The Land of the Two Rivers: A 2006 Assessment of Iraq

The Land of the Two Rivers:
A 2006 Assessment
By
B.E.N.
December 15, 2005

2006 will be a turning point year for Iraq. The Iraqi conflict, and the elements that constitute it, will continue to match past trends as it steadily moves towards a peaceful resolution. This piece intends to look at the constituting elements and how they impact the conflict as well as provide an assessment for 2006 in Iraq.

[1]Looking at the political landscape of Iraq, and its relationship to the ongoing conflict there, it is important to examine the host of agendas that exist between the three major groups. While definitive differences exist between the major sects, unifying commonalities are also present and support shared goals between the groups that will contribute to near term stability.

For instance, the Kurds will be focused on the concept of Kurdistan. At the very least they will wish to maintain the autonomy they have enjoyed for the last decade, but will never truly lose sight of their desire to have an independent state. This will foster cooperation between the Sunni and Shi’ah political leadership as they aspire to prevent Kurdish independence and claims to resources in the north.

The Shi’ah will be focused on realizing political power that continues to be representative of their numbers within the Iraqi population. While the Shi’ah are not per se sympathetic to Iran, they are by far the best avenue for Iran to affect influence on the state of Iraq. Because of this, the Sunnis and the Kurds will ally to contain Iranian influence as much as possible.

The Sunni, a minority within Iraq, is by far the majority in the global Islamic community and in particular the other neighboring Arab states. This can grant the Sunnis a disproportionate amount of international legitimacy within the region and be a force multiplier with regards to their influence in the Iraqi government. This disproportionate legitimacy supports their aim of reestablishing themselves as the dominant force in the Iraqi government. The Kurds and Shi’ah will want to mitigate this and will pool resources to prevent Sunni dominance within Iraq.

These varying secular agendas will create an environment focused on balancing one sects agenda against the unified efforts of the other two groups; highlighting the importance of reconciliation and cooperation between the Shi’ah, Sunni and Kurds.

Cairo Conference…
Recently the Arab League, backed by the U.S., held a preparatory conference for Iraqi national reconciliation. In the final statement of the conference, three main points were presented. One, the Iraqi people will decide on the future of Iraq. Two, foreign troops must leave and a timetable for their departure must be developed- based on the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Finally, the document stated that resistance is legitimate; however, terrorism is not legitimate resistance.

Initial examination of the final statement highlights what appears to be a negative regard for Coalition forces’ continued involvement in Iraq. But is this really the case? Upon closer examination, and within the context of other significant events, the Cairo conference reinforced Coalition policy and presented an acceptable and manageable exit from Iraq for the Iraqis as well as the coalition members.

Democracy…
The first element of the Cairo conference statement revolved around the notion that the Iraqi people will decide the future of Iraq. This is to be realized through the vehicle of democracy and several key events have taken place since the 2003 invasion and transfer of sovereignty that support the democratic process.

The January ‘05 elections were a monumental occasion in that they placed an Iraqi face to the Iraqi government and reflected a monumental change in the way that Iraq would be managed and led in the future. But they were not perfect. The Sunnis by and large did not participate, marginalizing them and fostering a large amount of resentment towards the Shi’ah and Kurds, who enjoyed an enormous amount of power, as well as towards their own leadership for leading them in what proved to be the wrong direction.

The elections also brought to light a failing in that because of the Sunni non-participation, the Kurds were able to gather a disproportionate amount of seats in the transitional national assembly. However, through magnanimous efforts to extend an olive branch to the Sunni community in spite of their failings, the Iraq Interim Government managed to persevere and crest the next major obstacle to their goal of democracy- a national constitution.

The Constitution was voted on by the Iraqi people in a national referendum on 15 October, 2005. Over all, 78% of the Iraqi people voted for the document and 21% voted against it. Two of Iraq’s 18 provinces rejected the constitution, one province short of the requirement for veto.[2] With this, the constitution passed.

Several arguments can be made about the Constitution, both for and against it, but they are irrelevant now in light of the referendums passage. What is key is how the Constitution further paves the way towards democracy in Iraq and lays the groundwork for democracy in the future.
As the December 15[3] elections for the Iraqi national assembly approach, several political considerations must be examined; specifically, the situations facing the three major groups within Iraq.

The Shi’ah are going to experience some political fractionalization, which will weaken a previously united political front. With Ahmed Chalabi’s departure from the current ruling coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and his formation of a separate political alliance, the National Congress Coalition, he will pull some seats away from the current regime. However, this will not be enough to completely fractionalize the Shi’ah and they will maintain a political majority in the assembly as well as provide the next Prime Minister.

