Combating Terrorism Through Conflict Resolution

By B.E.N.
10 March 2006

Introduction…
Following the events of September 11, 2001, a major geo-political shift occurred, thrusting the threats of terrorism to the forefront of the international agenda. While terrorism is not a new tactic, it took the magnitude of the New York and Washington, D.C. attacks to bring to bear the full power and attention of the United States, and like the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, awake a sleeping giant.

Since 9/11 the US has focused on the notion of counter-terrorism, defined by Paul de Armond as, “essentially a defensive military strategy,” which, “consists of gathering intelligence, maintaining operational security, and applying force to capture or kill opponents.”[1] He continues, “Counter-terrorism is a strategy of repression or suppression [whose] aim is not to eliminate root causes or eliminate terrorism, but only to ‘bring the situation under control.’”[2]

So the strategy of counter-terrorism is short-term in nature and intended to mitigate the effectiveness and frequency of terrorist acts themselves. This has been the primary focus of the international community in general and specifically that of the United States for the last four and a half years. The notion of a long term strategy to deal with terrorism exists in a familiar international process known as conflict resolution. Conflict resolution provides a plethora of tools that not only deal with the symptoms of terrorism, but the root causes as well. It is these tools, within the process of conflict resolution, that allow a long-term, non-kinetic strategy of anti-terror to be developed, effectively combating terrorism.

The Framework…
In order to effectively devise a means for developing a long-term, strategic focus for combating terrorism through conflict resolution, it is necessary to form a policy framework. This can be applied through a four dimensional perspective that focuses on prevention, persuasion, denial and coordination.[3]

The first dimension of prevention centers itself around the general notion of properly addressing legitimate grievances, essentially reducing the disposition of disgruntled parties to use terrorism as a viable political tactic. This notion of prevention revolves around removing the political oxygen used by terrorist organizations to mobilize popular support and provide justification for terrorist events. It can be effective in addressing both root causes as well as the enablers to terrorism.

The importance of the preventive dimension is that it can be addressed through non-kinetic means and prevent a violent facet to the conflict. This dimension is the most effective and opportune moment for instituting structural change geared towards democratic transformation in the troubled state. This democratic transition requires an institutional and cultural attitude that is nurtured and embraced by both the state as well as the opposition groups. This transformation must address the economic conditions within the state so as to provide enfranchisement by all of the parties involved, effectively removing or mitigating the symptoms of under-development, such as poverty, which can be an enabling condition for terrorism.

The economic condition of the state is also important in that it impacts the ability of the state to develop and maintain the infrastructure necessary to effectively implement the democratic process. Moreover, it allows for a broader development program to include and incorporate minority and opposition parties, ensuring a more expansive and equal distribution of funds within the state.

In conjunction with the economic condition, the culture and mindset within the state and opposition, especially within the support constituency used by both, must be open to the notion and idea of democracy and resolution. This serves to support the first dimension of prevention as well as lay the ground work for the second dimension of persuasion.

Persuasion is intended to delegitimize and discredit terrorism and impact the policies and decisions of terrorist leaders. It also serves to reduce the support base for terrorist groups by again removing the political oxygen they use to muster logistical and financial support. This constitutes the effective implementation of the carrot and stick approach. When dealing with terrorism, this entails balancing counter-terrorism operations against political concessions and enfranchisement. For the diasporas and domestic support communities, the goal is to convincingly show non-violent options as the best course towards political accommodation. Jointly and when effectively employed, they provide a political environment non-conducive to violence and accommodating to political incorporation.

This political environment further denies the capability of terrorist groups to operate and is expanded further within a separate and unique third dimension of denial. The core consideration for properly employing denial is through a complementary process utilizing effective counter-terrorism tactics while maintaining certain inalienable freedoms. Denial is the quintessential dimension for counter-terrorism to operate. It serves to harden as many potential targets as possible, interrupt terrorist financial and logistical support, and disrupt or dismantle terrorist operational networks through effective coordination and cooperation both domestically and internationally.

The fourth and final dimension of coordination is essential for local and state services to be successful in combating terrorism. It involves the coordination of the various state intelligence and security services as they target the terrorists, as well as the synchronization of the reconstruction effort within the state. This dimension is the culmination of tying together the tactics of counter-terrorism with the tools of conflict resolution. This coordination and cooperation must occur on every level of both programs as they progress in parallel.

