Valid Reasons for the U.S. to Be, or Not to Be, Part of a Multi-National Conflict Management Force

The United States has been in an interesting position within the international community for the last two decades. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became the sole global superpower and ushered in a new, unipolar era. This unprecedented environment continues to present the US with an interesting problem; how does it deal with the notion of multilateralism, especially when dealing with conflict management?
Leading the Way?

An interesting dilemma within the conundrum of multilateral participation on the part of the US is whether the US is behind or ahead of the curve with regards to multilateralism. Depending on perspective, an argument could potentially be made for each.

Take the case of Kosovo. The US predominantly made up the NATO force that conducted ten weeks and over 38,000 sorties [1] and provided 650 of the 927 NATO aircraft.[2] This operation did not have United Nation’s support, primarily due to the belief that Russia would veto any such action within the UN Security Council. Therefore, through NATO, the US pushed for the use of military strikes to coerce Bosnian actions with regards to the Albanian population in the Kosovo province. Following the controversial conflict, the UNSC passed resolution 1244, authorizing “relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo,”[3] thus providing a UN mandate for the NATO Kosovo Forces (KFOR).

70% of the air forces used to conduct Operation Allied Force were American, and while all NATO members participated in the operation to some degree, this was a US campaign attempting to manage the Kosovo conflict. One could easily argue that it was US action that fostered NATO and UN participation since these regional and international institutions followed the US’s lead in the conflict. However, the argument could also be made that the US did not fully engage the UN completely and used NATO as a cover of multilateralism while really acting independently. So was the Kosovo conflict a case of the US elevating itself to international interaction or degrading itself so as to conform to international pressure?
Who Says?

Consider further that this highlights another relevant question; how does international law fit into the equation? Russia and China both played prominent roles in preventing the Kosovo question from being fully addressed within the UN Security Council.[4] Because of the structure of the UNSC, this opposition effectively ceased further action on the issue on the part of the council. As a result, the US bypassed the Security Council and chose to form a coalition of its own making, in this case through the regional security organization NATO. But this is technically in violation to international law and is one of the predominant contentious issues that question’s the legitimacy of the operation.

Fast forward to the development of the Iraq War in 2003 and it is a case of déjà vu. The US and the United Kingdom pursued within the UNSC a resolution geared towards forcing the Saddam Hussein regime to abandon its Weapons of Mass Destruction programs. Opposition to resolution enforcement was led by the French, and again due to the structure of the UNSC, the issue was at an impasse and the US therefore bypassed the Security Council and developed a coalition of its own making.

The structure of the UN and the composition of the UNSC have coalesced into what could arguably be called a fatal flaw in the system. Because the UN is the only recognized comprehensive international security organization that is authorized to address any interstate crisis, it is in the unique and solitary position of managing conflicts. Yet because of the veto powers of the permanent members of the UNSC, geo-politics and state interests greatly impact the ability of the council to address global crisis.

In addition to the examples of Kosovo and Iraq, the UNSC was relatively ineffective during the Cold War as the US, UK and France stood on the opposite side of the Soviet Union and China. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, and with the rise of Chinese influence, coupled with the geo-political ambitions of France, the UNSC has become an extremely volatile and unpredictable environment. So as the US addresses conflict management and its decision to incorporate other international actors, it must understand the dynamics and politics of the UNSC.

All of this impacts US policy as the state contemplates unilateral or multilateral action. A current example of this is the situation in Darfur, Sudan. The US is calling for international action, going so far as to call the violence in Darfur genocide. However, the West has been tenuous at best as it examines the situation. Currently about 7,000 African Union troops are operating in Darfur under a very limited mandate,[5] with most observers calling this force woefully inadequate to deal with the crisis. Moves to incorporate UN troops have received intense pushback from the Sudanese government, which according to some is complicit with the violence. To further complicate the issue is the fact that Sudan is the largest foreign oil project for China, who also happens to be the largest weapons supplier to the Sudanese government.[6] So the dilemma for the US, as well as the rest of the international community, is how to address the issue through the UNSC and in the face of China’s veto. This dilemma is replicated with the Iranian nuclear crisis as Iran recently signed a $70 Billion dollar oil deal with China.[7] Because of China’s growing thirst for oil and its heavy investment in these troubled locations, China simply will not allow Sudan or Iran to be impacted by UN sanctions, which would effectively eliminate China’s investments and restrict its access to these energy sources. This presents the international community and the US in particular, with two more crises that may not be able to be addressed by the one institution that was designed to deal with them.
Hard or Soft?

The bottom line with regards to the UN is that it is plagued with conflicts of interest. These conflicts of interests extend to every nation within the organization, but are most apparent and felt in the permanent five members of the UNSC. Therefore the interaction of the UN and the UNSC specifically, will always be limited, as it will be forced to address conflicts that do not garner direct and opposing views on the part of the permanent five members of the UNSC.

So when the US examines policy options with regards to conflict management, how should it decide on who, if any, to incorporate into the process? This decision should be largely based and driven by effects. Once the effects desired have been established, the state can then decide on what conditions then lead to these effect-objectives. After recognizing the desired conditions necessary, the US must then decide on the actions needed to create those conditions. Those actions will either be based on America’s hard or soft power. It will be that determination that will largely dictate whether the US should pursue unilateral or multilateral avenues.

The US boasts the worlds most powerful military, advanced and capable beyond the dreams of most worlds leaders. It is also home to the most power economy in the world. This constitutes considerable hard power and provides the US with many options for achieving its policies. The US is also known as the leader of the free world and as an icon of liberties, freedoms and opportunity. It is these qualities that allows the US to convince or persuades a foreign state that our goals should be their goals. This is soft power and it is not dependent on the capabilities of the state but on the foreign perception of the state.[8]

It is this reality, perception versus capability, that drives the paradigm needed to develop effective policy towards a conflict. Hard power versus Soft power, which can be focused as unilateral versus multilateral. Hard power depends on military and economic capabilities and is intended to coerce another state towards a certain action through either force or treasure. Soft power on the other hand is dependent on the intangible of perception, particularly that of the people. So the US could use the military to coerce a state to hold elections or its own government could serve as an example to the people of that state who then force their own government to hold elections. Both achieve the desired action of elections, but it is soft power that properly addressed the required conditions needed for the elections to occur.
Conclusions…

Within the preamble of the 2006 National Security Strategy, President Bush states that US national security strategy is founded on two pillars. “The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity,”[9] all primary elements of Soft power. The second pillar is, “confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.”[10] This second pillar of confrontation revolves around tangibles or elements of Hard power. The significance of Soft power as the first pillar shows a conscious effort by the US administration to at least theoretically constrain its enormous economic and military advantages while soliciting global buy-in towards the US position with regards to a conflict.

So when does multilateral conflict management work for the US? For one, when the conflict is controversial. If the legitimacy of the US position is in question, then US Soft power is under threat. Therefore an effort needs to be made to manage the conflict with as much of a concerted effort and with as many allies as possible so as to reinforce legitimacy. This was seen with regards to the Kosovo conflict and the incorporation of NATO. Secondly, conflicts that are dependent on reconstruction and reconciliation typically require multilateralism. This has been a shortfall for the US with regards to the current Iraq conflict. While the US was more than capable of dealing with the invasion, and it did so quite effectively, it has not been as successful with the reconstruction portion of the mission. This lack of success is due partially to the lack of legitimacy the US has in Iraq as well as the nature of the reconstruction mission itself. Finally, the US should search for a multilateral approach when the nature of the mission is specialized to a point that the US is not fully up to the task itself. While the US is improving, an example of this is peacekeeping operations; an operation the US has been slow in accepting and performing. All of this is of course under the umbrella of international legality, which if is lacking will inherently complicate the ability to garner multilateral support anyway.

As the second pillar of the 2006 NSS states, the US will continue to lead the way in addressing global conflicts but it highlights that, “history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs.”[11] The obvious implication in this is that unilateral US action is not a snub towards multilateralism but rather a drive to force multilateral participation. Kosovo again serves as a good example of this.