For Iraq and the West, the best that can be hoped for is the selection of Iyad Allawi as prime minister. This is due to his secular beliefs and associations with varying Kurd and Sunni political leaders, so it is possible that he would garner their support and put together a government. But Allawi does carry some baggage that may affect his ability to form a ruling coalition. For one, he was the interim Prime Minister during the second Fallujah operation, something the Sunni will be slow to forget. Second, his strong position against Iranian influence will hamper any support from the pro-Iranian elements within the Shi’ah, like the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which have a strong standing in the current government.

Most likely though, the next prime minister will be one of the two serving Iraqi Vice Presidents, Adel Abdul Mahdi. He is the candidate put forward by the SCIRI and does not carry the same negative political connotations that Allawi does. The worst case scenario would be the selection of Ahmed Chalabi, one of Iraq’s deputy prime ministers, as prime minister; however, he is a bit of a dark-horse in that he carries an enormous amount of baggage, both from the West as well as from the region itself, and he would be opposed by some within the Shi’ah community and especially from the other major sects.

Interestingly, following an agreement between the current Grand Ayatollahs in Iraq to refrain from politics, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani[4] recently issued a fatwa calling on the Shi’ah community to not waste their vote and to focus on a party that is influenced by the teachings of Islam. This implies that the smaller alliances should be ignored and that they should vote for the current ruling coalition and does so without directly endorsing them. The ramifications of this are yet to be seen, but will likely heavily impact the other Shi’ah political alliances and their ability to garner votes. Regardless, the Shi’ah will loose some political cohesiveness but not enough to greatly impact their standing in the current government.

As mentioned previously, due to the lack of Sunni participation in the January elections, the Kurds received a disproportionate number of seats in the current national assembly. Couple this with the separation of the Islamic Kurdish Union from the Kurdish alliance and the Kurds are going to end up losing seats in the next national assembly. They will attempt to cauterize the political hemorrhaging by maximizing their political leverage in the formation of the national government with the hope of, at the very least, attaining a major ministerial position. Therefore, they will side with any coalition that will grant them the most in political capital making them somewhat of a wildcard. However, they are not going to have the ability to generate any political momentum and will be forced to react to political events.

[5]By far, the Sunni will come out the best in the December elections. With full participation this time around in the political process, they have the numbers to become the second largest body in the national assembly. They will take advantage of this political momentum and seek to influence the selection of the governmental leadership as well as set the near term political agenda for Iraq. They will support secular candidates such as Allawi for prime minister over the other pro-Iranian Shi’ah candidates.

This is further supported by the fact that the Sunni religious leadership in Iraq has issued fatwas calling on the Sunni community to fully participate in the elections and condemning any interference with the voting process. Obviously, this is in an effort to maximize their political gains in the election but will also allow the Shi’ah and Kurds to fully participate.

Throw in the future provincial elections to take place in February of 2006 and the road to democracy continues to march forward in Iraq. This is all towards the underlying requirement, by the Iraqi government and the Coalition Forces, that the Iraqi people decide the future of Iraq and that democracy must prevail.

Removal of Foreign Forces…
The second element in the final statement of the Cairo Conference was the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. The only real caveat revolved around the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces.
In the beginning of June 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1546, which provided a UN mandate to the Coalition Forces in Iraq. The expiration of the mandate was contingent on either the expiration of the timeframe within the document itself, or at the will of the Iraqi government. In early November of 2005, the mandate was again extended till June 15th of 2006. Following the national assembly elections and the formation of the next Iraqi government, it will be very easy for the government of Iraq to simply do nothing and allow the mandate to expire. This will, of course be dependant on the level of violence in Iraq at the time.

The Sunni will force to the forefront the removal of Coalition forces from Iraq following the expiration of the UN mandate. They will be able to receive support from elements within the Shi’ah community, like Muqtada al Sadr, but they will be opposed by the Kurds. Depending on the success of the national elections, the formation of the government and the level of violence in Iraq at the time, the Sunni will be successful in, at the very least, the development of a timetable that forces some Coalition forces to withdraw.

It will also be dependant on the status and capabilities of the ISF. 2005 saw the ISF mature at an incredible pace, laying the groundwork for an effective and capable security apparatus. For instance, at the beginning of the year, there were a handful of trained and combat ready Iraqi battalions, whereas now there are over 120. Of these, 80 are currently engaged alongside Coalition forces with 40 acting as lead elements controlling their battle space.[6]

Their combat effectiveness is also improving. During the Fallujah operation, 9 Coalition force battalions were engaged with 6 Iraqi battalions supporting them. This was reversed during the Tel Afar operation later in the year with 11 Iraqi battalions being supported by 5 Coalition battalions.

