to be the wrong direction.

The elections also brought to light a failing in that because of the Sunni non-participation, the Kurds were able to gather a disproportionate amount of seats in the transitional national assembly. However, through magnanimous efforts to extend an olive branch to the Sunni community in spite of their failings, the Iraq Interim Government managed to persevere and crest the next major obstacle to their goal of democracy- a national constitution.

The Constitution was voted on by the Iraqi people in a national referendum on 15 October, 2005. Over all, 78% of the Iraqi people voted for the document and 21% voted against it. Two of Iraq’s 18 provinces rejected the constitution, one province short of the requirement for veto.[2] With this, the constitution passed.

Several arguments can be made about the Constitution, both for and against it, but they are irrelevant now in light of the referendums passage. What is key is how the Constitution further paves the way towards democracy in Iraq and lays the groundwork for democracy in the future.
As the December 15[3] elections for the Iraqi national assembly approach, several political considerations must be examined; specifically, the situations facing the three major groups within Iraq.

The Shi’ah are going to experience some political fractionalization, which will weaken a previously united political front. With Ahmed Chalabi’s departure from the current ruling coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and his formation of a separate political alliance, the National Congress Coalition, he will pull some seats away from the current regime. However, this will not be enough to completely fractionalize the Shi’ah and they will maintain a political majority in the assembly as well as provide the next Prime Minister.

For Iraq and the West, the best that can be hoped for is the selection of Iyad Allawi as prime minister. This is due to his secular beliefs and associations with varying Kurd and Sunni political leaders, so it is possible that he would garner their support and put together a government. But Allawi does carry some baggage that may affect his ability to form a ruling coalition. For one, he was the interim Prime Minister during the second Fallujah operation, something the Sunni will be slow to forget. Second, his strong position against Iranian influence will hamper any support from the pro-Iranian elements within the Shi’ah, like the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which have a strong standing in the current government.

Most likely though, the next prime minister will be one of the two serving Iraqi Vice Presidents, Adel Abdul Mahdi. He is the candidate put forward by the SCIRI and does not carry the same negative political connotations that Allawi does. The worst case scenario would be the selection of Ahmed Chalabi, one of Iraq’s deputy prime ministers, as prime minister; however, he is a bit of a dark-horse in that he carries an enormous amount of baggage, both from the West as well as from the region itself, and he would be opposed by some within the Shi’ah community and especially from the other major sects.

Interestingly, following an agreement between the current Grand Ayatollahs in Iraq to refrain from politics, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani[4] recently issued a fatwa calling on the Shi’ah community to not waste their vote and to focus on a party that is influenced by the teachings of Islam. This implies that the smaller alliances should be ignored and that they should vote for the current ruling coalition and does so without directly endorsing them. The ramifications of this are yet to be seen, but will likely heavily impact the other Shi’ah political alliances and their ability to garner votes. Regardless, the Shi’ah will loose some political cohesiveness but not enough to greatly impact their standing in the current government.

As mentioned previously, due to the lack of Sunni participation in the January elections, the Kurds received a disproportionate number of seats in the current national assembly. Couple this with the separation of the Islamic Kurdish Union from the Kurdish alliance and the Kurds are going to end up losing seats in the next national assembly. They will attempt to cauterize the political hemorrhaging by maximizing their political leverage in the formation of the national government with the hope of, at the very least, attaining a major ministerial position. Therefore, they will side with any coalition that will grant them the most in political capital making them somewhat of a wildcard. However, they are not going to have the ability to generate any political momentum and will be forced to react to political events.

[5]By far, the Sunni will come out the best in the December elections. With full participation this time around in the political process, they have the numbers to become the second largest body in the national assembly. They will take advantage of this political momentum and seek to influence the selection of the governmental leadership as well as set the near term political agenda for Iraq. They will support secular candidates such as Allawi for prime minister over the other pro-Iranian Shi’ah candidates.

This is further supported by the fact that the Sunni religious leadership in Iraq has issued fatwas calling on the Sunni community to fully participate in the elections and condemning any interference with the voting process. Obviously, this is in an effort to maximize their political gains in the election but will also allow the Shi’ah and Kurds to fully participate.