Of course many tangible reasons exist to incorporate multilateral action, to include the conflict cost-sharing factor and increased troop deployment numbers; and they can be serious contributions to a conflict. For instance in the 1991 Gulf War, the US had committed over 500,000 troops along with about 160,000 coalition allies who made up around 24% of the UN force. But the conflict only cost the US about $7 Billion rather than the roughly $62 Billions dollar cost of the conflict.[12] So the contributions of states in treasure to a conflict can be very important.

The US, as the most powerful state in the world is in the unique position of having its foreign policy, especially its management of conflicts, examined and criticized by the global community. Under this scrutiny, the US must ensure that its Hard power is used precisely and rarely while strengthening and projecting its Soft power as broadly and often as possible. By using this approach to conflict management, the US maximizes its ability to leverage force or goodwill as appropriate. There are many valid reasons for the U.S. to be, or not to be, a part of a multilateral conflict management force, but the determining factor for that participation must be determined by what the US hopes to effect and how they intend to do it.


[1] Kosovo War. The NATO Bombing Campaign. Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War#Criticism_of_the_Case_for_War.
[2] Operation Allied Force. http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/.
[3] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Article 7. 10Jun1999. 4May2006. http://www.un.int/usa/sres1244.htm.
[4] Nye, Joseph S., Jr., “Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism: America Can’t Go It Alone”. International Herald Tribune. 13Jun2002. 2May2006. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/us/2002/0613uni.htm.
[5] Q&A: Sudan's Darfur Conflict. BBC News. 5May2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3496731.stm.
[6] Goodman, Peter S. “China Invests Heavily In Sudan's Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on Villagers”. The Washington Post. 23Dec2004. 5May2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power”. International Herald Tribune. 10Jan2003. 4May2006. http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/nye_soft_power_iht_011003.htm.
[9] Bush, George W., Preamble. The National Security Strategy of the United States. Mar2006. 5May2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Horan, Fred. “How much did the Gulf War cost the US”. Information taken from Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, The Final Report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense; April 1992; Appendix P. Cornell University. 20May1997. 6May2006. http://people.psych.cornell.edu/~fhoran/gulf/GW_cost/GW_payments.html.

Multinational Conflict Management: Does the Concept Conflict with Sovereignty?

Sovereignty is classically and generally defined as, “supreme authority within a territory,”[1] and basically revolves around the notion that no entity supercedes the legal authority of the state. This definition has described the role of the state as the sovereign since the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the 30 Years War in 1648.[2] But with the development of supranational institutions, this definition of sovereignty has changed slightly to reflect, “the legal principle that no authority is above the state to establish or enforce rules about foreign or domestic conduct.”[3] However, with the expansion of supranational institutions and/or multinational coalitions, the conduct of state domestic policy is becoming ever more international. This development begs the question: does multinational conflict management conflict with the concept of sovereignty?

An obvious element of the question resides within the newer developments of sovereignty itself. As states concede certain provisions or accept a limited amount of oversight into their domestic policies, the idea of conflict or violation diminishes. So the acceptance of supranational supervision does not conflict with state sovereignty, provided the parameters of supervision include domestic policy. The United Nations is the world’s premier supranational institution, if for no other reason because of its size. The UN is the only institution with the mandate of maintaining global peace that can boast total global membership. But does the UN have the mandate to manage domestic peace?

The purpose of the UN per it’s Charter is, “to maintain international peace and security… take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace…[suppress] acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace…”[4] However, the charter states that, “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”[5] So clearly there is a limitation in the authority bestowed on the UN by member states. Per the charter, the UN does not posses a mandate for the enforcement of peace within state domestic policy. But what about regional organizations?

Second only to the UN in global stature is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. The organization, established to counter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, has been the preeminent regional security institution since the Second World War. But institutions, even ones such as NATO, are constrained in what they can and cannot do with regards to peace and security. The UN Charter states that, “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”[6] Moreover, the UN Charter goes on to explain that these regional institutions can be used, “where appropriate… such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.”[7] However, the charter specifically comments that, “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”[8] Since regional institutions require UN Security Council approval, and since the UN does not posses a mandate for interfering in state domestic policies, it is not justified for regional organizations or actors to interfere with state domestic policy.

But does this answer the question of conflict between the concept of sovereignty and multinational conflict management? The nature of the conflict is very important, especially with regards to the parties of the conflict. Is the nature of the conflict intra-state or inter-state? If the crisis meets the criteria of international conflict, then supranational institutions and regional collective security organizations are justified in their actions. But what happens with regards to intra-state conflict?

It is important to recognize that the norms of sovereignty- such as nonintervention, self-determination or sovereign equality- are “morally ambiguous” and can be judged moral or immoral based on perspective, period or place.[9] The relative norms of sovereignty contradict any moral justifications of its violation. Couple that with the lack of any legal provisions authorizing sovereignty’s breach and a conflict between the concepts of sovereignty and multilateral conflict management becomes more apparent.

So the precepts surrounding multilateral conflict management permit international conflicts to be addressed, but greatly constrain intervention with regards to intrastate crisis. Therefore within the classical and technical perceptions of multilateral conflict management, it is difficult to justify intrastate intervention. However, with the expansion of global interconnectedness, it is virtually impossible to have intrastate conflicts not impact their neighbors and thus transform into interstate conflicts.

This was the line of thought used by NATO to intervene in Kosovo. They asserted that, “NATO and the international community have a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo, inter alia because of their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern to the Alliance.”[10] Supporters of their intervention contend that the refugee issues, specifically that involving the Albanians, were solved and that political stability was reinstalled in the region. Opponents disagree and claim that the Albanian refugees were simply replaced by different ethnic groups and that the region is still unstable with violence and crime still prevalent.

What is clear is that the intervention of NATO lead to the removal of Slobodan Milošević’s regime and expedited his standing trial for war crimes. What is not clear is whether or not NATO had the legal justification for such action. A Canadian law professor by the name of Michael Mandel filed a formal complaint to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in which he charged the NATO leadership with war crimes.[11] However, the tribunal rejected this complaint because they felt they had no jurisdiction over NATO, so the issue of NATO’s legitimacy in acting against Kosovo is likely to never be formally decided.[12]
What is clear is that multinational conflict management is directly applicable to international crisis, what is not so clear is the applicability of multinational conflict management to intrastate conflict. In a technical or classical sense, the concept of sovereignty does conflict with multinational conflict management directed towards intrastate conflict, but if the attitude associated with the NATO intervention is indicative of future international perspectives, then the use of multinational conflict management and intervention will continue to exist.


[1] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/#1.
[2] The Avalon Project. The Treaty of Westphalia. Yale Law School. April 15, 2006. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm.
[3] Kegley, Charles W., Jr., Gregory A. Raymond. From War to Peace: Fateful Decisions in International Politics. Bedford/St. Martin’s. Boston. 2002. Pg. 280.
[4] United Nations Charter. Article 1:1. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[5] Ibid. Article 2:7. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[6] Ibid. Article 52:1. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[7] Ibid. Article 53:1. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[8] Ibid. Article 53:1. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
[9] Acharya, Amitav. “Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics”. Institute of Defense and Security Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Singapore. May 2005. Apr 2006. Pg. 3. http://www.ntu.edu.sg/IDSS/publications/WorkingPapers/wp78.pdf.
[10] Council statement on the situation in Kosovo. NATO Press Release (98) 29. 5 Mar. 1998. Apr 2006. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-029e.htm.
[11] Formal complaint to the ICTFY stating NATO War Crimes. Apr 2006. http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/icty.htm.
[12] A summary of the legitimacy of the NATO intervention in Kosovo is laid out in Wikipedia, however, as with anything in Wikipedia the information must be vetted.

Combating Terrorism Through Conflict Resolution

By B.E.N.
10 March 2006

Introduction…
Following the events of September 11, 2001, a major geo-political shift occurred, thrusting the threats of terrorism to the forefront of the international agenda. While terrorism is not a new tactic, it took the magnitude of the New York and Washington, D.C. attacks to bring to bear the full power and attention of the United States, and like the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, awake a sleeping giant.