There is only one Iraqi battalion that is fully independent, but the definition of independence is important. To qualify, the battalion must be able to supply their logistics, airlift, intelligence, command & control, etc. There are NATO battalions that don’t qualify under this definition, so this achievement is to be congratulated.

The Shi’ah will also attempt to force the Sunni into fully supporting the ISF through the next government and will also augment the ISF with the various dissolved militias. This augmentation will dramatically increase the size of the ISF and will incorporate Sunni participation and cooperation in ISF operations.

Resistance and Terrorism…
The final point made in the Cairo Conference statement was the legitimacy of the “insurgency”. The document states that, “resistance is a legitimate right for all nations; terrorism does not represent legitimate resistance.”[7] The document even went so far as to define terrorism as “acts of violence that target civilians, humanitarian and civilian institutions and houses of worship.”[8]

Therefore, when examining the anti-Coalition forces, the lexicon used to describe them becomes crucial. The statement spoke to the legitimacy of resistance, referring to the insurgency, but differentiated between resistance and terrorism. In order to fully understand the statement and its context, a differentiation must be made between insurgents and terrorists.

A central goal of any insurgency is the establishment of a separate ‘government’ intended to eventually usurp the legitimacy of the state government and ultimately supplant it. However, this has not occurred in Iraq. In fact, the deficiency of this element has exacerbated the standing of the main ‘insurgent’ faction, Al Qaeda in Iraq, in the eyes of the Islamic community.

Nothing highlights this better than the captured letter that Ayman al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two leader, sent to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the letter, Zawahiri criticizes Zarqawi for targeting the Shi’ah and for not establishing a Caliphate in territory that AQIZ controlled. Because Zarqawi has been deficient in this governmental establishment, he has not been able to foster any legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqis or the general Islamic community.

The resistance comment in the conference statement further expounds on this by addressing the means of the resistance rather than the ends, which are embodied in the establishment of a Caliphate. By targeting terrorism, and defining it as such, they delegitimize over half of Zarqawi’s operations in Iraq. They also focus on the massive casualty events, which are responsible for the bulk of Iraqi deaths since initial major combat operations in 2003 ended.

By attacking the means, they indirectly attack the end goal of a Caliphate, and allow the Sunnis to be able to further legitimize themselves by clamping down on the support network for the insurgency, regardless of their complicity in it. This grants them the ability to influence the ISF and its formation and operations, and as a byproduct, leverage themselves into positions of power within the Iraqi leadership. This also serves to legitimize the resistance components of the insurgency, but not the terrorist elements, providing an out for, for lack of a better term, the moderate elements of the insurgency.

The US Plan for Victory in Iraq…
All of these events must be viewed in light of US policy, considering that it is the leading force in the occupation of Iraq. The White House recently released a document called the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and it lays out three tracks for success: political, security, and economic. The political track calls for the development of democracy in Iraq and the political engagement of all the groups within Iraq. The security track focuses on the rebuilding of the ISF and the removal of the insurgent/terrorist elements. The economic track explains the importance of rebuilding their infrastructure and the need to reform the Iraqi economy on a free and open framework.[10]

The political track’s focus on democracy mirrors the desires of the Iraqi people in their decision to decide their own future and has been repeatedly stated by the Coalition force leaders and the international community at large. The security track is another echo of Coalition and US policy. President Bush has stated numerous times that “coalition forces will stand down as the Iraqi people stand up.”[11] And the economic track will be inherently supported by the improvement in the security situation and the desire for success by the Iraqi people themselves.

Conclusion…
Iraq is on the verge of rounding a major corner towards peace and resolving the internal conflict that has plagued it for the last two and half years. Violence will continue and it is unreasonable and irresponsible to think that the violent elements in Iraq will simply disappear because of the progress made thus far; however, it is safe to assume that the worst is over.

With the full participation of the Sunni population in the Iraqi political process, a major supporting element for the ‘insurgency’ has vanished. Couple this with the growing capabilities of the ISF and the expanding legitimacy and power of the Iraqi government and the final statement of the Cairo Conference portends a successful 2006 for Iraq.

It also presents the Iraqi people, as well as the Coalition leadership, with an exit strategy for Coalition Forces. This exit strategy is going to resemble something similar to the plan put forward by US Congressman John Murtha, but for much different reasons than what he stated.
Coalition forces will draw down, starting with 30,000 US troops who were maintained for added security during the December elections. US forces will continue to draw down and by the end of 2006 will number somewhere around 75,000 with another 20-30,000 positioned in Kuwait as a Quick Reaction Force. The other Coalition partners will also withdraw forces, most of the smaller participants completely, but the more significant contingents, like the United Kingdom, following the US lead and drawing down to about half of their current numbers. This will result in the ISF being given control of more and more territory and Coalition visibility reduced to a supporting force for Iraqi operations.