It is through this framework, as applied through these four dimensions, which allow a strategy to develop that can effectively utilize conflict resolution for combating terrorism. But it is important to know more than just the general premise behind the framework. How can these concepts be properly applied?

The Tools…
The US National Security Strategy defines terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”[4] Simply put, it is a political event geared towards achieving political results through violence, fear and intimidation. Conflict resolution is focused on achieving political appeasement between conflicting parties, utilizing political tools that range from official dialogue through economic actions to military operations. So it is natural, if not obvious, that conflict resolution as a political solution is applicable to terrorism which revolves around a political problem.

A key mechanism within official dialogue, geared towards conflict resolution, is the notion and process of reconciliation. A major challenge to this process is the ability to identify and understand the root causes of the conflict as well as the enabling factors that perpetuate the fight. This requires communication on all levels and fronts as the relationship between the state and the opposition transforms and grows. As with any conflict, the grievances of the past must be understood and amends, as appropriate, be made. There must be the capacity for all involved to coexist, requiring the ability for justice to prevail for injured parties. But justice per se does not imply only a punitive solution. Reconciliation contains four key elements: restorative justice and reparations, which are more punitive in nature and through reconciliatory measures like healing and truth-telling.[5]

Restorative justice is an effort to right past wrongs through legal methods via four primary modes: retribution through prosecution, restoration via mediation, historically with truth commissions and economically by reparations.[6] While these measures are punitive in nature and seek to assign some accountability to the offending party, they are not the only means for effectively reconciling the conflict. In fact, they’re only half of the solution for while it is important for justice to be handed out, it is also necessary for the victim to forgive the offending party. This is accomplished through healing and truth-telling and allows all involved to reach a point of closure on the conflict. These more forgiving elements of reconciliation touch on the intangible aspects of human nature and can sometimes utilize punitive tools in non-punitive ways. For example, truth-telling within a truth-commission allows victims and society in general to know the truth of what occurred so as to prevent false reconciliation and foster a new social beginning.

The key to reconciliation being successful is the proper management of the environment, which is the primary responsibility of the state. The goal of reconciliation is to mitigate and change the emotional attitude of the conflict and when used to combat terrorism, it prevents and persuades the support structure for terrorist organizations to pursue non-violent means. So to be an effective tool, the state must balance its approach and use of these differing forums, preventing the overuse or under-use of any particular one.

Economics can be a bulwark against, or a fuel for, terrorism. Groups like al Qaeda have received tens of millions of dollars over the years through legitimate charities or organized criminal activities. This money is then spent on training facilities in the lawless reaches of the globe, on maintaining its global support network or on clandestine terrorist plots. At the same time, in countries were terrorism, or terrorist groups, are most prevalent, like Yemen, Afghanistan, the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, we see a per capita GDP average of only $825.[7] So what is the role of economics, specifically through the process of conflict resolution, in combating terrorism?

The advantage of economic measures with regards to conflict resolution is that it provides a non-kinetic means for addressing the situation. Whether through sanctions or aid, these tools either hinder or support the parties involved. In combating terrorism, these tools can impact the ability for terrorist groups to garner direct state support and can mobilize international pressure and procedures that further complicate or prevent their financial capabilities. These tools can also benefit local communities and prevent them from becoming breeding grounds for terrorist recruitment by providing hope and progress. Investment in education facilities, administrative and judicial centers and the expansion of economic opportunities can all remove the political oxygen needed by terrorist organizations.

But it is important that the international community, in its bid to develop an aid program for the conflicted state, not replace one problem with another by creating a dependence on foreign aid. Ethiopia is a prime example of this phenomenon.

With a per capita GDP of just $800, it is one of the poorest nations on earth.[8] What’s more, between 1984 and 2002, the annual food production on a per capita basis fell from 450 kilos to only 140 kilos- a 69% drop. But there is no incentive to restructure this situation on the part of the Ethiopians. In 2003, it cost an Ethiopian farmer $50 to produce a ton of grain that would only receive $25 on the market, primarily because of the massive aid program’s influx of free grain.[9] This leads to an increase in unemployment and dependence on the international community. What’s worse is that it allows ill feelings to fester and mature, fertilizing a potential resource pool for terrorist organizations to utilize, which is occurring as terrorism is on the rise in the state. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the aid that is used is in such a manner as to foster development for long term growth and not simply address the symptoms of under-development.