Since 9/11 the US has focused on the notion of counter-terrorism, defined by Paul de Armond as, “essentially a defensive military strategy,” which, “consists of gathering intelligence, maintaining operational security, and applying force to capture or kill opponents.”[1] He continues, “Counter-terrorism is a strategy of repression or suppression [whose] aim is not to eliminate root causes or eliminate terrorism, but only to ‘bring the situation under control.’”[2]

So the strategy of counter-terrorism is short-term in nature and intended to mitigate the effectiveness and frequency of terrorist acts themselves. This has been the primary focus of the international community in general and specifically that of the United States for the last four and a half years. The notion of a long term strategy to deal with terrorism exists in a familiar international process known as conflict resolution. Conflict resolution provides a plethora of tools that not only deal with the symptoms of terrorism, but the root causes as well. It is these tools, within the process of conflict resolution, that allow a long-term, non-kinetic strategy of anti-terror to be developed, effectively combating terrorism.

The Framework…
In order to effectively devise a means for developing a long-term, strategic focus for combating terrorism through conflict resolution, it is necessary to form a policy framework. This can be applied through a four dimensional perspective that focuses on prevention, persuasion, denial and coordination.[3]

The first dimension of prevention centers itself around the general notion of properly addressing legitimate grievances, essentially reducing the disposition of disgruntled parties to use terrorism as a viable political tactic. This notion of prevention revolves around removing the political oxygen used by terrorist organizations to mobilize popular support and provide justification for terrorist events. It can be effective in addressing both root causes as well as the enablers to terrorism.

The importance of the preventive dimension is that it can be addressed through non-kinetic means and prevent a violent facet to the conflict. This dimension is the most effective and opportune moment for instituting structural change geared towards democratic transformation in the troubled state. This democratic transition requires an institutional and cultural attitude that is nurtured and embraced by both the state as well as the opposition groups. This transformation must address the economic conditions within the state so as to provide enfranchisement by all of the parties involved, effectively removing or mitigating the symptoms of under-development, such as poverty, which can be an enabling condition for terrorism.

The economic condition of the state is also important in that it impacts the ability of the state to develop and maintain the infrastructure necessary to effectively implement the democratic process. Moreover, it allows for a broader development program to include and incorporate minority and opposition parties, ensuring a more expansive and equal distribution of funds within the state.

In conjunction with the economic condition, the culture and mindset within the state and opposition, especially within the support constituency used by both, must be open to the notion and idea of democracy and resolution. This serves to support the first dimension of prevention as well as lay the ground work for the second dimension of persuasion.

Persuasion is intended to delegitimize and discredit terrorism and impact the policies and decisions of terrorist leaders. It also serves to reduce the support base for terrorist groups by again removing the political oxygen they use to muster logistical and financial support. This constitutes the effective implementation of the carrot and stick approach. When dealing with terrorism, this entails balancing counter-terrorism operations against political concessions and enfranchisement. For the diasporas and domestic support communities, the goal is to convincingly show non-violent options as the best course towards political accommodation. Jointly and when effectively employed, they provide a political environment non-conducive to violence and accommodating to political incorporation.

This political environment further denies the capability of terrorist groups to operate and is expanded further within a separate and unique third dimension of denial. The core consideration for properly employing denial is through a complementary process utilizing effective counter-terrorism tactics while maintaining certain inalienable freedoms. Denial is the quintessential dimension for counter-terrorism to operate. It serves to harden as many potential targets as possible, interrupt terrorist financial and logistical support, and disrupt or dismantle terrorist operational networks through effective coordination and cooperation both domestically and internationally.

The fourth and final dimension of coordination is essential for local and state services to be successful in combating terrorism. It involves the coordination of the various state intelligence and security services as they target the terrorists, as well as the synchronization of the reconstruction effort within the state. This dimension is the culmination of tying together the tactics of counter-terrorism with the tools of conflict resolution. This coordination and cooperation must occur on every level of both programs as they progress in parallel.

It is through this framework, as applied through these four dimensions, which allow a strategy to develop that can effectively utilize conflict resolution for combating terrorism. But it is important to know more than just the general premise behind the framework. How can these concepts be properly applied?

The Tools…
The US National Security Strategy defines terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”[4] Simply put, it is a political event geared towards achieving political results through violence, fear and intimidation. Conflict resolution is focused on achieving political appeasement between conflicting parties, utilizing political tools that range from official dialogue through economic actions to military operations. So it is natural, if not obvious, that conflict resolution as a political solution is applicable to terrorism which revolves around a political problem.

A key mechanism within official dialogue, geared towards conflict resolution, is the notion and process of reconciliation. A major challenge to this process is the ability to identify and understand the root causes of the conflict as well as the enabling factors that perpetuate the fight. This requires communication on all levels and fronts as the relationship between the state and the opposition transforms and grows. As with any conflict, the grievances of the past must be understood and amends, as appropriate, be made. There must be the capacity for all involved to coexist, requiring the ability for justice to prevail for injured parties. But justice per se does not imply only a punitive solution. Reconciliation contains four key elements: restorative justice and reparations, which are more punitive in nature and through reconciliatory measures like healing and truth-telling.[5]

Restorative justice is an effort to right past wrongs through legal methods via four primary modes: retribution through prosecution, restoration via mediation, historically with truth commissions and economically by reparations.[6] While these measures are punitive in nature and seek to assign some accountability to the offending party, they are not the only means for effectively reconciling the conflict. In fact, they’re only half of the solution for while it is important for justice to be handed out, it is also necessary for the victim to forgive the offending party. This is accomplished through healing and truth-telling and allows all involved to reach a point of closure on the conflict. These more forgiving elements of reconciliation touch on the intangible aspects of human nature and can sometimes utilize punitive tools in non-punitive ways. For example, truth-telling within a truth-commission allows victims and society in general to know the truth of what occurred so as to prevent false reconciliation and foster a new social beginning.

The key to reconciliation being successful is the proper management of the environment, which is the primary responsibility of the state. The goal of reconciliation is to mitigate and change the emotional attitude of the conflict and when used to combat terrorism, it prevents and persuades the support structure for terrorist organizations to pursue non-violent means. So to be an effective tool, the state must balance its approach and use of these differing forums, preventing the overuse or under-use of any particular one.

Economics can be a bulwark against, or a fuel for, terrorism. Groups like al Qaeda have received tens of millions of dollars over the years through legitimate charities or organized criminal activities. This money is then spent on training facilities in the lawless reaches of the globe, on maintaining its global support network or on clandestine terrorist plots. At the same time, in countries were terrorism, or terrorist groups, are most prevalent, like Yemen, Afghanistan, the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, we see a per capita GDP average of only $825.[7] So what is the role of economics, specifically through the process of conflict resolution, in combating terrorism?

The advantage of economic measures with regards to conflict resolution is that it provides a non-kinetic means for addressing the situation. Whether through sanctions or aid, these tools either hinder or support the parties involved. In combating terrorism, these tools can impact the ability for terrorist groups to garner direct state support and can mobilize international pressure and procedures that further complicate or prevent their financial capabilities. These tools can also benefit local communities and prevent them from becoming breeding grounds for terrorist recruitment by providing hope and progress. Investment in education facilities, administrative and judicial centers and the expansion of economic opportunities can all remove the political oxygen needed by terrorist organizations.

But it is important that the international community, in its bid to develop an aid program for the conflicted state, not replace one problem with another by creating a dependence on foreign aid. Ethiopia is a prime example of this phenomenon.

With a per capita GDP of just $800, it is one of the poorest nations on earth.[8] What’s more, between 1984 and 2002, the annual food production on a per capita basis fell from 450 kilos to only 140 kilos- a 69% drop. But there is no incentive to restructure this situation on the part of the Ethiopians. In 2003, it cost an Ethiopian farmer $50 to produce a ton of grain that would only receive $25 on the market, primarily because of the massive aid program’s influx of free grain.[9] This leads to an increase in unemployment and dependence on the international community. What’s worse is that it allows ill feelings to fester and mature, fertilizing a potential resource pool for terrorist organizations to utilize, which is occurring as terrorism is on the rise in the state. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the aid that is used is in such a manner as to foster development for long term growth and not simply address the symptoms of under-development.