The prognosis for Iraq in 2006 looks good. With the advancements of the political process, the improvement of the security situation and the removal of Coalition forces, the Iraqi conflict is finally seeing some light at the end of the tunnel. If the Iraqi people can continue the steady and persistent march towards democracy as well as moderate and mitigate their various extremist elements, then they will be able to emerge as a strong, united state well on their way to joining modern society.

[1] Figure 1 diagram created by the author.
[2] The Iraqi Constitution. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Constitution.
[3] December 15, 2005.
[4] Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani is the most senior grand ayatollah in Iraq, and arguably in the Shi’ah world. He commands the following of millions and his positions are extremely influential in the Shi’ah community, especially in Iraq where the Shi’ah population by and large follows his teachings.
[5] An unclassified diagram from an operation order for Iraq.
[6] Fact Sheet: Training Iraqi Security Forces. White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130.html.
[7] Final Statement of National Accord Conference. http://democracyrising.us/content/view/373/151/.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Al-Shishani, Murad. “Al-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets”. Volume 3, Issue 22 (November 17, 2005). 15 Dec 2005. http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369831&printthis=1.
[10] National Security Council. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. November 2005. 15 Dec 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html.
[11] Paraphrase of President Bush in numerous speeches over the last two years.

The International Community and Bosnia: When Actions- or the Lack Thereof- Kill

The International Community and Bosnia:
When Actions- or the Lack Thereof- Kill
By B.E.N.
November 25, 2005


In the fall of 1991, the first in a string of nationalist events occurred in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These events, in the form of provincial declarations of independence, forced a chain of events that sparked a tinderbox of unresolved animosities that had smoldered under the surface of Yugoslavian society for decades.

These animosities, based on self-imposed identities under the guise of ethnicity, easily lent themselves to political expedience on the part of the nationalists and culminated some of the worst human tragedies since World War II, which could only be justified by the most extreme of self-delusions. Yet on top of these internal elements of the conflict, which had generated and perpetuated extreme violence, external factors also played key roles in the tremendous loss of life as well as the delay in, at the very least, the ending of the violence.

Three events in particular, initiated on the part of the international community, are significant either for their impact, or lack thereof, on the conflict. These events are the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia, for its impact on the warring parties, and the Vance-Owen and Contact Group plans, for their lack of impact on the Bosnian conflict.

The Arms Embargo
"If you confront us with the choice -- either UN blue helmets or weapons -- we choose weapons. They at least guarantee our people's survival."- Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian President

Following the declaration of independence made by Slovenia and Croatia, and the subsequent violence that ensued, the European Community (EC) on the 5th of July, 1991, imposed an arms embargo on all the provinces in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The United Nations followed suit on the 25th of September with UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 713, which placed its own embargo on the former state.

While at first glance this seems like a logical action, it should have been reviewed and assessed for its effectiveness and validity. Its initial development should have also taken into consideration several key facts.

For one, Belgrade was in control of the vast majority of the former Yugoslavian army, therefore it was in a unique position of possessing the bulk of the stockpiles as well as the defense industry’s infrastructure. Second, 14,000 tons of military weaponry had been purchased from the Middle East prior to the implementation of the arms embargo, therefore making it exempt from the weapons ban.[1] While the Serbs had this massive arsenal, the Bosnian government “had no artillery, no tanks, no planes, no missiles.”[2] In fact, the Serbian military commanders bragged that they had weapons and ammunition enough to continue the war for six or seven years.[3]

The situation was worse than poor for the Bosnians, who were estimated in September of 1992 to have acquired two tanks and two armored personnel carriers (APCs) where as the Serbs had “300 tanks, 200 APCs, 800 artillery pieces and 40 aircraft.”[4] Needless to say, the embargo actually helped the Serbs as it allowed them to maintain military superiority without spending limited funds on an arms race with the Bosnians.

What is troubling is that Great Britain seems to have prompted the former Yugoslavian Foreign Minister, Budimir Loncar, into recommending the arms embargo- playing perfectly into Serbian hands and contributing to the massive imbalance of forces.[5]

Finally, it is questionable as to the legality of the arms embargo placed against Bosnia. Three key elements in particular challenge the legal nature of the embargo. First, it violated Bosnia’s right to self-defense per Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter. Second, the UNSC did not provide the “action necessary to maintain international peace and security.” The UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) could not effectively protect themselves, as witnessed in numerous hostage situations, and their mandate authorized the use of force for self-defense and did not extend to the defense of the Bosnian citizens. Finally, it likely violated the UN Convention on Genocide as it prevented the Bosnian government from defending its nationals against foreign sponsored aggression that qualified as genocide and war crimes per the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.[6] Further more, the embargo was initially requested by and placed against Yugoslavia, but following Bosnia’s acceptance into the UN in May of 1992, the embargo should have no longer applied.