But as stated previously, aid is only one tool available in conflict resolution. Sanctions can provide an effective means for combating terrorism as they can greatly impact a terrorist group’s ability to locate a safe zone to operate or garner state level support. Depending on the geo-political ‘neighborhood’, the implementation and relevance of sanctions can vary in their scope and objective. The key to effective sanctions is their ability to be dynamic in nature. Static sanction regimes are immobile and do not have the ability to reward positive actions on the part of the targeted state.

Therefore, the nature of the sanction regime depends greatly on the parties involved. Individual states may choose to install their own set of economic sanctions against a state with some limited success. The United States has taken this approach with Cuba, deciding to sanction the state for its poor record on human rights. However, some situations cannot be addressed by single actors and require the cooperation of the international community. This style of sanction regime is normally monitored and managed by a supranational institution, like the United Nations. It may still be a single-issue set of sanctions, such as an oil embargo, which will punish a state without crippling it or the sanctions may consist of a comprehensive and complex program designed to paralyze the national regime.

Sometimes, however, dialogue breaks down or the economic tools are not capable of dealing with the situation, thus forcing the use of force to placate the conflict. The use of force should not be confused with war and in regards to conflict resolution; it generally takes the form of peace keeping or peacemaking.

Peacekeeping, as defined by the Conflict Research Consortium at the University of Colorado, is the prevention of hostilities by using a barrier, which is typically embodied by neutral foreign troops, and does not focus on the resolution of the conflict per se or its negotiations for peace.[10] Peacemaking is a much broader term defined by the United Nations as “the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.”[11] Within the context of peacemaking, is the notion of peace-enforcement, which is the application of force to further the program of the peacemaking regime. Therefore, the key difference between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is the goal of the forces on the ground. Peacekeepers are focused simply on preventing the conflicting factions from violently engaging one another. Peace-enforcement, under the over arching premise of peacemaking, is the active engagement of the forces to implement and enforce the provisions of the process. Within the context of combating terrorism, peace-enforcement is synonymous with the application of counter-terrorism operations.

The Roadmap…
When examining the dimensions of the political framework and some of the tools available to conflict resolution, a roadmap for combating terrorism does begin to present itself. However, this roadmap must present more than a short term solution, abandoning the finger-in-the-dyke policies that have been utilized thus far through the application of counter-terrorism. It is imperative that both an international and national level strategy be nurtured and developed. But before the strategy can be effectively and completely drawn, it is imperative that a definition of terrorism be decided upon and applied on an international basis.

Countless definitions within a myriad of organizations from every nation attempt to define the tactic, which needs to be refined down to a single identifiable definition that can be applied through supranational institutions as well as within national regimes and their associated organizations. This definition must contain the general premise of an extra-legal, violent action, or the threat thereof, directed towards achieving a political concession through intimidation and/or fear.

Once the definition of terrorism has been set, a strategy for combating it can be accurately developed. This comprehensive strategic regime should enlist elements of democratic transition, like economic development, culture, regional attitudes and domestic ideas, as well as the some of the core tools of conflict resolution, such as reconciliation, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. The building blocks of conflict resolution can effectively provide the short to mid-term process of the strategy with the factors of democratic transition presenting the mid to long-term benchmarks. But for the short term plan to be effective, it must be geared towards the long term agenda of the strategy.

Therefore, within the strategy of democratic transition, it is necessary that economic support be focused metaphorically on teaching a state to fish. That said and in regards to the concept of foreign aid, the Millennium Challenge Account needs to be the primary factor used by the international community, shifting the focus from the notion of aid towards the concept of international developmental support. Target states looking to receive grants and/or loans should be progressing towards economic freedom and openness. A benchmark for determining this developmental support can be based on the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s Index for Economic Freedom, which centers it rankings on 10 key economic factors: trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market activity.[12] This focus on economic freedom has a proven track record of improving the per capita GDP of the developing state, thus supporting a core element in combating terrorism within the dimension of prevention. An important and vital element that should be incorporated in the economic developmental program is the reinvestment in the local and state infrastructure so as to support other components of the strategy, like reconciliation. This is to include administrative, judicial and educational centers throughout the state.