But as stated previously, aid is only one tool available in conflict resolution. Sanctions can provide an effective means for combating terrorism as they can greatly impact a terrorist group’s ability to locate a safe zone to operate or garner state level support. Depending on the geo-political ‘neighborhood’, the implementation and relevance of sanctions can vary in their scope and objective. The key to effective sanctions is their ability to be dynamic in nature. Static sanction regimes are immobile and do not have the ability to reward positive actions on the part of the targeted state.

Therefore, the nature of the sanction regime depends greatly on the parties involved. Individual states may choose to install their own set of economic sanctions against a state with some limited success. The United States has taken this approach with Cuba, deciding to sanction the state for its poor record on human rights. However, some situations cannot be addressed by single actors and require the cooperation of the international community. This style of sanction regime is normally monitored and managed by a supranational institution, like the United Nations. It may still be a single-issue set of sanctions, such as an oil embargo, which will punish a state without crippling it or the sanctions may consist of a comprehensive and complex program designed to paralyze the national regime.

Sometimes, however, dialogue breaks down or the economic tools are not capable of dealing with the situation, thus forcing the use of force to placate the conflict. The use of force should not be confused with war and in regards to conflict resolution; it generally takes the form of peace keeping or peacemaking.

Peacekeeping, as defined by the Conflict Research Consortium at the University of Colorado, is the prevention of hostilities by using a barrier, which is typically embodied by neutral foreign troops, and does not focus on the resolution of the conflict per se or its negotiations for peace.[10] Peacemaking is a much broader term defined by the United Nations as “the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.”[11] Within the context of peacemaking, is the notion of peace-enforcement, which is the application of force to further the program of the peacemaking regime. Therefore, the key difference between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is the goal of the forces on the ground. Peacekeepers are focused simply on preventing the conflicting factions from violently engaging one another. Peace-enforcement, under the over arching premise of peacemaking, is the active engagement of the forces to implement and enforce the provisions of the process. Within the context of combating terrorism, peace-enforcement is synonymous with the application of counter-terrorism operations.

The Roadmap…
When examining the dimensions of the political framework and some of the tools available to conflict resolution, a roadmap for combating terrorism does begin to present itself. However, this roadmap must present more than a short term solution, abandoning the finger-in-the-dyke policies that have been utilized thus far through the application of counter-terrorism. It is imperative that both an international and national level strategy be nurtured and developed. But before the strategy can be effectively and completely drawn, it is imperative that a definition of terrorism be decided upon and applied on an international basis.

Countless definitions within a myriad of organizations from every nation attempt to define the tactic, which needs to be refined down to a single identifiable definition that can be applied through supranational institutions as well as within national regimes and their associated organizations. This definition must contain the general premise of an extra-legal, violent action, or the threat thereof, directed towards achieving a political concession through intimidation and/or fear.

Once the definition of terrorism has been set, a strategy for combating it can be accurately developed. This comprehensive strategic regime should enlist elements of democratic transition, like economic development, culture, regional attitudes and domestic ideas, as well as the some of the core tools of conflict resolution, such as reconciliation, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. The building blocks of conflict resolution can effectively provide the short to mid-term process of the strategy with the factors of democratic transition presenting the mid to long-term benchmarks. But for the short term plan to be effective, it must be geared towards the long term agenda of the strategy.

Therefore, within the strategy of democratic transition, it is necessary that economic support be focused metaphorically on teaching a state to fish. That said and in regards to the concept of foreign aid, the Millennium Challenge Account needs to be the primary factor used by the international community, shifting the focus from the notion of aid towards the concept of international developmental support. Target states looking to receive grants and/or loans should be progressing towards economic freedom and openness. A benchmark for determining this developmental support can be based on the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s Index for Economic Freedom, which centers it rankings on 10 key economic factors: trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market activity.[12] This focus on economic freedom has a proven track record of improving the per capita GDP of the developing state, thus supporting a core element in combating terrorism within the dimension of prevention. An important and vital element that should be incorporated in the economic developmental program is the reinvestment in the local and state infrastructure so as to support other components of the strategy, like reconciliation. This is to include administrative, judicial and educational centers throughout the state.

Balancing as well as supporting economic development, sanction programs can be employed to effectively address states that provide support to terrorist organizations. However, it is necessary that the sanction regime contain several key elements to ensure their effectiveness. First, the sanction program needs to be as multilateral as possible. Single state sanction regimes are not nearly as effective as supranational programs and require much longer in achieving the changes they desire.[13] Secondly, slow and incrementally introduced sanction regimes allow the target state to find “alternative suppliers, to build new alliances, and to mobilize domestic opinion in support of its policies.”[14] Finally, it is necessary for the sanction regime to be dynamic and flexible, adjusting as needed and rewarding positive state action when warranted. Together, sanctions and developmental aid can be effective in combating terrorism as well as accomplishing the goals of developing the target states economy.

In addition to economic development, the process of reconciliation must be applied. As a part of reconciliation, reparations can and should be tied in, as appropriate, with economic developmental programs. As the local and state infrastructure is advanced and improved, restorative justice can be implemented and applied. Those guilty of serious human rights violations should face justice within the domestic judicial system if at all possible. While the supranational institutions, such as The Hague, provide a similar service, they take too much time to prosecute and can desensitize the victim from the justice to be achieved. Truth Commissions are a vital element of the process as well. The most popular examples of the use of truth commissions are those of South Africa and Rwanda, which followed devastating human tragedies. But it should not take events like apartheid or genocide to mobilize this tool. Consider the impact that a truth commission might have on the Israel-Palestine conflict. On both sides of the struggle, disinformation and propaganda are present and serve only to exacerbate and perpetuate the conflict. However, if these two parties could use the truth commission process to remove the extraneous and enabling elements of the conflict, it would allow for a focused and direct negotiation on the root cause of the conflict, potentially expediting a settlement to the dispute.

As the Israel-Palestine conflict also shows, the geo-political ‘neighborhood’ of the conflict greatly impacts said dispute. States like Syria and Iran have been key supporting cogs in perpetuating the conflict and in ensuring that peace cannot be achieved for decades. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and the rest of the Arab League members have also, albeit to a lesser degree, complicated and prevented peace. Therefore it is necessary that the tools of conflict resolution be applied to all involved- the primary and secondary players to the conflict. The goal in addressing the neighborhood approach is that peace cannot be achieved within a specific conflict if the supporting geo-political cast subverts the process, therefore, it is necessary for the international community- and this is an international issue- to mitigate and prevent this as much as possible.

In developing the strategy for democratic transition, the face of democracy must have a local flavor and not have the appearance of a foreign entity. This requires the incorporation of domestic cultural norms and it must be sold to the people. This requires incorporating it into the general social context, educating and preparing the population for the transition. Another important element, not geared towards the target state’s population, but at the greater international community, is that democratic transition is the development of a system and the results of the system are the responsibility of the local population. So when the Palestinian people, for example, elect a group like Hamas to represent them in their governmental system, the international community must respect that choice. Attacking the system is certainly not the answer as other tools of statecraft exist for interacting, or not, with the elected body. The point is that in states transitioning towards democracy, it is vital that the international community support the transition and educate the state and its population on the responsibilities of the system.

The bulk of the strategy to combat terrorism is non-violent. The use of force is a very small element in the approach; however, it provides a critical atmospheric condition- peace. The role of force in the strategy is the implementation of peace-enforcement. Peacekeeping is necessary in the initial stages and allows for a cooling off period to occur to start the rest of the strategic processes, but it is the support peace-enforcement, as it implements the provisions of the process, contributes to the overall strategy. Furthermore, the perception of peacekeeping versus that of peace-enforcement is very different. Peace-enforcement requires more than just the perception of security, but also that of compassion and understanding. Peacekeeping operates under a simple premise, prevent violence. Peace-enforcement must maneuver itself and support restorative justice operations, contribute to the reconciliation process, support and protect the truth-commissions, etcetera.