The Vance-Owen Plan
"Because I'm paid to engage in the absurd." (US State Department spokesman when asked how Clinton can expect the Serbs to agree to a just peace without facing a threat of force)

A product of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which took place in Geneva in early September 1992, the Vance-Owen plan presented a three part package of 10 constitutional principles, an immediate end to hostilities and a confederation of 10 provinces with three each controlled ethnically.

The plan was accepted by the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, with slight territorial changes, but the Bosnian Serbs, who controlled 70% of Bosnia and were militarily superior, did not want to accept the 43% of territory allocated to them in the plan.[7] Their rejection of the plan came in the face of strong pressure from Serbia, who wanted a settlement as soon as possible to alleviate the sanctions they were under. For the Serbs, any territorial gains from the province of Bosnia were good, while the Bosnian Serbs, who were primarily located rurally, wanted to establish their own state or unite with Serbia with their lands.

Because the Bosnian Serbs had rejected the plan, the international community decided to step up pressure, and thus passed UNSC resolution 820, which froze the assets of the Serbs and stopped the movement of hard currency into Serbia. In essence, it completely isolated Serbia financially and pushed Slobodan Milosevic to increase pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and abandon his goal of a ‘Greater Serbia’, thus proving the sanctions successful.[8]

The plan also highlighted some key differences between the frame of mind of the Permanent 5 (P5) members of the UNSC. The US looked at the situation as unfair and one-sided, thus it pushed for a leveling of the playing field. The leveling was to come from the ‘lift and strike’ plan, which called for the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and sent air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs/Serbian forces. Europe on the other hand, and France in particular, objected to any lifting of the embargo believing that it would simply prolong the conflict. Another core dispute within the P5 was the Vance-Owen plan itself, which the US felt was an appeasement to Serbia as they were to receive 43% of the territory when they only made up 30% of the population.

This illustrates another difference between the US position on Bosnia and that of the EC and the UN - there existed a moral concern. Holbrooke called the Bosnian conflict “the greatest failure of the West since the 1930s” and did not cavalierly speak of Bosnian options. On the other hand, Europe seemed to possess an amoral attitude towards the war.[9]

In the end however, the plan was never adopted yet it remained the goal of the international community and the model for which future plans would be based on. The premise behind the plan does make perfectly clear one startling revelation- Bosnia was not to exist any longer. The plan carved up the state- a member of the UN- and simple geography shows the end result. The Muslims would be broken and isolated with indefensible and disconnected provinces constituting a state pillaged and raped by its neighbors. This represents an abandonment of the Bosnian people and completely goes against the UN Charter by rewarding aggressor states. The plan does not represent a high point for the international community.

The Contact Group Plan
A "bewildered bunch which does not know how to solve the war." (Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb President, referring to the 'contact group': US, Germany, France, Britain and Russia)

The Contact Group was an attempt by the international community to present a unified front and prevent the Serbs from playing one member against the other. It was also a means for bringing in the US and Russia into the conflict and get them fully involved, something both wanted.

Their plan, based on the Vance-Owen plan, again called for the partition of Bosnia, though on a more favorable level to the Bosnians. The Bosnian Muslim-Croat federation was to receive 51% of the territory where as the Bosnian Serbs were allocated the remaining land. The Muslim-Croats unconditionally accepted the agreement, even though it continued to reward the Bosnian Serbs for aggression and violence. The Bosnian Serbs on the other hand called for further negotiations, of which the Contact Group took as tantamount rejection of the plan.

Serbia and Russia pushed the Bosnian Serbs towards accepting the plan, however, the Bosnian Serbs accurately assessed that the major powers would not use their full spectrum of power against them and held firm. Serbia, desperate by now to get some relief from the international sanctions, was forced to accept international monitors along the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. In exchange for this, the UNSC passed a resolution reopening the Belgrade Airport to all civilian traffic, resume ferry operations to with Italy and permitting the Serbs to participate in international sporting and cultural events.[10]

Again the US found itself on the other side of the issue from the European members of the group. The US wanted to step up pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and increase the use of force in protecting the ‘safe areas’, locals that were anything but safe. However, the US encountered resistance, which in the end led to the US deciding to no longer enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia- the first time a NATO policy that had been unanimously accepted had been unilaterally breached.[11]

In truth, this had no real impact since the US had no forces on the ground, but diplomatically it highlighted a growing rift between the NATO members. It also reasserts the moral concern the US had in the Bosnian conflict, but they lacked the political will necessary to unilaterally engage to the degree required to solve the crisis. Coupled with the policy of containment, which the EC and UN favored, and the Bosnian’s continued to find themselves in a very precarious situation.