Balancing as well as supporting economic development, sanction programs can be employed to effectively address states that provide support to terrorist organizations. However, it is necessary that the sanction regime contain several key elements to ensure their effectiveness. First, the sanction program needs to be as multilateral as possible. Single state sanction regimes are not nearly as effective as supranational programs and require much longer in achieving the changes they desire.[13] Secondly, slow and incrementally introduced sanction regimes allow the target state to find “alternative suppliers, to build new alliances, and to mobilize domestic opinion in support of its policies.”[14] Finally, it is necessary for the sanction regime to be dynamic and flexible, adjusting as needed and rewarding positive state action when warranted. Together, sanctions and developmental aid can be effective in combating terrorism as well as accomplishing the goals of developing the target states economy.

In addition to economic development, the process of reconciliation must be applied. As a part of reconciliation, reparations can and should be tied in, as appropriate, with economic developmental programs. As the local and state infrastructure is advanced and improved, restorative justice can be implemented and applied. Those guilty of serious human rights violations should face justice within the domestic judicial system if at all possible. While the supranational institutions, such as The Hague, provide a similar service, they take too much time to prosecute and can desensitize the victim from the justice to be achieved. Truth Commissions are a vital element of the process as well. The most popular examples of the use of truth commissions are those of South Africa and Rwanda, which followed devastating human tragedies. But it should not take events like apartheid or genocide to mobilize this tool. Consider the impact that a truth commission might have on the Israel-Palestine conflict. On both sides of the struggle, disinformation and propaganda are present and serve only to exacerbate and perpetuate the conflict. However, if these two parties could use the truth commission process to remove the extraneous and enabling elements of the conflict, it would allow for a focused and direct negotiation on the root cause of the conflict, potentially expediting a settlement to the dispute.

As the Israel-Palestine conflict also shows, the geo-political ‘neighborhood’ of the conflict greatly impacts said dispute. States like Syria and Iran have been key supporting cogs in perpetuating the conflict and in ensuring that peace cannot be achieved for decades. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and the rest of the Arab League members have also, albeit to a lesser degree, complicated and prevented peace. Therefore it is necessary that the tools of conflict resolution be applied to all involved- the primary and secondary players to the conflict. The goal in addressing the neighborhood approach is that peace cannot be achieved within a specific conflict if the supporting geo-political cast subverts the process, therefore, it is necessary for the international community- and this is an international issue- to mitigate and prevent this as much as possible.

In developing the strategy for democratic transition, the face of democracy must have a local flavor and not have the appearance of a foreign entity. This requires the incorporation of domestic cultural norms and it must be sold to the people. This requires incorporating it into the general social context, educating and preparing the population for the transition. Another important element, not geared towards the target state’s population, but at the greater international community, is that democratic transition is the development of a system and the results of the system are the responsibility of the local population. So when the Palestinian people, for example, elect a group like Hamas to represent them in their governmental system, the international community must respect that choice. Attacking the system is certainly not the answer as other tools of statecraft exist for interacting, or not, with the elected body. The point is that in states transitioning towards democracy, it is vital that the international community support the transition and educate the state and its population on the responsibilities of the system.

The bulk of the strategy to combat terrorism is non-violent. The use of force is a very small element in the approach; however, it provides a critical atmospheric condition- peace. The role of force in the strategy is the implementation of peace-enforcement. Peacekeeping is necessary in the initial stages and allows for a cooling off period to occur to start the rest of the strategic processes, but it is the support peace-enforcement, as it implements the provisions of the process, contributes to the overall strategy. Furthermore, the perception of peacekeeping versus that of peace-enforcement is very different. Peace-enforcement requires more than just the perception of security, but also that of compassion and understanding. Peacekeeping operates under a simple premise, prevent violence. Peace-enforcement must maneuver itself and support restorative justice operations, contribute to the reconciliation process, support and protect the truth-commissions, etcetera.