This is not to say that peace-enforcement is a passive use of force, quite the contrary. The operative word here is enforcement, which is why peace-enforcement operations are synonymous with that of counter-terror operations. Both focus on the need to gather intelligence, to provide security to the process, and to attack those that threaten peace. Neither one is intended to be an independent solution to the conflict; rather their key contribution is providing an atmosphere for the process to take place.

Conclusion…
The war on terror is more than just the prevention of terrorist operations. It is the process of attacking the premise of terrorism itself. Its focus needs to be comprehensive in nature, addressing the root causes, the enablers, and the operations; in general it is the culmination of goals and justifications of terrorism itself reversed engineered. Combating terrorism is as much about promoting cooperation as it is countering extra-legal violent action. The strategy has an obligation to provide not just security, but hope and progress.

Therefore, any strategic development towards combating terrorism must examine and utilize the tools of conflict resolution, for it is within this process that the war on terror, and terrorism itself, can be won.

[1] De Armond, Paul. “Rock, Paper, Scissors: Counter-terrorism, Anti-terrorism and Terrorism.” Public Good occasional Paper #6. 1997. 1 Mar 2006. http://nwcitizen.com/publicgood/reports/rockpaperscissors/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ramsbotham, Oliver; Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Second Edition. Cambridge. Polity Press. 2005. Pg. 257.
[4] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002. 7 Mar 2006. Pg. 5. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
[5] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 24. Box 1.1. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.

[6] Ibid.
[7] CIA World Fact Book. 7 Mar 2006. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/rankorderguide.html.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Wiedemann, Erich. “Addicted to Aid in Ethiopia”. Der Speigal via Global Policy Forum. 28 Nov 2005. 7 Mar 2006. http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/africa/2005/1128ethiopia.htm.
[10] “Peacemaking”. International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict. Conflict Research Consortium. University of Colorado. 1998. 8 Mar 2006. http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/peacemkg.htm.
[11] Peacemaking. Introduction. DPA Home. Pg. 2. 8 Mar 2006. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm.
[12] Fitzgerald, Sara J.; Anthony B. Kim. “MCA: Rewarding Open Markets”. Executive Memorandum #915. The Heritage Foundation. 25 Feb 2004. 9 Mar 2006. http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/em915.cfm.
[13] Hufbauer, Gary Clyde; Jeffrey J. Schott; and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, second edition, revised, 2 vols. Washington. Institute for International Economics. Dec 1990. 9 Mar 2006. http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-summary.cfm.
[14] Ibid.

America as a Democratic Model:
Promoting or Preventing Democratic Transition?
By B.E.N.

What’s the best democracy? A relevant question focused on what model should be followed when promoting this form of governance to states foreign to the practice. It begs to question who the best democracy really is. Who has the most to offer as an example to the fledgling state? For those engaged in the process of building states, it seeks a model for success. But what it does not do, this simple question, is ask what is feasible for democratic development.

As the sole superpower, unrivaled militarily and envied economically, the United States is a unique paradigm of democracy. As the oldest example of this form of government today, many assume that this model is the best one, again begging the question of feasibility. Is it feasible to apply the principles of democracy and capitalism as practiced by the US to nation-building projects in the developing world? The answer to this is an obvious and definitive no. Why?

Before we can properly answer this question, we must first examine what democracy is, more specifically that of democratic change. Dr. Mohammed Nimer, the research director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), states that, “democratic change implies that members of any collectivity agree on the management of existing conflicts.” He continues, “the absence of such condition means society will eventually break-up or be held together artificially by some coercive power.”[1] So there must exist, first and foremost, a general desire for collective management within a society for democracy to take root.

Dr. Francis Fukuyama, who speaks to it as democratic transition, continues this line of thought. For this process of democratic transition to occur, Fukuyama points to four conditions: one is the level of development, the second is culture, thirdly is the geo-political “neighborhood”, and finally domestic ideas.[2]

While it is the fourth condition put forward, it echoes that of Nimer in the importance of societal acceptance of collective rule. He simply, and quite aptly puts it, “you cannot have democracy unless you have people who believe in democracy.”[3]

But do Americans believe in democracy? Just 64% of eligible US voters cast ballots in 2004, and this was up from 60% in 2000.[4] Voter turnout in US elections is relatively low compared to elections held in other Western states. Even developing democracies typically show a much higher turn out than the US musters. Iraq’s parliamentary elections, under fear of death from the various insurgent groups, managed a voter turnout of 79.6%[5], over 20% higher than the US. If a developing state, in the process of transitioning to democracy, only turned out 60% or 64% in its elections, the legitimacy and success of said elections would be mixed at best. So the practice of democracy, at least by US standards, requires a much higher benchmark than even the US can meet.

While the idea of democracy could arguably be the single most important element to democratic development, Fukuyama also examines the importance of enablers to democratic transition. For instance, he points to a correlation between per capita GDP and its proportionality to democracy, highlighting that, “virtually all of the industrialized countries are functioning democracies, and relatively few poor countries are democratic.”[6] While valid exceptions do exist, most notably India and Saudi Arabia as representatives of the ends of the spectrum, this is a pretty valid point, which examines the ability of an emerging democratic state to sustain its democratic development. “If you live in a subsistence economy you worry about feeding your family and not whether you can vote,” Fukuyama points out, continuing, “and all of those things begin changing as you become richer.”[7] He even goes so far as to assign a value of $6,000 per capita GDP to this condition as the typical benchmark required for democratic transition to occur.

Per the CIA World Factbook, the US per capita GDP is $41,800. Per the same source, the per capita GDP of the world is only $9,300 and the European Union amounts to $28,100. So the individual purchasing power of one average American is equal to two average Europeans or 52.25 typical Congolese.[8] Comparatively speaking, it is difficult for Americans, use to so much, to identify with the struggles of people in the developing world who are use to so little. It is this economic disparity that also translates into the intolerance Americans hold for corruption; something rather common and somewhat tolerated through most of the developing world. So the American practice of throwing money, and occasionally a solution, at a problem is simply not feasible for states transitioning towards democracy.

Fukuyama mentions, as his third condition, the importance of the neighborhood. All states are influenced, and sometimes coerced towards certain predetermined outcomes beneficial to their more powerful neighbors. But sometimes it is not strength or arms as it is simple peer pressure that influences state actions. Democracy, as it is typically understood as a form of government, is a Western concept. In certain locals, especially the Middle East, Western concepts are foreign concepts and anything foreign is not accepted as a good concept. It is necessary to translate democracy into something acceptable to the Transitioning State as it furthers its democratic development.

If the US is considered anything, it is certainly Western. It is the quintessential icon of the Western world. Therefore it is impossible to package US democracy as anything other than just that- US democracy. Without an ability to literally translate US democracy into something less, Western, it will hold more the image of Western encroachment rather than that of democratic enlightenment.

This fits into the larger concept of culture and Fukuyama’s final condition. Culture has become more and more a hot topic in the developing world, especially with their impression that they are losing their culture to Western influence. This includes the notion of religion and couldn’t be more apparent than the struggle some are having with the compatibility of Islam with democracy. This struggle has been manipulated by some as avenues for exploiting the cultural dilemma transitioning states are facing.

For example, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi used the fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran put forth by his religious mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Per both Maqdisi and Zarqawi, democracy is heresy as it promotes the decision of the people over that of God as laid out in the Quran. The logical progression used by both is simple in its self-fulfilling nature and extremely dangerous when presented to illiterate and ignorant Muslims who depend on the wisdom and intentions of their religious leaders to show them the pitfalls in fundamentalist teachings.

But more than religion alone, it is the all-encompassing notion of culture as a whole that constitutes the concern of developing states transitioning to democracy. US culture revolves around the notion of capitalism with market drivers and competition fueling the notion and necessity for individuals to sell themselves to others and themselves. Americans celebrate their individualism with the notion of a pioneering spirit conquering life’s obstacles. Compare this with the collective mentality that permeates the vast majority of the globe, highlighted in their focus on protecting and nurturing individual family ties and societal norms in general and the alien nature of US culture stands out.