Conclusions…
"It's like pornography. We'll know it when we see it." (Clinton's Bosnia exit strategy as whispered by 'top White House official' to Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-VT)

Bosnia and the response of the international community show the importance of political will. The Bosnian Serbs were, by no stretch of the imagination, an equal to the major powers, yet they managed to manipulate and dictate the policies and processes that the powers would adopt for nearly half a decade.

It also showed the ease at which intelligent and powerful institutions can glob onto an oversimplified justification for violence, regardless of how erroneous it may be. This is seen by the many attempts by the international community to develop solutions based on ethnicity as opposed to creating solutions based on accuracy.

Most importantly, Bosnia laid bare the ineptness of the various security institutions following the Cold War. Their inability to unite under a single voice and their incompatible attitudes towards the plight of the victims in the crisis prevented them from decidedly addressing the conflict. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 150,000 people died in the Bosnian War, 70% of which were Muslim.[12] Thousands of women were raped, many gang raped, with some as many as 150 times. The atrocities of the Bosnian conflict were the worst since the discovery of the final solution implemented by the Nazis in World War II. And it shook the international community to its core.

The international community’s actions or lack thereof, killed thousands of Bosnians. While they may not have pulled the trigger, and the ultimate responsibility of the atrocities lies with the Serbs, the major powers allowed the conflict to fester into a lethal sore that continues to plague the Balkans to this day.

[1] Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A short History. London: Macmillan. 1994. Pg. 243.
[2] Thompson, Mark. A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. London: Vintage. 1992. Pg. 328.
[3] Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A short History. London: Macmillan. 1994. Pg. 243.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hodge, Carole. “Hesitation to use force gave Milosevic green light”. Bosnian Institute. 9 Oct 2001.23 Nov 2005. < http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=1549 >.
[6] Williams, Paul R. “Why the Bosnian Arms Embargo Is Illegal”. Public International Law and Policy Group. 15 Jun 1995. 24 Nov 2005. < http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/editorials/Bosnian%20Arms%20Embargo.htm >.
[7] Sloan, Elinor S. Bosnia and the New Collective Security. London: Praeger. 1998. Pg. 48.
[8] Owen, David. Bosnian Odyssey. New York: Harcourt Brace. 1995. Pg. 153.
[9] Rieff, David. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1996. Pg. 257.
[10] Sloan, Elinor S. Bosnia and the New Collective Security. London: Praeger. 1998. Pg. 62.
[11] Ibid, Pg. 64.
[12] Dervišbegovic, Nedim. “Revised death toll for Bosnian war”. Bosnian Institute. 23 Dec 2004. 25 Nov 2005. < http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=1985 >.

Who Am I? The Roles of Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism

Who Am I? The Roles of Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism
In the Yugoslavian Conflict
By B.E.N.
October 30, 2005

When examining the genesis of an intrastate conflict, in this case the Balkans and specifically the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the driving originating factors must be assessed and acknowledged. The rallying dynamic, whether it is religious, ethnic or economic, etc, must be broken down into the core elements and examined for their role in mitigating or exacerbating the crisis. This article intends to look at the roles ethnicity and religion play in nationalism, and determine whether they are drivers or enablers to the conflicts experienced in Yugoslavia.

Ethnicity…
Ethnicity, according to the Random House College Dictionary, is defined as, “belonging to or deriving from the cultural, racial, religious, or linguistic traditions of a people or country.”[1] Members of an ethnic group are usually readily distinguishable from other non-members with these distinguishing features holding commonality to the ethnic group claiming them.

Ethnic groups share common origins, possess a continuity of time- in both the past as well as in the future- and maintain an intergenerational transmission of these common traits. A key point about ethnicity is that it is a social concept, which differentiates it from race, which is a biological concept. While race can be part of an ethnic group, it is not the driving factor behind the formation of the group.

Religion…
Referring once again to the Random House College Dictionary, religion is defined as, “a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe.”[2] This is especially important when the members of different religions use it to define their roles and positions in the universe. Since religion is an intellectual element, the groups based on it are not limited by ethnic or geographical characteristics.