Throw in the future provincial elections to take place in February of 2006 and the road to democracy continues to march forward in Iraq. This is all towards the underlying requirement, by the Iraqi government and the Coalition Forces, that the Iraqi people decide the future of Iraq and that democracy must prevail.

Removal of Foreign Forces…
The second element in the final statement of the Cairo Conference was the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. The only real caveat revolved around the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces.
In the beginning of June 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1546, which provided a UN mandate to the Coalition Forces in Iraq. The expiration of the mandate was contingent on either the expiration of the timeframe within the document itself, or at the will of the Iraqi government. In early November of 2005, the mandate was again extended till June 15th of 2006. Following the national assembly elections and the formation of the next Iraqi government, it will be very easy for the government of Iraq to simply do nothing and allow the mandate to expire. This will, of course be dependant on the level of violence in Iraq at the time.

The Sunni will force to the forefront the removal of Coalition forces from Iraq following the expiration of the UN mandate. They will be able to receive support from elements within the Shi’ah community, like Muqtada al Sadr, but they will be opposed by the Kurds. Depending on the success of the national elections, the formation of the government and the level of violence in Iraq at the time, the Sunni will be successful in, at the very least, the development of a timetable that forces some Coalition forces to withdraw.

It will also be dependant on the status and capabilities of the ISF. 2005 saw the ISF mature at an incredible pace, laying the groundwork for an effective and capable security apparatus. For instance, at the beginning of the year, there were a handful of trained and combat ready Iraqi battalions, whereas now there are over 120. Of these, 80 are currently engaged alongside Coalition forces with 40 acting as lead elements controlling their battle space.[6]

Their combat effectiveness is also improving. During the Fallujah operation, 9 Coalition force battalions were engaged with 6 Iraqi battalions supporting them. This was reversed during the Tel Afar operation later in the year with 11 Iraqi battalions being supported by 5 Coalition battalions.

There is only one Iraqi battalion that is fully independent, but the definition of independence is important. To qualify, the battalion must be able to supply their logistics, airlift, intelligence, command & control, etc. There are NATO battalions that don’t qualify under this definition, so this achievement is to be congratulated.

The Shi’ah will also attempt to force the Sunni into fully supporting the ISF through the next government and will also augment the ISF with the various dissolved militias. This augmentation will dramatically increase the size of the ISF and will incorporate Sunni participation and cooperation in ISF operations.

Resistance and Terrorism…
The final point made in the Cairo Conference statement was the legitimacy of the “insurgency”. The document states that, “resistance is a legitimate right for all nations; terrorism does not represent legitimate resistance.”[7] The document even went so far as to define terrorism as “acts of violence that target civilians, humanitarian and civilian institutions and houses of worship.”[8]

Therefore, when examining the anti-Coalition forces, the lexicon used to describe them becomes crucial. The statement spoke to the legitimacy of resistance, referring to the insurgency, but differentiated between resistance and terrorism. In order to fully understand the statement and its context, a differentiation must be made between insurgents and terrorists.

A central goal of any insurgency is the establishment of a separate ‘government’ intended to eventually usurp the legitimacy of the state government and ultimately supplant it. However, this has not occurred in Iraq. In fact, the deficiency of this element has exacerbated the standing of the main ‘insurgent’ faction, Al Qaeda in Iraq, in the eyes of the Islamic community.

Nothing highlights this better than the captured letter that Ayman al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two leader, sent to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the letter, Zawahiri criticizes Zarqawi for targeting the Shi’ah and for not establishing a Caliphate in territory that AQIZ controlled. Because Zarqawi has been deficient in this governmental establishment, he has not been able to foster any legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqis or the general Islamic community.

The resistance comment in the conference statement further expounds on this by addressing the means of the resistance rather than the ends, which are embodied in the establishment of a Caliphate. By targeting terrorism, and defining it as such, they delegitimize over half of Zarqawi’s operations in Iraq. They also focus on the massive casualty events, which are responsible for the bulk of Iraqi deaths since initial major combat operations in 2003 ended.