It is the practices of US democracy that make America so unique and inherently a very poor model for states transitioning to a democratic form of government. But it is not American culture alone that impedes the promotion of democracy. As stated throughout this piece, several conditions are necessary for democracy to not only take root but find nourishment for continued growth. It takes an economic base that supports a growing middle class to sustain and fuel democracy. It takes a political will within the population to take control of their state and guide it in the direction they see fit. It takes a cultural acceptance of tolerance and patience in dealing with others within the state to foment collective management of their existing conflicts. It is this admixture of economic, political and cultural factors that provide impediments to the transitioning of a state to democracy.

[1] Nimer, Mohammad. “Prospects for an American Muslim Polity: Implicat5ions for Muslim World Democratization”. CSID 6th Annual Conference, Washington D.C. April 22-23, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.islam-democracy.org/documents/pdf/6th_Annual_Conference-MohamedNimer.pdf.

[2] Fukuyama, Francis. “Do we really know how to promote democracy?” Remarks made to the New York Democracy Forum on May 24, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.ned.org/nydf/francisFukuyama05.pdf.
[3] Ibid.
[4] US Census Bureau News Release. http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/voting/004986.html.
[5] Iraqi Elections. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_legislative_election,_December_2005.
[6] Fukuyama, Francis. “Do we really know how to promote democracy?” Remarks made to the New York Democracy Forum on May 24, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.ned.org/nydf/francisFukuyama05.pdf.
[7] Ibid.
[8] CIA World Factbook. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html.

Reconciliation

In the post Cold-War environment, inter and intrastate conflict resolution and reconstruction has faced some new and some old challenges to success. Whenever a third party is brought into the process, whether invited or not, the largest challenge and biggest burden to success is their ability to understand the nature of the conflict, to include its root cause as well as the enabling factors that contribute to the crisis.

This understanding is further expanded on the capabilities of the players and the roles that they try to play. Therefore, it is necessary of actors involved in conflict resolution, more specifically reconciliation, to interact not only with each other, but also with the primary parties of the conflict. So what challenges can these actors expect and how can they balance these challenges between one another as they divvy the responsibilities of reconciliation?

First and foremost, before the roles can be divvied up, it must be understood what reconciliation is, and more importantly what it is not. Reconciliation cannot be an excuse for impunity or exist in opposition of or as an alternative to truth and justice. It is not a quick solution, an excuse for forgetting crimes or simply a matter of forgiving. It is finding a way to live with one another with a vision of the future. It revolves around building, or as necessary rebuilding, relationships between the contested parties as they come to terms with the past. It must incorporate all of affected society as it matures into a long term process for changing perceptions and attitudes. It involves acknowledgement, remembrance and historical understanding. Most importantly, it must be voluntary.[1]

When actors examine reconciliation, it is necessary to differentiate punitive and reconciliatory measures as well as balance the approach of each. There are essentially four elements to be considered: restorative justice, reparations, healing and truth-telling. The first two are punitive measures where as the last two are reconciliatory steps[2].

But these cannot take place in a vacuum. They require coexistence, which requires the cessation of violence. It requires communication and the dissolution of stereotypes so as to overcome polarization. Through these it is possible to bridge together the parties as they manage their contradictions. Finally it results in a celebration of diversity as all involved reconstitute their relationship.[3] This requires the participation of the victims and the offenders as well as any beneficiaries.

So for justice to occur, which includes both the punitive and reconciliatory measures, it must bring the conflict before the parties. Forgive and forget is not a policy, rather it is denial and it inherently fertilizes future conflict. The other extreme is vengeance, which simply perpetuates the conflict as it fuels misgivings and feeds the negative image the opposing side maintains. The parties must find the center and publicly deal with the grievances to provide the justice sought and to prevent the suppression of the problem.[4]

In addressing the elements of reconciliation, it therefore becomes a case of tangible versus intangible. This falls along the lines of punitive versus reconciliatory.
Punitively, there is a focus on restorative justice made up of four primary elements: retributive through prosecution; restorative via mediation; historically with truth commissions and economically by reparations[5]. The punitive elements come more from international, national and local judicial bodies focused on the prosecution of perpetrators for crimes committed. But the need for care exists here in that if prosecution is overzealous, then the possibility exists for re-victimization, which counters the premise of reconciliation. The opposite is also true as under-prosecution does not address the needs for accountability with the victims.

Reconciliatory measures revolve around the notion of healing the individual and societal wounds caused by the conflict. It is a long term process focused on the psychological welfare of the victims as it helps move everyone involved towards closure. It is intangible in that there are few measurable quantities that can be used, rather it examines the general atmosphere of the parties involved and attempts to focus on certain aspects as they rise and fall. Some of the same tools used to punitively address the process can also be used in healing. For example, truth commissions allow victims to know the truth of what occurred and why, preventing false reconciliation. The punitive element s themselves provide for healing that they allow a notion of justice to be ascribed to the victim, but the overarching goal of the healing process is to allow for closure and forward progression from the conflict.

The nature of these components of reconciliation also inherently impacts the role of the actors involved. It is important to first identify the base characters, the victims and perpetrators, followed with an identification of the parties that can contribute to the reconciliation process. It is important to note the perspective and capabilities of the problem solving parties, which should constitute a collage of perspectives and capabilities and vary between supranational institutions such as the United Nations, national bodies like parliaments and social and religious non-governmental organizations.

The division of labor should then be partitioned based on the access, acceptance, and capabilities of the party. Supranational institutions, such as the United Nations, enjoy a capability of seeing the entire conflict in its fullest context. They therefore have the ability to view the crisis in a manner that doesn’t inject a biased emotional perspective. These types of institutions are also in the unique position of being able to coordinate global resources from multiple states and bring in non-partial security forces to secure a peaceful environment for the reconciliation process to grow out of. A key service the international community, and the supranational institutions in particular, can provide inter/intrastate conflicts is non-violent forums for dispute.

It is, however, the host nation(s) of the conflict that must carry the brunt of the responsibility in fully nurturing the environment of reconciliation. While the international community can provide support, the host nation(s) must ensure important governmental services such as effective civil services, fair judiciaries and efficient legislative structures exist. It is on the national level, most effectively through a parliament, that truth, justice and compensation can be handed out.[6]

But governmental bodies, both supranational and national, are not always perceived in a good light and so their access may be limited. This is where NGO’s have an advantage in supporting the process. NGO’s in general can support reconciliation in two ways. One, the can provide some checks and balances towards the elements involved that are capable of escalating the conflict back into violence, like governments or rebel groups. Two, they can often garner access to areas where the government may be limited or unaccepted, allowing them to more expeditiously deliver aid to those in need[7]. Faith-based groups also have a role to play in the reconciliation process as they can be especially effective in religious conflict, even though they will often follow secular policies. However their religious nature can shape their support to the process, so this element must be taken into consideration when using them to support reconciliation.[8]

Reconciliation is a long term process with the end goal of providing a environment that sustains peace. It requires the involvement of both the victims and the perpetrators and is constituted with both tangible and intangible benchmarks. Those involved in the reconciliation process must work together in a concerted effort to prevent the conflict from erupting back into violence.Supranational institutions are uniquely capable of fully coordinating and monitoring the reconciliation process with the national governments establishing and maintaining the environment necessary for the process to fully mature. NGO’s provide a more appeasing face of the process to the people and can therefore be a more effective conduit for success. These elements, when all exercised in a coordinated and cooperative environment, enjoy a much better chance of success in reconciling the parties involved and fostering long term peace.