An important and interesting phenomenon that comes with religion is the sense of family that it creates. From the paternal feelings that exist between the supernatural and the corporeal to the lexicon that exists within the institution; there is a strong familial aura that surrounds religion. And religion, in a sense, serves the same purpose that family does. As members within a family benefit from a present tense feeling of “social welfare security”, members of religious ideologies receive a future tense feeling of “social welfare security.”[3]

The impact and importance of this, as will be seen later, cannot be overstated, especially when this phenomenon is used to justify religious member actions. As was wisely put, “no matter how apolitical the act of worship itself may seem, the institutional infrastructure of religion is invariably politicized.”[4]

Nationalism…
So when we focus on the development of nationalist movements, we have to understand what the required elements of a nation are. What are the factors that constitute a nation, and how are these factors determined.

Anne-Marie Thiesse explains in her piece Inventing National Identity[5] that to create a national identity, several key factors must be nourished and universally established. These include a history, to include historical monuments; heroes who embody the national values; language, culture and folklore which characteristically develop a specific national mentality; but most importantly for the purposes of a state is the ties to a distinctive geographical feature or location.

Upon examination of the required elements of nationalism, a similarity to ethnicity is apparent. The definition of nation is typically explained as, “a body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or possess a government peculiarly its own.”[6] This is important because nation is usually synonymous with state, which is defined as, “a politically unified population occupying a specific area of land.”[7] While they are similar in their political overtones, they are different, primarily in the notion of territorial possession. States occupy territory where as nations are associated with territories. This becomes important in examining heterogeneous states and the development of nationalist movements within.

To take this one step further, a major difference between a nation-state and an ethnic group is sovereignty; nation-states have it while ethnic groups may seek it, through nationalist movements.

Kingdom of Yugoslavia…
To properly examine the Yugoslavian situation, a proper starting point in time is necessary. In this case, the best is probably the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918.

A result of the Paris Peace Conference, the kingdom was created and ruled by then Prince-Regent Alexander, son of the former king of Serbia, Petar. The kingdom consisted of Serbia, Montenegro, the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A host of factors complicated the state’s attempt to politically integrate the government, which will be a common goal of the ruling regimes throughout the state’s history, to include: a diversity of languages, nationalities and varying religions as well as differing histories of the regions and an uneven distribution of economic development between the provinces.[8]

The kingdom was plagued by political crisis after political crisis, but the state managed to pass a Constitution in 1921, which established a unitary monarchy that became very Serbocentric. Croatian resistance experienced political oppression, which climaxed with a member of the governing majority shooting five members of the Croatian Peasant Party including the leader Stjepan Radic, two dieing on the floor and Radic four months later. As a result, the Croatian opposition completely withdrew from parliament and King Alexander on January 6th, 1929, prorogued the Constitution and dismissed the Parliament, establishing what became known as the 6th of January dictatorship. The name of the state also changed at this time to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Macedonian revolutionaries, in collaboration with the Croatian Ustashe, assassinated King Alexander, a Serbian hero, on October 9th, 1934. He was replaced by a regency council of three which was headed by Prince Pavle. This sets the stage for a series of events that will have an enormous impact on the Yugoslavian conflict of the 90s.

World War II and Nazi Germany…
During the Second World War, several events occurred that reverberates today. Germany invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, divided the country and established a puppet Croat regime, the Ustasha, in the newly created Independent State of Croatia. Two primary opposition groups formed; the Cetniks, who were mostly Serbian royalists supporting the exiled monarchy, and the Partisans, who were a communist group and opposed both the Ustasha and the Cetniks.

The Partisans, under the leadership of Josip Tito, were very effective in conducting a guerilla campaign against the Nazi’s, who gave the Ustasha a free hand in suppressing the insurgency. This resulted in a massive loss of civilian life. 10% of the Yugoslavian population or 1.7 million people, primarily the Serbs of Bosnia and Croatia who had been the major supporters to the rebel forces.

The Partisans were the de facto rulers of liberated Yugoslavian territory and following the expulsion of Axis forces from Serbia in 1944 and the rest of Yugoslavia in 1945, they established the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and Tito, now a national hero, was named the prime minister. In 1963, Yugoslavia was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Tito became the President for Life, which ended on May 4, 1980.
Creating Problems vs. Supporting Them…[9]

In an effort to create unity and overcome the obvious differences of the Yugoslavian population, Tito pushed Yugoslavia towards a Yugoslavian identity and tried to suppress the various ethnic, provincial identities. He was only partially successful in this as he was able to minimize conflicts between the various groups, however, he was not able to supplant the different identities with the state identity.