This is not to say that peace-enforcement is a passive use of force, quite the contrary. The operative word here is enforcement, which is why peace-enforcement operations are synonymous with that of counter-terror operations. Both focus on the need to gather intelligence, to provide security to the process, and to attack those that threaten peace. Neither one is intended to be an independent solution to the conflict; rather their key contribution is providing an atmosphere for the process to take place.

Conclusion…
The war on terror is more than just the prevention of terrorist operations. It is the process of attacking the premise of terrorism itself. Its focus needs to be comprehensive in nature, addressing the root causes, the enablers, and the operations; in general it is the culmination of goals and justifications of terrorism itself reversed engineered. Combating terrorism is as much about promoting cooperation as it is countering extra-legal violent action. The strategy has an obligation to provide not just security, but hope and progress.

Therefore, any strategic development towards combating terrorism must examine and utilize the tools of conflict resolution, for it is within this process that the war on terror, and terrorism itself, can be won.

[1] De Armond, Paul. “Rock, Paper, Scissors: Counter-terrorism, Anti-terrorism and Terrorism.” Public Good occasional Paper #6. 1997. 1 Mar 2006. http://nwcitizen.com/publicgood/reports/rockpaperscissors/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ramsbotham, Oliver; Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Second Edition. Cambridge. Polity Press. 2005. Pg. 257.
[4] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002. 7 Mar 2006. Pg. 5. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
[5] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 24. Box 1.1. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.

[6] Ibid.
[7] CIA World Fact Book. 7 Mar 2006. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/rankorderguide.html.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Wiedemann, Erich. “Addicted to Aid in Ethiopia”. Der Speigal via Global Policy Forum. 28 Nov 2005. 7 Mar 2006. http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/africa/2005/1128ethiopia.htm.
[10] “Peacemaking”. International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict. Conflict Research Consortium. University of Colorado. 1998. 8 Mar 2006. http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/peacemkg.htm.
[11] Peacemaking. Introduction. DPA Home. Pg. 2. 8 Mar 2006. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm.
[12] Fitzgerald, Sara J.; Anthony B. Kim. “MCA: Rewarding Open Markets”. Executive Memorandum #915. The Heritage Foundation. 25 Feb 2004. 9 Mar 2006. http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/em915.cfm.
[13] Hufbauer, Gary Clyde; Jeffrey J. Schott; and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, second edition, revised, 2 vols. Washington. Institute for International Economics. Dec 1990. 9 Mar 2006. http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-summary.cfm.
[14] Ibid.

America as a Democratic Model:
Promoting or Preventing Democratic Transition?
By B.E.N.

What’s the best democracy? A relevant question focused on what model should be followed when promoting this form of governance to states foreign to the practice. It begs to question who the best democracy really is. Who has the most to offer as an example to the fledgling state? For those engaged in the process of building states, it seeks a model for success. But what it does not do, this simple question, is ask what is feasible for democratic development.

As the sole superpower, unrivaled militarily and envied economically, the United States is a unique paradigm of democracy. As the oldest example of this form of government today, many assume that this model is the best one, again begging the question of feasibility. Is it feasible to apply the principles of democracy and capitalism as practiced by the US to nation-building projects in the developing world? The answer to this is an obvious and definitive no. Why?

Before we can properly answer this question, we must first examine what democracy is, more specifically that of democratic change. Dr. Mohammed Nimer, the research director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), states that, “democratic change implies that members of any collectivity agree on the management of existing conflicts.” He continues, “the absence of such condition means society will eventually break-up or be held together artificially by some coercive power.”[1] So there must exist, first and foremost, a general desire for collective management within a society for democracy to take root.

Dr. Francis Fukuyama, who speaks to it as democratic transition, continues this line of thought. For this process of democratic transition to occur, Fukuyama points to four conditions: one is the level of development, the second is culture, thirdly is the geo-political “neighborhood”, and finally domestic ideas.[2]

While it is the fourth condition put forward, it echoes that of Nimer in the importance of societal acceptance of collective rule. He simply, and quite aptly puts it, “you cannot have democracy unless you have people who believe in democracy.”[3]

But do Americans believe in democracy? Just 64% of eligible US voters cast ballots in 2004, and this was up from 60% in 2000.[4] Voter turnout in US elections is relatively low compared to elections held in other Western states. Even developing democracies typically show a much higher turn out than the US musters. Iraq’s parliamentary elections, under fear of death from the various insurgent groups, managed a voter turnout of 79.6%[5], over 20% higher than the US. If a developing state, in the process of transitioning to democracy, only turned out 60% or 64% in its elections, the legitimacy and success of said elections would be mixed at best. So the practice of democracy, at least by US standards, requires a much higher benchmark than even the US can meet.