[1] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 14. Box 1.1. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.
[2] Ibid, Pg 24.
[3] Ramsbotham, Oliver; Tom Woodhouse; Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 2nd Edition. Polity Press. Cambridge. 2005. Pg. 232. Table 10.1.
[4] Ibid, Pg. 235 Table 10.2.
[5] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 97. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.
[6] Mongbe’, Rene’ Valery; Robert del Picchia. “Promoting International Reconciliation, Helping to Bring Stability to Regins of Conflict, and Assisting with Post-Conflict Reconstruction”. Inter-Parliamentary Union 110th Assembly. Mexico City 15-23 April 2004. Pg. 11.
[7] “The Role of NGOs, National and International in Post-War Peacebuilding”. Report of a seminar held on 1st November 2001 at Islington Town Hall, Upper Street, London. Committee for Conflict Transformation Support Newsletter 15. 9 Feb 2006. http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts15/seminar.htm.
[8] “Faith-Based NGOs and International Peacebuilding”. US Institute of Peace. Special Report 76. 22 Oct 2001. 9 Feb 2006. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr76.html.

The Land of the Two Rivers: A 2006 Assessment of Iraq

The Land of the Two Rivers:
A 2006 Assessment
By
B.E.N.
December 15, 2005

2006 will be a turning point year for Iraq. The Iraqi conflict, and the elements that constitute it, will continue to match past trends as it steadily moves towards a peaceful resolution. This piece intends to look at the constituting elements and how they impact the conflict as well as provide an assessment for 2006 in Iraq.

[1]Looking at the political landscape of Iraq, and its relationship to the ongoing conflict there, it is important to examine the host of agendas that exist between the three major groups. While definitive differences exist between the major sects, unifying commonalities are also present and support shared goals between the groups that will contribute to near term stability.

For instance, the Kurds will be focused on the concept of Kurdistan. At the very least they will wish to maintain the autonomy they have enjoyed for the last decade, but will never truly lose sight of their desire to have an independent state. This will foster cooperation between the Sunni and Shi’ah political leadership as they aspire to prevent Kurdish independence and claims to resources in the north.

The Shi’ah will be focused on realizing political power that continues to be representative of their numbers within the Iraqi population. While the Shi’ah are not per se sympathetic to Iran, they are by far the best avenue for Iran to affect influence on the state of Iraq. Because of this, the Sunnis and the Kurds will ally to contain Iranian influence as much as possible.

The Sunni, a minority within Iraq, is by far the majority in the global Islamic community and in particular the other neighboring Arab states. This can grant the Sunnis a disproportionate amount of international legitimacy within the region and be a force multiplier with regards to their influence in the Iraqi government. This disproportionate legitimacy supports their aim of reestablishing themselves as the dominant force in the Iraqi government. The Kurds and Shi’ah will want to mitigate this and will pool resources to prevent Sunni dominance within Iraq.

These varying secular agendas will create an environment focused on balancing one sects agenda against the unified efforts of the other two groups; highlighting the importance of reconciliation and cooperation between the Shi’ah, Sunni and Kurds.

Cairo Conference…
Recently the Arab League, backed by the U.S., held a preparatory conference for Iraqi national reconciliation. In the final statement of the conference, three main points were presented. One, the Iraqi people will decide on the future of Iraq. Two, foreign troops must leave and a timetable for their departure must be developed- based on the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Finally, the document stated that resistance is legitimate; however, terrorism is not legitimate resistance.

Initial examination of the final statement highlights what appears to be a negative regard for Coalition forces’ continued involvement in Iraq. But is this really the case? Upon closer examination, and within the context of other significant events, the Cairo conference reinforced Coalition policy and presented an acceptable and manageable exit from Iraq for the Iraqis as well as the coalition members.

Democracy…
The first element of the Cairo conference statement revolved around the notion that the Iraqi people will decide the future of Iraq. This is to be realized through the vehicle of democracy and several key events have taken place since the 2003 invasion and transfer of sovereignty that support the democratic process.

The January ‘05 elections were a monumental occasion in that they placed an Iraqi face to the Iraqi government and reflected a monumental change in the way that Iraq would be managed and led in the future. But they were not perfect. The Sunnis by and large did not participate, marginalizing them and fostering a large amount of resentment towards the Shi’ah and Kurds, who enjoyed an enormous amount of power, as well as towards their own leadership for leading them in what proved to be the wrong direction.

The elections also brought to light a failing in that because of the Sunni non-participation, the Kurds were able to gather a disproportionate amount of seats in the transitional national assembly. However, through magnanimous efforts to extend an olive branch to the Sunni community in spite of their failings, the Iraq Interim Government managed to persevere and crest the next major obstacle to their goal of democracy- a national constitution.

The Constitution was voted on by the Iraqi people in a national referendum on 15 October, 2005. Over all, 78% of the Iraqi people voted for the document and 21% voted against it. Two of Iraq’s 18 provinces rejected the constitution, one province short of the requirement for veto.[2] With this, the constitution passed.

Several arguments can be made about the Constitution, both for and against it, but they are irrelevant now in light of the referendums passage. What is key is how the Constitution further paves the way towards democracy in Iraq and lays the groundwork for democracy in the future.
As the December 15[3] elections for the Iraqi national assembly approach, several political considerations must be examined; specifically, the situations facing the three major groups within Iraq.

The Shi’ah are going to experience some political fractionalization, which will weaken a previously united political front. With Ahmed Chalabi’s departure from the current ruling coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and his formation of a separate political alliance, the National Congress Coalition, he will pull some seats away from the current regime. However, this will not be enough to completely fractionalize the Shi’ah and they will maintain a political majority in the assembly as well as provide the next Prime Minister.

For Iraq and the West, the best that can be hoped for is the selection of Iyad Allawi as prime minister. This is due to his secular beliefs and associations with varying Kurd and Sunni political leaders, so it is possible that he would garner their support and put together a government. But Allawi does carry some baggage that may affect his ability to form a ruling coalition. For one, he was the interim Prime Minister during the second Fallujah operation, something the Sunni will be slow to forget. Second, his strong position against Iranian influence will hamper any support from the pro-Iranian elements within the Shi’ah, like the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which have a strong standing in the current government.

Most likely though, the next prime minister will be one of the two serving Iraqi Vice Presidents, Adel Abdul Mahdi. He is the candidate put forward by the SCIRI and does not carry the same negative political connotations that Allawi does. The worst case scenario would be the selection of Ahmed Chalabi, one of Iraq’s deputy prime ministers, as prime minister; however, he is a bit of a dark-horse in that he carries an enormous amount of baggage, both from the West as well as from the region itself, and he would be opposed by some within the Shi’ah community and especially from the other major sects.

Interestingly, following an agreement between the current Grand Ayatollahs in Iraq to refrain from politics, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani[4] recently issued a fatwa calling on the Shi’ah community to not waste their vote and to focus on a party that is influenced by the teachings of Islam. This implies that the smaller alliances should be ignored and that they should vote for the current ruling coalition and does so without directly endorsing them. The ramifications of this are yet to be seen, but will likely heavily impact the other Shi’ah political alliances and their ability to garner votes. Regardless, the Shi’ah will loose some political cohesiveness but not enough to greatly impact their standing in the current government.

As mentioned previously, due to the lack of Sunni participation in the January elections, the Kurds received a disproportionate number of seats in the current national assembly. Couple this with the separation of the Islamic Kurdish Union from the Kurdish alliance and the Kurds are going to end up losing seats in the next national assembly. They will attempt to cauterize the political hemorrhaging by maximizing their political leverage in the formation of the national government with the hope of, at the very least, attaining a major ministerial position. Therefore, they will side with any coalition that will grant them the most in political capital making them somewhat of a wildcard. However, they are not going to have the ability to generate any political momentum and will be forced to react to political events.

[5]By far, the Sunni will come out the best in the December elections. With full participation this time around in the political process, they have the numbers to become the second largest body in the national assembly. They will take advantage of this political momentum and seek to influence the selection of the governmental leadership as well as set the near term political agenda for Iraq. They will support secular candidates such as Allawi for prime minister over the other pro-Iranian Shi’ah candidates.