This is the crux, and the genesis, of Yugoslavia’s conflict- identity. Several factors perpetuated the crisis, all of which revolved around the notion of identity. For one, the identities of the parties involved were persistent. They are possible because of, “socialization with the group and from suffering from discrimination and exclusion by other ethnic groups.”[10] The primacy of an identity is also a contributing factor. The significance of the various identities of the participating groups was a central element of the conflict. Because of the significance of these identities, no one group was willing to compromise on their identity. Because there was no willingness to nurture a collective identity, there was no hope of constructive collaboration or successful settlement.

Two other important elements of identity must also be examined. One is nationalism, which asserts that, “nations or groups of people who share a common history and destiny have the right to have a territory or state of their own.”[11] This becomes especially powerful when the nationalist movement is ethnocentric. The other element is notion of victimhood. This stems from the notion that a certain group, both real and imagined, has been the repeated victim of oppression or domination. It fosters distrust of other non-group members and can generate pre-emptive actions, which then perpetuate the conflict.

So how do these different factors affect the conflict in the Balkans, in particular the former Republic of Yugoslavia? The internal factors of leadership and experience go a long way. The experiences of the Croats, who have been discriminated and oppressed by the Serbs, fostered a victim relationship in their collective identity. However, the Croats treatment of the Serbs during World War II cemented a feeling of victimhood with the Serbian populations and painted them as violent oppressors.

Leadership factors have also impacted the conflict. Consider the message of tolerance espoused by Cardinal Strossmayer that called on the Catholic Croats to have tolerance for the Serbs and the Eastern Orthodoxy. Compare that with the nationalist zeal of Arch Cardinal Stepinac, who supported the growth of the Ustasha, who hated communism and who supported collaboration with the Nazi’s for nationalist reasons.

This spilled over into the relationship the groups had with one another. A history of violence and oppression exists, toughening the resolve the groups and raising the bar for the level of force needed to break that resolve. How the varying ethnic communities characterize one another also impacts their ability to reach peace. Dehumanizing other ethnic groups removes barriers that might normally exist for committing violence on human beings, but if the groups are considered less than human then the same restraints no longer exist.

Finally, the social context for the groups and their thought process impacts the situation. Therefore the parameters and paradigms established by intellectual elements, like religion, go a long ways in the justification of group actions. Religion is especially important in this, as it allows for the indoctrination of a core premise, which is reinforced by regular contemporary updates conveniently translated into current events. Couple this with a self-determinist attitude within a group, and the identity factors become amplified.

Conclusions…
Tito managed to suppress the various ethnic groups enough to prevent these conflicts of identity, and because of this strength, there did not appear any real hope of attaining the goals of self-determination. But at his death, the door of nationalism flew open, and the seeds planted long ago began to sow in the various ethnic communities.

So what is the genesis of the conflict in the Balkans? Ethnicity and nationalism. These groups have fostered, nurtured and strengthened their identities. History in the region only goes to support the different premises they hold. The Croats feels they’ve been oppressed throughout time by the Serbs, the Serbs feel that the crimes committed at Jasenovac by the Croats have never been properly atoned. The Serbs feel that the Bosnian conversion to Islam during Ottoman rule was a sell out, and implied a lack of unity and strength, and so on and so forth. The point is that these groups have not let anything go, so when they examine one another, they dredge up their accounts of history and apply it to the present- whether it is applicable or not.

The conflict in the Balkans has revolved around identity and the nationalist goals these identities maintain, therefore ethnicity is a driver in this conflict. Religion allows a venue for mobilizing and justifying the nationalist identity. It also provides an avenue for expanding the identity of the support base without changing the parameters of the ethnic groups and is therefore an enabler to the conflict. The Balkans conflict is an ethnic conflict.

[1] Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, New York 1982, Pg. 454.
[2] Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, New York 1982, Pg. 1114.
[3] Liotta, P.H., Anna Simons. “Thicker than Water? Kin, Religion, and Conflict in the Balkans”. Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly. Winter 1998. 27 Oct 2005. < http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98winter/liotta.htm >.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Thiesse, Anne-Marie. “Inventing National Identity”. Le Monde Diplomatique. June 1999. 25 Oct 2005.< http://mondediplo.com/1999/06/05thiesse >.
[6] Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, New York 1982, Pg. 886.
[7] Ibid, Pg. 1282.
[8] Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Wikipedia. 27 Oct 2005. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_yugoslavia >.
[9] The bulk of this section is based on the writings of Louis Kriesberg and his piece on Identity Issues. I consider this article a great example of how identity affects conflict.
[10] Kriesberg, Louis. Identity Issues. July 2003. 27 Oct 2005.< http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/identity_issues.jsp >.
[11] Ibid.