While the idea of democracy could arguably be the single most important element to democratic development, Fukuyama also examines the importance of enablers to democratic transition. For instance, he points to a correlation between per capita GDP and its proportionality to democracy, highlighting that, “virtually all of the industrialized countries are functioning democracies, and relatively few poor countries are democratic.”[6] While valid exceptions do exist, most notably India and Saudi Arabia as representatives of the ends of the spectrum, this is a pretty valid point, which examines the ability of an emerging democratic state to sustain its democratic development. “If you live in a subsistence economy you worry about feeding your family and not whether you can vote,” Fukuyama points out, continuing, “and all of those things begin changing as you become richer.”[7] He even goes so far as to assign a value of $6,000 per capita GDP to this condition as the typical benchmark required for democratic transition to occur.

Per the CIA World Factbook, the US per capita GDP is $41,800. Per the same source, the per capita GDP of the world is only $9,300 and the European Union amounts to $28,100. So the individual purchasing power of one average American is equal to two average Europeans or 52.25 typical Congolese.[8] Comparatively speaking, it is difficult for Americans, use to so much, to identify with the struggles of people in the developing world who are use to so little. It is this economic disparity that also translates into the intolerance Americans hold for corruption; something rather common and somewhat tolerated through most of the developing world. So the American practice of throwing money, and occasionally a solution, at a problem is simply not feasible for states transitioning towards democracy.

Fukuyama mentions, as his third condition, the importance of the neighborhood. All states are influenced, and sometimes coerced towards certain predetermined outcomes beneficial to their more powerful neighbors. But sometimes it is not strength or arms as it is simple peer pressure that influences state actions. Democracy, as it is typically understood as a form of government, is a Western concept. In certain locals, especially the Middle East, Western concepts are foreign concepts and anything foreign is not accepted as a good concept. It is necessary to translate democracy into something acceptable to the Transitioning State as it furthers its democratic development.

If the US is considered anything, it is certainly Western. It is the quintessential icon of the Western world. Therefore it is impossible to package US democracy as anything other than just that- US democracy. Without an ability to literally translate US democracy into something less, Western, it will hold more the image of Western encroachment rather than that of democratic enlightenment.

This fits into the larger concept of culture and Fukuyama’s final condition. Culture has become more and more a hot topic in the developing world, especially with their impression that they are losing their culture to Western influence. This includes the notion of religion and couldn’t be more apparent than the struggle some are having with the compatibility of Islam with democracy. This struggle has been manipulated by some as avenues for exploiting the cultural dilemma transitioning states are facing.

For example, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi used the fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran put forth by his religious mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Per both Maqdisi and Zarqawi, democracy is heresy as it promotes the decision of the people over that of God as laid out in the Quran. The logical progression used by both is simple in its self-fulfilling nature and extremely dangerous when presented to illiterate and ignorant Muslims who depend on the wisdom and intentions of their religious leaders to show them the pitfalls in fundamentalist teachings.

But more than religion alone, it is the all-encompassing notion of culture as a whole that constitutes the concern of developing states transitioning to democracy. US culture revolves around the notion of capitalism with market drivers and competition fueling the notion and necessity for individuals to sell themselves to others and themselves. Americans celebrate their individualism with the notion of a pioneering spirit conquering life’s obstacles. Compare this with the collective mentality that permeates the vast majority of the globe, highlighted in their focus on protecting and nurturing individual family ties and societal norms in general and the alien nature of US culture stands out.

It is the practices of US democracy that make America so unique and inherently a very poor model for states transitioning to a democratic form of government. But it is not American culture alone that impedes the promotion of democracy. As stated throughout this piece, several conditions are necessary for democracy to not only take root but find nourishment for continued growth. It takes an economic base that supports a growing middle class to sustain and fuel democracy. It takes a political will within the population to take control of their state and guide it in the direction they see fit. It takes a cultural acceptance of tolerance and patience in dealing with others within the state to foment collective management of their existing conflicts. It is this admixture of economic, political and cultural factors that provide impediments to the transitioning of a state to democracy.