By attacking the means, they indirectly attack the end goal of a Caliphate, and allow the Sunnis to be able to further legitimize themselves by clamping down on the support network for the insurgency, regardless of their complicity in it. This grants them the ability to influence the ISF and its formation and operations, and as a byproduct, leverage themselves into positions of power within the Iraqi leadership. This also serves to legitimize the resistance components of the insurgency, but not the terrorist elements, providing an out for, for lack of a better term, the moderate elements of the insurgency.

The US Plan for Victory in Iraq…
All of these events must be viewed in light of US policy, considering that it is the leading force in the occupation of Iraq. The White House recently released a document called the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and it lays out three tracks for success: political, security, and economic. The political track calls for the development of democracy in Iraq and the political engagement of all the groups within Iraq. The security track focuses on the rebuilding of the ISF and the removal of the insurgent/terrorist elements. The economic track explains the importance of rebuilding their infrastructure and the need to reform the Iraqi economy on a free and open framework.[10]

The political track’s focus on democracy mirrors the desires of the Iraqi people in their decision to decide their own future and has been repeatedly stated by the Coalition force leaders and the international community at large. The security track is another echo of Coalition and US policy. President Bush has stated numerous times that “coalition forces will stand down as the Iraqi people stand up.”[11] And the economic track will be inherently supported by the improvement in the security situation and the desire for success by the Iraqi people themselves.

Conclusion…
Iraq is on the verge of rounding a major corner towards peace and resolving the internal conflict that has plagued it for the last two and half years. Violence will continue and it is unreasonable and irresponsible to think that the violent elements in Iraq will simply disappear because of the progress made thus far; however, it is safe to assume that the worst is over.

With the full participation of the Sunni population in the Iraqi political process, a major supporting element for the ‘insurgency’ has vanished. Couple this with the growing capabilities of the ISF and the expanding legitimacy and power of the Iraqi government and the final statement of the Cairo Conference portends a successful 2006 for Iraq.

It also presents the Iraqi people, as well as the Coalition leadership, with an exit strategy for Coalition Forces. This exit strategy is going to resemble something similar to the plan put forward by US Congressman John Murtha, but for much different reasons than what he stated.
Coalition forces will draw down, starting with 30,000 US troops who were maintained for added security during the December elections. US forces will continue to draw down and by the end of 2006 will number somewhere around 75,000 with another 20-30,000 positioned in Kuwait as a Quick Reaction Force. The other Coalition partners will also withdraw forces, most of the smaller participants completely, but the more significant contingents, like the United Kingdom, following the US lead and drawing down to about half of their current numbers. This will result in the ISF being given control of more and more territory and Coalition visibility reduced to a supporting force for Iraqi operations.

The prognosis for Iraq in 2006 looks good. With the advancements of the political process, the improvement of the security situation and the removal of Coalition forces, the Iraqi conflict is finally seeing some light at the end of the tunnel. If the Iraqi people can continue the steady and persistent march towards democracy as well as moderate and mitigate their various extremist elements, then they will be able to emerge as a strong, united state well on their way to joining modern society.

[1] Figure 1 diagram created by the author.
[2] The Iraqi Constitution. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Constitution.
[3] December 15, 2005.
[4] Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani is the most senior grand ayatollah in Iraq, and arguably in the Shi’ah world. He commands the following of millions and his positions are extremely influential in the Shi’ah community, especially in Iraq where the Shi’ah population by and large follows his teachings.
[5] An unclassified diagram from an operation order for Iraq.
[6] Fact Sheet: Training Iraqi Security Forces. White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130.html.
[7] Final Statement of National Accord Conference. http://democracyrising.us/content/view/373/151/.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Al-Shishani, Murad. “Al-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets”. Volume 3, Issue 22 (November 17, 2005). 15 Dec 2005. http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369831&printthis=1.
[10] National Security Council. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. November 2005. 15 Dec 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html.
[11] Paraphrase of President Bush in numerous speeches over the last two years.