This is further supported by the fact that the Sunni religious leadership in Iraq has issued fatwas calling on the Sunni community to fully participate in the elections and condemning any interference with the voting process. Obviously, this is in an effort to maximize their political gains in the election but will also allow the Shi’ah and Kurds to fully participate.

Throw in the future provincial elections to take place in February of 2006 and the road to democracy continues to march forward in Iraq. This is all towards the underlying requirement, by the Iraqi government and the Coalition Forces, that the Iraqi people decide the future of Iraq and that democracy must prevail.

Removal of Foreign Forces…
The second element in the final statement of the Cairo Conference was the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. The only real caveat revolved around the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces.
In the beginning of June 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1546, which provided a UN mandate to the Coalition Forces in Iraq. The expiration of the mandate was contingent on either the expiration of the timeframe within the document itself, or at the will of the Iraqi government. In early November of 2005, the mandate was again extended till June 15th of 2006. Following the national assembly elections and the formation of the next Iraqi government, it will be very easy for the government of Iraq to simply do nothing and allow the mandate to expire. This will, of course be dependant on the level of violence in Iraq at the time.

The Sunni will force to the forefront the removal of Coalition forces from Iraq following the expiration of the UN mandate. They will be able to receive support from elements within the Shi’ah community, like Muqtada al Sadr, but they will be opposed by the Kurds. Depending on the success of the national elections, the formation of the government and the level of violence in Iraq at the time, the Sunni will be successful in, at the very least, the development of a timetable that forces some Coalition forces to withdraw.

It will also be dependant on the status and capabilities of the ISF. 2005 saw the ISF mature at an incredible pace, laying the groundwork for an effective and capable security apparatus. For instance, at the beginning of the year, there were a handful of trained and combat ready Iraqi battalions, whereas now there are over 120. Of these, 80 are currently engaged alongside Coalition forces with 40 acting as lead elements controlling their battle space.[6]

Their combat effectiveness is also improving. During the Fallujah operation, 9 Coalition force battalions were engaged with 6 Iraqi battalions supporting them. This was reversed during the Tel Afar operation later in the year with 11 Iraqi battalions being supported by 5 Coalition battalions.

There is only one Iraqi battalion that is fully independent, but the definition of independence is important. To qualify, the battalion must be able to supply their logistics, airlift, intelligence, command & control, etc. There are NATO battalions that don’t qualify under this definition, so this achievement is to be congratulated.

The Shi’ah will also attempt to force the Sunni into fully supporting the ISF through the next government and will also augment the ISF with the various dissolved militias. This augmentation will dramatically increase the size of the ISF and will incorporate Sunni participation and cooperation in ISF operations.

Resistance and Terrorism…
The final point made in the Cairo Conference statement was the legitimacy of the “insurgency”. The document states that, “resistance is a legitimate right for all nations; terrorism does not represent legitimate resistance.”[7] The document even went so far as to define terrorism as “acts of violence that target civilians, humanitarian and civilian institutions and houses of worship.”[8]

Therefore, when examining the anti-Coalition forces, the lexicon used to describe them becomes crucial. The statement spoke to the legitimacy of resistance, referring to the insurgency, but differentiated between resistance and terrorism. In order to fully understand the statement and its context, a differentiation must be made between insurgents and terrorists.

A central goal of any insurgency is the establishment of a separate ‘government’ intended to eventually usurp the legitimacy of the state government and ultimately supplant it. However, this has not occurred in Iraq. In fact, the deficiency of this element has exacerbated the standing of the main ‘insurgent’ faction, Al Qaeda in Iraq, in the eyes of the Islamic community.

Nothing highlights this better than the captured letter that Ayman al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two leader, sent to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the letter, Zawahiri criticizes Zarqawi for targeting the Shi’ah and for not establishing a Caliphate in territory that AQIZ controlled. Because Zarqawi has been deficient in this governmental establishment, he has not been able to foster any legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqis or the general Islamic community.

The resistance comment in the conference statement further expounds on this by addressing the means of the resistance rather than the ends, which are embodied in the establishment of a Caliphate. By targeting terrorism, and defining it as such, they delegitimize over half of Zarqawi’s operations in Iraq. They also focus on the massive casualty events, which are responsible for the bulk of Iraqi deaths since initial major combat operations in 2003 ended.

By attacking the means, they indirectly attack the end goal of a Caliphate, and allow the Sunnis to be able to further legitimize themselves by clamping down on the support network for the insurgency, regardless of their complicity in it. This grants them the ability to influence the ISF and its formation and operations, and as a byproduct, leverage themselves into positions of power within the Iraqi leadership. This also serves to legitimize the resistance components of the insurgency, but not the terrorist elements, providing an out for, for lack of a better term, the moderate elements of the insurgency.

The US Plan for Victory in Iraq…
All of these events must be viewed in light of US policy, considering that it is the leading force in the occupation of Iraq. The White House recently released a document called the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and it lays out three tracks for success: political, security, and economic. The political track calls for the development of democracy in Iraq and the political engagement of all the groups within Iraq. The security track focuses on the rebuilding of the ISF and the removal of the insurgent/terrorist elements. The economic track explains the importance of rebuilding their infrastructure and the need to reform the Iraqi economy on a free and open framework.[10]

The political track’s focus on democracy mirrors the desires of the Iraqi people in their decision to decide their own future and has been repeatedly stated by the Coalition force leaders and the international community at large. The security track is another echo of Coalition and US policy. President Bush has stated numerous times that “coalition forces will stand down as the Iraqi people stand up.”[11] And the economic track will be inherently supported by the improvement in the security situation and the desire for success by the Iraqi people themselves.

Conclusion…
Iraq is on the verge of rounding a major corner towards peace and resolving the internal conflict that has plagued it for the last two and half years. Violence will continue and it is unreasonable and irresponsible to think that the violent elements in Iraq will simply disappear because of the progress made thus far; however, it is safe to assume that the worst is over.

With the full participation of the Sunni population in the Iraqi political process, a major supporting element for the ‘insurgency’ has vanished. Couple this with the growing capabilities of the ISF and the expanding legitimacy and power of the Iraqi government and the final statement of the Cairo Conference portends a successful 2006 for Iraq.

It also presents the Iraqi people, as well as the Coalition leadership, with an exit strategy for Coalition Forces. This exit strategy is going to resemble something similar to the plan put forward by US Congressman John Murtha, but for much different reasons than what he stated.
Coalition forces will draw down, starting with 30,000 US troops who were maintained for added security during the December elections. US forces will continue to draw down and by the end of 2006 will number somewhere around 75,000 with another 20-30,000 positioned in Kuwait as a Quick Reaction Force. The other Coalition partners will also withdraw forces, most of the smaller participants completely, but the more significant contingents, like the United Kingdom, following the US lead and drawing down to about half of their current numbers. This will result in the ISF being given control of more and more territory and Coalition visibility reduced to a supporting force for Iraqi operations.

The prognosis for Iraq in 2006 looks good. With the advancements of the political process, the improvement of the security situation and the removal of Coalition forces, the Iraqi conflict is finally seeing some light at the end of the tunnel. If the Iraqi people can continue the steady and persistent march towards democracy as well as moderate and mitigate their various extremist elements, then they will be able to emerge as a strong, united state well on their way to joining modern society.

[1] Figure 1 diagram created by the author.
[2] The Iraqi Constitution. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Constitution.
[3] December 15, 2005.
[4] Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani is the most senior grand ayatollah in Iraq, and arguably in the Shi’ah world. He commands the following of millions and his positions are extremely influential in the Shi’ah community, especially in Iraq where the Shi’ah population by and large follows his teachings.
[5] An unclassified diagram from an operation order for Iraq.
[6] Fact Sheet: Training Iraqi Security Forces. White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130.html.
[7] Final Statement of National Accord Conference. http://democracyrising.us/content/view/373/151/.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Al-Shishani, Murad. “Al-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets”. Volume 3, Issue 22 (November 17, 2005). 15 Dec 2005. http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369831&printthis=1.
[10] National Security Council. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. November 2005. 15 Dec 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html.
[11] Paraphrase of President Bush in numerous speeches over the last two years.