[1] Nimer, Mohammad. “Prospects for an American Muslim Polity: Implicat5ions for Muslim World Democratization”. CSID 6th Annual Conference, Washington D.C. April 22-23, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.islam-democracy.org/documents/pdf/6th_Annual_Conference-MohamedNimer.pdf.

[2] Fukuyama, Francis. “Do we really know how to promote democracy?” Remarks made to the New York Democracy Forum on May 24, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.ned.org/nydf/francisFukuyama05.pdf.
[3] Ibid.
[4] US Census Bureau News Release. http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/voting/004986.html.
[5] Iraqi Elections. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_legislative_election,_December_2005.
[6] Fukuyama, Francis. “Do we really know how to promote democracy?” Remarks made to the New York Democracy Forum on May 24, 2005. 25 Feb 06. http://www.ned.org/nydf/francisFukuyama05.pdf.
[7] Ibid.
[8] CIA World Factbook. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html.

Reconciliation

In the post Cold-War environment, inter and intrastate conflict resolution and reconstruction has faced some new and some old challenges to success. Whenever a third party is brought into the process, whether invited or not, the largest challenge and biggest burden to success is their ability to understand the nature of the conflict, to include its root cause as well as the enabling factors that contribute to the crisis.

This understanding is further expanded on the capabilities of the players and the roles that they try to play. Therefore, it is necessary of actors involved in conflict resolution, more specifically reconciliation, to interact not only with each other, but also with the primary parties of the conflict. So what challenges can these actors expect and how can they balance these challenges between one another as they divvy the responsibilities of reconciliation?

First and foremost, before the roles can be divvied up, it must be understood what reconciliation is, and more importantly what it is not. Reconciliation cannot be an excuse for impunity or exist in opposition of or as an alternative to truth and justice. It is not a quick solution, an excuse for forgetting crimes or simply a matter of forgiving. It is finding a way to live with one another with a vision of the future. It revolves around building, or as necessary rebuilding, relationships between the contested parties as they come to terms with the past. It must incorporate all of affected society as it matures into a long term process for changing perceptions and attitudes. It involves acknowledgement, remembrance and historical understanding. Most importantly, it must be voluntary.[1]

When actors examine reconciliation, it is necessary to differentiate punitive and reconciliatory measures as well as balance the approach of each. There are essentially four elements to be considered: restorative justice, reparations, healing and truth-telling. The first two are punitive measures where as the last two are reconciliatory steps[2].

But these cannot take place in a vacuum. They require coexistence, which requires the cessation of violence. It requires communication and the dissolution of stereotypes so as to overcome polarization. Through these it is possible to bridge together the parties as they manage their contradictions. Finally it results in a celebration of diversity as all involved reconstitute their relationship.[3] This requires the participation of the victims and the offenders as well as any beneficiaries.

So for justice to occur, which includes both the punitive and reconciliatory measures, it must bring the conflict before the parties. Forgive and forget is not a policy, rather it is denial and it inherently fertilizes future conflict. The other extreme is vengeance, which simply perpetuates the conflict as it fuels misgivings and feeds the negative image the opposing side maintains. The parties must find the center and publicly deal with the grievances to provide the justice sought and to prevent the suppression of the problem.[4]

In addressing the elements of reconciliation, it therefore becomes a case of tangible versus intangible. This falls along the lines of punitive versus reconciliatory.
Punitively, there is a focus on restorative justice made up of four primary elements: retributive through prosecution; restorative via mediation; historically with truth commissions and economically by reparations[5]. The punitive elements come more from international, national and local judicial bodies focused on the prosecution of perpetrators for crimes committed. But the need for care exists here in that if prosecution is overzealous, then the possibility exists for re-victimization, which counters the premise of reconciliation. The opposite is also true as under-prosecution does not address the needs for accountability with the victims.

Reconciliatory measures revolve around the notion of healing the individual and societal wounds caused by the conflict. It is a long term process focused on the psychological welfare of the victims as it helps move everyone involved towards closure. It is intangible in that there are few measurable quantities that can be used, rather it examines the general atmosphere of the parties involved and attempts to focus on certain aspects as they rise and fall. Some of the same tools used to punitively address the process can also be used in healing. For example, truth commissions allow victims to know the truth of what occurred and why, preventing false reconciliation. The punitive element s themselves provide for healing that they allow a notion of justice to be ascribed to the victim, but the overarching goal of the healing process is to allow for closure and forward progression from the conflict.

The nature of these components of reconciliation also inherently impacts the role of the actors involved. It is important to first identify the base characters, the victims and perpetrators, followed with an identification of the parties that can contribute to the reconciliation process. It is important to note the perspective and capabilities of the problem solving parties, which should constitute a collage of perspectives and capabilities and vary between supranational institutions such as the United Nations, national bodies like parliaments and social and religious non-governmental organizations.

The division of labor should then be partitioned based on the access, acceptance, and capabilities of the party. Supranational institutions, such as the United Nations, enjoy a capability of seeing the entire conflict in its fullest context. They therefore have the ability to view the crisis in a manner that doesn’t inject a biased emotional perspective. These types of institutions are also in the unique position of being able to coordinate global resources from multiple states and bring in non-partial security forces to secure a peaceful environment for the reconciliation process to grow out of. A key service the international community, and the supranational institutions in particular, can provide inter/intrastate conflicts is non-violent forums for dispute.

It is, however, the host nation(s) of the conflict that must carry the brunt of the responsibility in fully nurturing the environment of reconciliation. While the international community can provide support, the host nation(s) must ensure important governmental services such as effective civil services, fair judiciaries and efficient legislative structures exist. It is on the national level, most effectively through a parliament, that truth, justice and compensation can be handed out.[6]

But governmental bodies, both supranational and national, are not always perceived in a good light and so their access may be limited. This is where NGO’s have an advantage in supporting the process. NGO’s in general can support reconciliation in two ways. One, the can provide some checks and balances towards the elements involved that are capable of escalating the conflict back into violence, like governments or rebel groups. Two, they can often garner access to areas where the government may be limited or unaccepted, allowing them to more expeditiously deliver aid to those in need[7]. Faith-based groups also have a role to play in the reconciliation process as they can be especially effective in religious conflict, even though they will often follow secular policies. However their religious nature can shape their support to the process, so this element must be taken into consideration when using them to support reconciliation.[8]

Reconciliation is a long term process with the end goal of providing a environment that sustains peace. It requires the involvement of both the victims and the perpetrators and is constituted with both tangible and intangible benchmarks. Those involved in the reconciliation process must work together in a concerted effort to prevent the conflict from erupting back into violence.Supranational institutions are uniquely capable of fully coordinating and monitoring the reconciliation process with the national governments establishing and maintaining the environment necessary for the process to fully mature. NGO’s provide a more appeasing face of the process to the people and can therefore be a more effective conduit for success. These elements, when all exercised in a coordinated and cooperative environment, enjoy a much better chance of success in reconciling the parties involved and fostering long term peace.

[1] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 14. Box 1.1. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.
[2] Ibid, Pg 24.
[3] Ramsbotham, Oliver; Tom Woodhouse; Hugh Miall. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 2nd Edition. Polity Press. Cambridge. 2005. Pg. 232. Table 10.1.
[4] Ibid, Pg. 235 Table 10.2.
[5] Bloomfield, David; Teresa Barnes; Luc Huyse. Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Pg 97. 2003. 8 Feb 06. http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.
[6] Mongbe’, Rene’ Valery; Robert del Picchia. “Promoting International Reconciliation, Helping to Bring Stability to Regins of Conflict, and Assisting with Post-Conflict Reconstruction”. Inter-Parliamentary Union 110th Assembly. Mexico City 15-23 April 2004. Pg. 11.
[7] “The Role of NGOs, National and International in Post-War Peacebuilding”. Report of a seminar held on 1st November 2001 at Islington Town Hall, Upper Street, London. Committee for Conflict Transformation Support Newsletter 15. 9 Feb 2006. http://www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts15/seminar.htm.
[8] “Faith-Based NGOs and International Peacebuilding”. US Institute of Peace. Special Report 76. 22 Oct 2001. 9 Feb 2006. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr76.html.